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A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE GROWTH THEORIES OF 
ALVIN H. HANSEN AND WILLIAM J. FELLNER
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Historical Perspective 
The concept of stagnation Is not new to the science^ 
of economics. There have been times In history when economics 
was referred to aa the "dismal science." The reasons for 
such dismalness lie In the long history of economic privation 
or, more recently. In long-run predictions concerning secular 
economic stagnation. The general area of study of the present 
work Is the problem of secular stagnation. This chapter deals 
with the problem from the general, historical perspective, and 
emphasizes the fact that the problem Is not a new one In
^The use of the term "science of economics" may raise 
some skeptics to doubt. I use the term In the broad sense 
to Include any field that uses the empirical method of 
assumptions, hypotheses, theory and the testing of predictions 
as to actual fact. The fact that It might seem that the 
empirical method Is not .used by economists Is not because It _ 
Is not used but, rather, because the field Is more complex 
and, thus, the results less certain. Also, some economists 
seem to adopt doctrinal fanaticism and, thus, fight hard the 
accumulation of empirical evidence against them.
2 *
economic thought. After this general introduction, the •
»
Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis will he dealt with in some
detail. Next, the growth thesis of William Pellner will be
studied. Lastly, the thesis will deal with the process of
technology and technological innovation and the possible
institutional hindrances that may develop in an advanced
industrial economy to block the introduction of technology.
The purposes of the thesis is to show that the development of
these institutional blocs to the adoption of technology may
contribute to secular stagnation.
A glance at economic history shows the prevalence of
some concern over stagnation. Prom the time of the prophets
of the Old Testament to the more recent economics of John
Maynard Keynes,^^^e fear of stagnation can be seen either on
or below the surface of doctrine. The ancients had a doctrine
based on complacency concerning the socio-economic order.
The Medieval Church had its own theory, while the theories of
Adam Smith and Thomas Maithus also stress the dismal aspects
of economic existence. The concern is still with us. In
modern times, William Pellner, for example, argues that
Keynesian economic thinking can be divided into three separate
2
parts: stagnation, cyclical and fundamental. Alvin Hansen
has further developed the stagnation aspects of the economics 
of Lord Keynes and, thus, adds to the dismality. Some
^William Pellner, "What is Surviving?" American 
Economic Review, Vol. 47 (May, 1957), p. 67.
jleading economists still fear the eventuality of stagnation 
in the capitalist system and there is.no dearth of literature 
written on the subject.^ The present chapter will deal 
briefly with the concept of stagnation from an historical 
perspective.
The azicient prophets of the Old Testament often 
preached about the need for honesty in business dealings and 
the immorality of usury. Fundamental to their sermonizing was 
the need for charity and the rewards that a merciful God would 
give to the charitable person. Such an emphasis upon fair 
dealings in business and charity towards the lower/and working 
classes probably was correlated with the degree of the poverty 
and maltreatment present during that time. There was, thus, 
a feeling of complacency for the conditions of the vast numbers 
of the populace. This is an understandable doctrine for 
ancient times because the prophets, were primarily ecclesiastical 
and believed that the obedience to God's commands and the 
leading of the "good life" were more important than economic 
growth and welfare. Also, it is conceivable that the prophets 
saw very little hope for economic betterment due to the 
dearth of resources and the immobility inherent in the socio­
economic order. Thus, continued poverty seemed inevitable,
^The term "stagnation" will be used throughout this 
work. At times, for variety, the terms "secular stagnation" 
or "economic maturity" or the term "mature economy" may be used. 
Economists that fall into the general stagnation school are, 
in one way or another, Alvin Hansen, Benjamin Higgins, Paul 
Sweezy, John Kenneth Galbraith and Paul Sarauelson.
4and perhaps, part of the design of providence.
The next major group of economic doctrines can be 
attributed to the Medieval Period of Roman Catholic dominance 
over European economic and social affairs.^ Like the ancients, 
the Medieval Churchmen of Europe believed in the importance 
of the "good life." It was unimportant to them that man was 
suffering economic hardship in this world. The task of the 
Church was to prepare man for the eternal life after the soul 
left the prison of the temporary body. Thus, obedience to . - 
God's commands was much more important than economic progress. 
Charity and complacency were also stressed. The age old 
concepts of usury, fair wages, charity and complacency were 
still in vogue and much discussed. Certainly man— in this 
world at least— faced a long and probably constant annoyance 
with the economic hardships of that day.^
In the transition from the Medieval period into the 
industrial period, the concept of the maintenance of socio­
economic status quo and the religious emphasis upon the after­
life were stressed less while economic development was more 
emphasized. Moreover, constant, current stagnation was
^John Fred Bell, History of Economic Thought (New York; 
Ronald Press, 1953) and Eric Roll, History of Economic Thought 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957) may be
referred to by the reader for a more complete analysis of this 
period.
^Again the works of John Fred Bell and Eric Roll may 
be referred to for a more complete, but general summary of 
this period.
5minimized and was replaced by anticipated stagnation. The 
coming of the industrial revolution ended the stagnation of 
past generations. The same revolution, however, brought about 
the development of the theoretical concept of the law of 
diminishing returns. This is a concept leading to the 
possibility of stagnation, which can generally be defined as 
follows: At some level of economic development the various
factors which make for investment will tend to become less 
favorable in bringing forth an adequate amount of investment 
to maintain the attained level of income and employment. In 
this concept, profits will decrease to a point where the 
needed investment stimulus is no longer sufficient to 
éustain econbmic growth and progress. Such a concept prevails 
in various forms and in various complexities throughout the 
works of many economists from Adam Smith to Alvin Hansen.
In 1776, Adam Smith published his now famous treatise 
on economic affairs.^ There seems to be three rather gloomy 
interrelated concepts in the theories of Smith, David Ricardo 
and their followers. First of all, there was the concept of 
the conflict of interests between society and businessmen.
This manifested itself in the form of rent. Rent was 
deducted from the value of the output of labor and entrepreneurs 
under the assumption that only the labor of workers and of 
entrepreneurs created value. Ricardo later argued that as the
^See the references in footnote 4, above, -for more 
complete summaries.
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population increased, inferior land would be put into use for 
the production of food and a differential could be charged for 
the higher quality land due to its higher productivity. This 
differential would go, of course, to the landlord. As the 
price and population levels increased, rent would become 
greater and the entrepreneur and the laborer would have to 
fight it out to see which of them would pay the rent. This 
concept would result in either a lowering of wages (^ffective 
demand) if the wages were temporarily above the subsistence 
level, or lower profits (the return to investment).
Second, the classical framework was based on the 
subsistence-theory of wages. This meant that the laws of 
supply and demand would keep wages at a level at which the 
needed labor force would be able merely to maintain itself 
by the purchase of food, housing, clothing and the acquisition 
of the skills necessary for work. Any increase in the 
subsistence level of wages would come out of profits since 
profit was that amount left after the labor costs of 
production were paid in wages or kind to the working class. 
Thus, higher wages would decrease profits. Indeed, if market 
wages were to increase above the subsistence level of wages, 
they would soon fall again since the population and labor 
force would increase and drive the wages down. An increase 
in the labor force would result as the demand for labor 
increased in relation to the supply. Finally, an equilibrium 
level of the supply of labor and the demand for labor would
reduce wages to the subsistence level and maintain them at 
this level.
Third, classical economists conceived of the theory 
of diminishing returns. This doctrine Indicated that as more 
and more capital was put to work, there would be an historical 
tendency for profits to be driven down to the level of "normal 
returns."^ An historical tendency towards declining prices 
and profits would*not be helpful In maintaining economic 
growth and Investment. Thus, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and 
their followers were certainly not the most optimistic of 
economists.
Thomas Robert Maithus was the next great pessimist.
He saw the population of the world growing at a rate far In 
excess of the food supply. Thus, the end result would be 
eventual starvation for many unless something stopped the 
growth of population. War, pestilence, disease, and moral 
restraint were possibilities considered by Malthus. (One cannot 
blame him for not seeing the sociological significance of 
an urban environment, the surge In agricultural technology, 
or the use of contraceptive devices.) He was pessimistic 
about man's future. Indeed, economic "progress" Itself led 
to these Malthusian ends as higher wages and profits brought 
about an Increase In population. An Increase In population
^Normal returns are the minimum returns the 
entrepreneur must receive on his labor and other owned 
resources to keep them In their present uses. In the stationary 
state only "normal" returns are received by all entrepreneurs.
8resulted in Increases in the demand for food. The supply of 
food was dominated by the rentier class whose monopoly over 
the land allowed them to increase the price of food and Dfj 
subsistence. This allowed the rentier class to reap from 
the wages and profits of others, decreasing the prosperity of 
the laborer and the entrepreneur.
Malthus, however, had more than a population theory.
He also believed in the concept of secular stagnation. Malthus
took a view that ran contrary to the views of the other
economists of his time and unlike Ricardo, did not see the
accumulation of savings and the maintenance of the profit level
as the modus vivendi of continued economic progress. In one
of his letters to Ricardo, Malthus maintains that:
I don't at all wish to deny that some persons or others 
are entitled to consume all that is produced; but the 
grand question is whether it is distributed in such a 
manner between the different parties concerned as to 
occasion the most effective demand for future produce: 
and I distinctly maintain that an attempt to accumulate 
very rapidly which necessarily implies a considerable 
diminution of unproductive consumption, by greatly 
impairing the usual motives to production must prematurely 
check the progress of wealth. . . . But if it be true that 
an attempt to accumulate very rapidly will occasion such 
a division of labor and profits as almost to destroy both 
the motive and the power of future accumulation and 
consequently the power of maintaining and employing an 
increasing population, must it not be acknowledged that 
such an attempt to accumulate, or that saving too much, 
may be really prejudicial to the country.°
In a later letter to Ricardo, Malthus further states that
Gjohn Maynard Keynes, Essays j.n Biography (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1933)  ^ P* 1^2.
But you yourself allow that a great temporary 
saving, commencing when profits were sufficient to 
encourage it, might occasion such a division of the produce 
as would leave no motive to a further increase of pro­
duction. And if a state of things in which for a time 
there is no motive to a further increase of production be 
not properly denominated a stagnation, I do not know what 
. can be so called; particularly as this stagnation must 
inevitably throw the rising generation out of employment."
Indeed, this is a departure from the classical
economists who feared that the impingement of rent and/or the
subsistence level of wages upon profits might bring about a
stationary economic state. Malthus, on the other hand, feared
that profits and savings might increase so as to limit the
necessary effective demand. Malthus hoped that
. . . there must be some intermediate point, though the 
resources of political economy may not be able to 
ascertain it, where, taking into consideration both the 
power to produce and the will to consume, the encourage­
ment to the increase of wealth is the greatest.10
Karl Marx was the next important economic figure. He 
used the very framework of classical capitalism to show how 
its inherent qualities would bring about its eventual demise. 
The presence of a maldistribution of income, subsistence 
wages, cyclical unemployment, and the reserve army of the 
unemployed were all inherent disturbances that he believed 
would destroy the system of capitalism and make possible the 
creation, of a new socio-economic order— communism.Certainly,
9lbid., p. 143. 
lOlbid., p. 147.
l^Throughout this thesis, whenever the terms "communism" 
and "socialism are used, they will not be used interchangeably. 
"Socialism" will refer to economics, with government ownership
10
this Is not the brightest picture for man unless one assumes, 
along with Marx, that the communist system is without flaws.
Say’s Law, however, explicitly denied any concept of 
stagnation by asserting that supply created its own demand.
Goods produced in one period were bought in that period since 
all income was either spent or saved. Savings and investment 
would be equal in a competitive market structure because as
savings accumulated in excess of Investment demand, the
/
interest rate would fail to bring forth an increase in 
investment. Thus, the economy would be characterized by full 
employment. One musir notice, however, the assumption of a 
competitive market structure, the ability of slight changes 
in the interest rate to affect the investment of capital, and 
the corollary from the above that all money received is spent 
through consumption or savings since the latter are automatically 
invested because of the flexibility and effectiveness of the 
interest rate. One might gather that if there were no return 
to capital, the interest rate would fall so low as to 
discourage savings which would increase consumption without 
employment. This concept tends to differ from that of Smith, 
Ricardo, Malthus and Marx, but later Say's Law itself was 
attacked by John Maynard Keynes who did much to cause a 
renaissance of the concept of secular stagnation.
and control of essential industries whereas "communism" will 
refer to a system where all of the factors of production and 
distribution are owned and controlled by the government..
11
Keynes did nothing to the basic theory that the level 
of Income was dependent upon the amount of Investment and 
consumption. Income In the Keynesian framework Is a result 
of the consumption of consumer and Investment goods which 
represents wages to workers and returns to entrepreneurs.
Net Investment would not be necessary In maintaining the 
present level of the economy (in the short run) If savings 
(on the part of consumers) did not take place. If savings do 
take place, they must be offset by Investment If the entrepreneurs 
are to get back'the funds necessary to cover their production ^
costs. The wearing out of capital goods (in the long run) j
Introduces the necessity for some entrepreneurial savings
* •
which must be offset by current Investment If the current 
Income level Is to be maint&1 nedu^ ^^ I^f there Is an equality of 
savings and Investment, the equlllbrî‘a^'*nS^ be below the 
full-employment level which necessitates an amount of 
Investment In excess of savings to bring the Income level up 
to a higher level. This might be difficult. Keynes doubted 
the ability of the economy to maintain Investment because of 
the fact that
. . . today and presumably for the future the schedule 
of the marginal efficiency of capital Is, for a variety 
of reasons, much lower than It was In the nineteenth
century.
12John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
19jb), p. ioti.
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Keynes did not, himself, develop an analysis of the
possibilities of secular stagnation, but rather made a few
rather explicit points (which will be discussed in Chapter II)
from which others developed a theory of stagnation or maturity.
Alvin Hansen is the chief proponent of the thesis of secular
stagnation. It can be said that Hansen reasons that there are
three main causes for the rapid economic growth of a country.
The causes are increasing population due to a high birth rate
or migration, an expanding frontier area opening new fields
of investment opportunity, enterprise and social expenditures,
and a rapidly progressing or exceedingly stimulating
IStechnological advance. The stagnationists point out that 
there has been (with the exception of recent years which may 
or may not be representative) a decline in the rate of increase 
in population. The declining rate of increase is due to 
several probable factors: An urban environment where children
are no longer economic assets; the breakdown of the woman's 
position in the home; the high and rising cost of bearing and 
raising children; and the desire for some peace, quiet, leisure 
and independence. The recent upsurge in population (which 
may or may not be permanent) may well be due to international 
tension and the social boredom associated with a television 
orientated culture. Psuedo-sexual education might also be 
one of the causes, as also might the increase in the average
^%enjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York:
W. W. Norton-and Company, 1959)j pp. 183, 188.
13
per capita income level.
If there is an historical tendency towards a relative 
decreasing population growth, there could also be a decrease 
in the stimulus for investment. The stimulus would not be 
present because population would not be increasing at a rapid 
enough rate to provide an adequate market to cover the initial 
cost of investment within a reasonable period of time. Thus, 
the marginal efficiency of capital would fall.
The absence of a frontier into which the economy might 
advance is also important. This greatly decreases the marginal 
efficiency of capital due to the fact that there is no virgin 
land to conquer economically. Foreign investment has often 
been argued as a source of this "frontier stimulus," but it 
seems that even without international restrictions on the 
free flow of capital and goods the foreign investment 
opportunities in the so-called underdeveloped countries is 
limited. -Thus, foreign investment might merely be a time- 
saving, stop-gap measure to delay, but not to prevent, stagnation.
The third source of investment stimulus is technological 
advance and innovation. The stagnationists fear that as the 
economy becomes more complex, a particular industry will 
fail to provide sufficiently adequate investment stimulus.
They see no more great innovations such as railroads, canals, 
or automobiles. The only important innovations available are 
labor-saving, and these do not stimulate economic growth much.
l^ibid., p. 172f.
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This point will be covered more fully in the following 
chapter and in the chapter dealing with Pellner's growth 
thesis. Also, the size and increasing institutional hindrances 
to investment and stimulation are factors that worry 
s tagnationists.
In the course of the dissertation thus far a great deal 
has been mentioned about the stagnationists. The reason for 
this has been to acquaint the reader in a general way with the 
prominence of stagnation-type thinking in the history of 
economic thought. None of the views of any of the contributors 
has been fully presented. Moreover, no mention has been made 
of the critics of the stagnationists. Many economists, as a 
matter of fact, stand opposed to the stagnation school. Such 
prominent names as David McCord Wright, George Terborgh, Frank 
Knight, Henry Simons and W. J. Pellner stand out as anti­
stagnationists. These men attack the stagnationists on the 
basis of historical tendencies in technology and growth and 
the fact that they believe generally that a decreasing 
population growth rate would decrease relative savings. A 
later chapter will deal with some of the more prominent 
critics of stagnation.
Current Perspective 
The general concept of stagnation depends upon the 
diminishing returns to capital. The diminishing returns to 
capital might take place when either or both the capital
15
accumulation rate is excessive in relation to the growth of 
the labor force or when the rate of technological advance 
begins to slow down. In the case of an increase of capital 
in relation to labor, not enough labor is available for capital 
and, thus, savings cannot be offset by new investment without 
the possibility of increasing wages to a point where they _ 
impinge upon profits. The concept of the growth of capital 
and capital input in relation to the growth of labor and labor 
input makes capital a variable and labor a constant which 
introduces the law of diminishing returns— specifically, the 
diminishing returns to capital. What is needed, therefore, 
are labor-saving innovations.
The growth rate of capital and labor in relation to 
one another is important. The relative growth rate between 
capital and labor answers both the questions of what must be 
done to maintain economic growth and what is happening to 
the relative shares going to the various factors of production. 
John Kendrick, in his study of productivity trends, finds 
that there has been a faster rate of growth of capital in 
relation to-labor.^ Output per unit of capital has also 
increased, which points out the capital-labor savings aspects 
of previous innovations.^^ William Pellner states that the 
labor force has increased only half as fast as the stock of
15john W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends; Capital and 
Labor (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
I95G), Occasional Paper 53, p. 10.
l i^bid.
l6
17capital. This implies, therefore, that there may be a
problem of diminishing .returns to capital. If there has not
been a decrease in the relative share going to capital, there
must have been a dominance of labor-saving innovations.
Since the relative share going to capital has not decreased
T 8
to any significant degree," the innovations must have been 
labor-saving in character so as not to increase the relative 
share going to labor in relation to that going to capital.
The question remains whether innovations of a labor-saving 
character, which have, at the same time, a sufficiently 
stimulating effect upon the economy, can continue to take 
place,
William Fellner believes that such a growth process
can take p&^e. H -^-ba:ses this conclusion partly on the fact
that things have always worked out in the past.^^ However,
Fellner assumes sufficient mobility of resources and a monetary
20policy compatible to price stability, and further implies 
a concept of competition which appears to be of the order of
^^William Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic 
Activity (New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 243.
B. Kravis, "Relative Income Shares in Fact and 
Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 49 (December, 1959), 
p. 917.
^^Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 389.
20lbid., pp. 227, 231.
17
"workable competition"^^ so that price differentials between 
industries may develop in order that resource shifts may take 
place. Thus, because of Fellner's assumptions concerning the 
historical trend of innovations in relation to the needs of 
the time, mobility, the price level and monetary policy, he 
can be confident of a continued growth of the economy.
Alvin Hansen, on the other hand, is not as confident.
His concept of a diminishing rate of population increase, the 
absence of the frontier, the growing importance of depreciation 
reserves and the decline in the rate of technological advance
pp
makes him pessimistic. After all, in the face of a 
declining growth of new markets, the absence of investment 
outlets in the form of a frontier, and the growing importance 
of depreciation reserves for investment, where is the investment 
need going to come from so as to form an investment outlet 
for the savings of individuals? Also, if one drops Pellner's 
implication concerning competition and adopts a concept of 
administered pricing, where does the price flexibility for 
mobility and for the profitable innovation of technology come 
from? Hansen forces us to ponder these factors and leaves us
^^The concept of "workable competition" implies that 
even though there may not be price competition within an 
industry, there may be price competition between industries 
producing substitute goods. The effectiveness of such 
competition, however, depends upon the degree of substitutability 
and also assumes that there will not develop formal or informal 
price agreements or an extension of the concept of the 
"kinky-demand" curve to an inter-industry basis.
22niggins, op. cit., p. I76.
18
much less optimistic concerning the future.
Relevant to any brief Introduction to the respective 
beliefs of Hansen and Pellner are the statistical data 
available. These data partly answer the question as to what 
Is happening. John W. Kendrick finds that the output per 
weighted man-hour has Increased since I889 whereas the output 
per weighted unit of tangible capital has expressed a more 
fluctuating Increase except for the period from approxlmate^Iy 
1945 to present where the general tendency can be seen to be 
slightly downward.^3 Overall, however, there has been a 
general upward tendency of the output-capital ratio which 
Indicates a substitution of capital for labor. Kendrick's 
data show, however, a recent downward tendency which may be
OK
a sign of danger. Such a sign of possible danger may 
also be Indicated by the slight Increase In the relative
26share going to labor as found by Irving B. Kravis. Indeed, 
Solomon Fabricant finds that the output unit per unit of 
capital fell substantially from 19^5 to 1949 and had
^^John W. Kendrick, "Productivity, Costs and Prices: 
Concepts and Measures," Wages, Prices, Profits and Productivity 
(New York: American Assembly, June, 1959)» p.
Z^ibid.
25ibid., p. 24.
26Kravis, op. cit., p. 917.
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fluctuated violently in the years since 1949 to 1959.^^
Moses Abramovitz finds that the combined index of 
resources per capita and of capital per head has declined 
since 1900, but that the productivity of capital has risen
28since World War I. Thus, he reaches no conclusion.
Kendrick finds that there has been an increase in capital 
input in relation to labor input so that labor-saving has not
po
been significant. ^ Furthermore, the growth of capital has 
only slightly exceeded the growth of o u t p u t . A s  has been 
previously stated, however, Kendrick found in another 
(and later work) that there has been a recent slight decline 
in the output -of capital which seems to correlate with the 
finding of Kravis concerning trends in the relative shares. 
Thus, one might tend to conclude that the danger of diminishing 
returns to capital may be setting in. This, however, involves 
a generalization about the future growth of technology.
If, for instance, the institutional structure of the market 
were to bloc the introduction of technology in the future, 
the appropriate offset to the diminishing returns to capital
^"^Solomon Fabricant, Basic Facts on Productivity 
Change (New York: National Bureau of Research, Inc., 1959),
Occasional Paper 63, p. 39.
^®Moses Abramovitz, Resource and Output Trends in the 
United States Since I870 (New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc., 1956), p. I8.
^^Kendrick, Productivity Trends: Capital and Labor,
p. 10.
30ibid., p. 11.
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would no longer be present. After dealing with the growth 
theories of Hansen and Pellner, this thesis will analyze the 
possible deterrent effects the market structure and large- 
scale industry may have upon the innovation of technology.
The purpose of this thesis will be to show that there may be 
deterrent tendencies within an advanced industrial economy 
to bloc the introduction of technology. Such blocs to 
innovations would have a detrimental effect upon the 
introduction of offsets to diminishing returns of capital, and 
thus, would have grave implications upon continued economic 
growth. Such implications may imply chronic unemployment in 
the future especially in the face of an increase in the labor 
force. Thus, stagnation may be the reality of the future.
CHAPTER II
THE KEYNES-HANSEN STAGNATION THESIS
Keynes' Contribution to the Thesis 
An analysis of-the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis 
must begin with a discussion of some of the basic Keynesian 
contributions to the development of the thesis. Actually, 
Keynes did not deal with the stagnation thesis at any great .  ^
length. He did, however. Indicate In his The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money several paths that might 
lead to stagnation. At the time of publication of The General 
Theory, the depression of the nineteen-thirties was stimulating 
much criticism of the capitalistic economic system. Keynes 
saw the economic system of his choosing being endangered and 
attempted to provide an analysis of the causes of the 
problems. Also, he Implicitly provided an analysis of the 
possible means of alleviating the problems without a basic 
change In the economic system.^'
Fundamental to any study of the Keynesian stagnation
^Lord Keynes, In the last chapter of The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt.
Brace and Company, 1^36; discusses the social philosophy of 
the General Theory more fully.
21 .
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thesis are the concepts of the Interest rate, the marginal 
and average propensities to save and to consume, and the 
marginal efficiency of capital. It is necessary to discuss 
the propensity to save before the role of investment is 
considered. Keynes believed that out of any level of income 
above the culturally-determined subsistence level there 
would be a tendency on the part of the society to save. The 
proportion out of current income that is saved is measured by 
the average propensity to save or, alternately, the average 
propensity to consume. If, for example, the average 
propensity to save is one-third, the average propensity to 
consume is two-thirds. (The sum of society's savings and 
consumption is the sum total of society's current income.)
As both the aggregate and per capita income levels increase 
(which signifies an increase in national income in excess 
of population growth), the individual and the society spends 
absolutely more but also saves absolutely more due to a 
relative satisfaction of consumer needs. Thus, there is a 
widening gap between the level of income of the economy and 
amount consumed out of that income in absolute and relative 
terms.
For sake of illustration, the economy Bright be likened 
to a circular flow system filled with water. In order for a 
circular flow system to remain full of water, any leakages in 
the system (savings) must be replenished by new liquids 
(investments) or else the supply of water in the flow system
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will run out. In a djrnamlc economy, the investment of one 
time period would, in fact, generate a higher income level 
and necessitate a greater amount of investment in the next 
time period. For the time being, however, the water tank and 
flow system analogy is sufficient. What is said of the 
water tank can also be applied to the economy. The income- 
generating sectors of the economy will not continue to 
produce at any given level if that income which they produce 
is not returned to them in the way of sales from consumption 
or in the form of investment funds either directly or indirectly 
through newly established or enlarged firms.
Keynes believed that in the short run the marginal
propensity to consume remained relatively constant and
that the average propensity to consume was culturally determined,
given the level of income. Since there are cycles in our
economic system, Keynes, as had others before him, concluded
that investment, the other component of income, is the
fluctuating, independent variable. Keynes also believed that:
Thus our four conditions together are adequate to explain 
the outstanding features of our actual experience;—  
namely, that we oscillate, avoiding the gravest extremes 
of fluctuation in employment and prices in both directions, 
round an intermediate position appreciably below full 
employment. . . .
Consumption, however, it should be pointed out, is not
necessarily constant over time, but rather is a function of
income change. The change in income, on the other hand, is
determined by changes in the amount of investment. If
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consumption is a function of income and if changes in income 
are dependent upon changes in investment, the economy— since 
investment is the independent, fluctuating variable— is 
subject to cyclical movements which are set in motion by 
changes in the rate of investment. These cyclical disturbances 
are caused by drops in the marginal efficiency of capital 
relative to the rate of interest. The relative drop in the 
marginal efficiency of capital may be due to an increase in 
the cost of capital goods or some decrease in the rate of 
expectations regarding future profits due perhaps to mere 
psychological reactions. The relative increase in the interest 
rate could be caused by a decrease in the stock of money.
Also, it could be increased because of psychological reactions 
to various economic signs bringing about a hoarding of funds 
for later speculation. A secular or long-run disturbance, 
on the other hand, might be caused by diminishing returns 
to capital, a relative dearth in technological change or, in 
general, a decline in long-run profit expectations. Since 
investment is the variable endangering the present income 
level and causing upward and downward fluctuations, the 
determinants of investment must be studied. These determinants 
were summarized by Keynes under the heading of the inducement 
to investment.
The inducement to invest is determined by two factors. 
The first of these is the rate of long-run anticipations 
concerning the rate of interest; the second is the marginal
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efficiency of Investment. The Interest rate is, in the 
Keynesian framework, determined by the quantity of money in 
circulation and the desire of the community to hold idle 
cash balances— its liquidity preference. The marginal 
efficiency of capital is determined by replacement costs and 
profit expectations. This implies that if the replacement . 
cost is too great, or the interest rate is too high in relation 
to profit expectations, the marginal efficiency of capital 
will be low or zero. If the marginal efficiency of capital 
is low or zero, there will be little or no investment taking 
place. If there is no investment taking place, the level of 
income must fall because income is the sum total of both 
investment and consumption. & Thus, at various times, the 
inducement to invest is lower than at other times because of 
the level of the interest rate relative to the marginal 
efficiency of capital.
It is necessary to lower the rate of interest relative 
to the marginal efficiency of capital in order to raise 
income to a full employment level. At full employment, the 
marginal efficiency of capital and the interest rate should 
be equated so as not to push the economy into inflation. The 
marginal efficiency of capital is roughly the return that 
the entrepreneur expects to receive on his investment. The 
interest rate is the cost which he expects to pay for the 
funds he uses in order to carry out his investment plans. 
Assuming a perfectly elastic supply curve of funds for
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Investment, Keynes argued that a low interest rate In 
relation to the marginal efficiency of capital is, therefore, 
advantageous to the economy as a whole in order to stimulate 
investment. A low interest rate would mean that it would 
cost less for the entrepreneur to borrow money to carry forth 
his investment plans. In his General Theory, Keynes points 
to the need for a low interest rate by categorically stating 
that:
. . . it is to our best advantage to reduce the rate of 
interest to that point relative to the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full 
employment.3
A low interest rate would involve a monetary policy
designed to keep the money market from becoming "tight" if
there is a tendency towards less than full employment. Keynes,
however, did not believe that low interest rates are the
sole answer to the problem.
For ray own part I am now somewhat skeptical of the 
success of a merely monetary policy directed towards 
influencing.the rate of interest. I expect to see the 
State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal 
efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the 
basis of the general social advantage, taking an ever 
greater responsibility for directly organizing investment; 
since it seems likely that the fluctuations In the market 
estimation of the marginal efficiency of different types 
of capital, calculated on the principles I have described
2
Ibid., p. 111. Alvin Hansen, A Guide to Keynes 
(New Yorkl McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., p. 81 .
3john Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1 9 3 6 ) , p . 575.
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above, will be too great to be offset by any practicable 
change In the rate of Interest.^
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that
Keynes did not believe that the interest raté was the automatic
equilibrator that the classical economists believed it to
be. Indeed it is evident that he did not believe the
interest rate ever to have been effective in bringing about
full employment.
Except for during the war [World War I], I doubt if we 
have any recent experience of a boom so strong that it 
led to full employment.5
And Keynes was by no means optimistic about the future; 
in his analysis of the marginal efficiency of capital, he 
states that:
It is impossible to study the notions to which the 
mercantilists were led by their actual experiences, without 
perceiving that there has been a chronic tendency through­
out human history for the propensity to save to be stronger 
than the inducement to invest. The weakness of the 
inducement to invest has been at all times the key to the 
problem. Today the explanation of the weakness of this 
inducement may chiefly lie in the- extent of existing 
accumulations; whereas, formerly, risks and hazards of all 
kinds may have played a larger part. But the result is 
the same. The desire of the individual to augment his 
personal wealth by abstaining from consumption has usually 
been stronger than the inducement of the entrepreneur 
to augment the national wealth by employing labour on the 
construction of durable assets.°
Keynes, in short, believed that investment was
^Ibid., p. 164.
5ibid., p. 332.
Gibid., pp. 347-348. ■ .
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determined by the relationship of the interest rate to the
marginal efficiency of capital. The interest rate, however,
might not be really too instrumental because of the
possibility that it might not fall far enough below the trend
line of the marginal efficiency of capital to bring forth
adequate investment returns. The inducement to invest,
therefore, may be considered to be the real "sour apple" in
the institutional framework. As more and more capital is used,
the rate of return in any industry or in the economy as a
whole falls unless, of course, technology offsets diminishing
returns to capital. As the income level increases, the
savings of the society will increase relative to the increase
in the size of incomes. This means that less goods are being
sold relative to the income" level and income generating
capacity of the economy. Therefore, the marginal efficiency
of capital is low. Thus, discussion again leads to the
Keynesian conclusion that:
Today and presumably for the future the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital is, for a variety of 
reasons, much lower than it was in the nineteenth 
century.I
Thus, the General Theory, concludes that the marginal
efficiency of capital and the inducement to invest must be
high in relation to the cost of investing if there is to be 
continuing full employment. In an economy, however, where
it may not be possible to lower the rate of interest to a
^Keynes, The General Theory, p. 308.
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point low enough to provide for a sufficient profit, the 
main emphasis must fall not on the interest rate, but, rather, 
on the factors that determine the marginal efficiency of 
capital and the inducement to invest. In other words, what 
are the essential ingredients that are necessary for an 
expanding economy? What must be present in the economy to 
increase the marginal efficiency of capital relative to the 
interest rate (besides lowering the interest rate beyond a 
practical degree or point) in order that investment might be 
forthcoming? John Maynard Keynes did not deal with these 
problems specifically. He did, however, indicate what he 
believed to be the general trend in the rate of social 
investment.
The State will have to exercise a guiding influence on 
the propensity to consume partly through its scheme of 
taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest, and 
partly perhaps in other ways. Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the 
rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine 
an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, 
that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment 
will prove the only means of securing an approximation of 
full employment; though this need not exclude all manner 
of compromises and of devices by which public authority 
will co-operate with private initiative.8
Hansen's Version of the Thesis 
Alvin Hansen is perhaps the most famous of the American 
disciples of Lord Keynes. Traditionally Hansen's name is 
linked to Keynes in terms of the modern Stagnation School of
8lbid., p: 378.
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economics. Hansen, however, has been more Important In the 
development of* the Stagnation Thesis than Lord Keynes. The 
latter merely placed the general conceptual analysis before 
Hansen who, in turn, developed the Stagnation Thesis within 
the Keynesian framework. John Maynard Keynes, it should be 
pointed out, never refuted the Hansen additions to this theory, 
even though he was alive for several years after the popular 
acceptance of the so-called Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis.
In his version of the Stagnation Thesis, Hansen deals with 
the questions concerning the essential ingredients of an 
expanding economy. He further evaluates what must be present 
in the economy if the marginal efficiency of capital is to 
rise relative to the interest rate and, thus increase the 
inducement to invest.
The Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis states that 
under conditions of laissez-faire, capitalism would be
Q
subject to increasing unemployment. Hansen based this theory 
on the secular decline of the factors of dynamic growth and 
applies this theory to the United States. The growth of 
output will rise and will continue to rise only if there is 
an increase in the size of the labor force, the known resource 
base, the stock of capital and the level of technology.^® As
^Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York:
W. W. Norton Company, 1959)j p. lb$.
IQjbid., p. 170.
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for the American economy, Hansen states that there had been
a decline in the rate of growth of the population, the
disappearance of the frontier and a slowing down of the rate
of resource discovery and the rate of technological
development.^^ Thus, private investment falls because of
the decline in the net effects on autonomous investment of
1 Ppopulation and resource growth and technology. Because of 
the absence of frontiers, the decline in the rate of growth 
of population, and the decline in the growth of the level of 
technology the economy would fall into stagnation. This 
might be further aggravated by the dominance of capital saving 
innovations, the lack of great new industries, a rising 
propensity to save and the loss of the "frontier spirit. 
Hansen, because of the decline of the factors of dynamic 
growth and the emergence of other aggravating factors, felt 
that there is little to look forward to as far as laissez- 
faire capitalism is concerned.
Hansen is dealing primarily with the secular trend of 
employment and output. His analysis has some relationship 
to short-run business cycle theory, but the present work will 
deal only with the secular trend towards stagnation. Hansen 
postulates that the economy will tend to stagnate because 
of the insufficiency of investment outlets and the changing 
institutional market structure. He fears that there will be
lllbid., p. 170.
12lbid.
13ibid., p. ITlff.
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a divergence between the full-employment level of income and
1 itthe actual level of Income. Also, for analytical purposes,
Hansen holds fiscal policy constant so that he might analyze
the private sector, which traditionally has been the most
important in free enterprise, capitalistic-economies.
There seems to be little agreement on the essential
ingredients of Hansen's Stagnation Thesis. For example, in
his critique of the Thesis, Benj'>.min Higgins argues that
Hansen believed that there are four aggravating factors that
16contribute to stagnation. These consist of the rising 
dominance of capital-saving innovations, the diminishing 
importance of "great new industries" to stimulate economic 
progress, the loss of the frontier spirit resulting in a 
lessening of the spirit of adventure and enterprise, and the 
possibility of a rising propensity to save. Higgins also
% 1 O
deals with Hansen's views concdbning the growth of population.
John Fred Bell, on the other hand, maintains that the 
essentials of the Stagnation or mature economy thesis are:
^^Higgins, Economic Development, p. 169.
15%bid., p. 170. Hansen, however, realizes the 
Importance of fiscal and monetary policy and recommends strongly 
.heir use. Benjamin Higgins briefly considers the policy 
implications on pages I67-I71 of Economic Development.
_  . l^Ibid., p. 171ff.
ITlbid.
l^ibid., p. 184.
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A decline in the population growth; the disappearance of
frontiers; the non-existence of new industries of a greatly
stimulating nature; and the increasing proportion of reserves
for depreciation.These sure narrower than the factors-
considered by Higgins. Bell, for example, uses the words
"disappearance of frontierswhereas Higgins uses the words
21"frontier spirit." Also, Bell refers to "increasing
22importance of depreciation reserves" whereas Higgins refers 
to the "institutionalization of savings."^3 The 
"institutionalization of savings" might be said to involve 
both depreciation allowances and retained earnings for 
internal financing resulting in what might be an increase in 
the propensity to save. Thus, Higgins has"Enlarged the 
concepts and has not restricted the thesis to the narrow
paconfines suggested by Bell. The scope of the Thesis,
^^John Fred Bell, A History of Economic Thought 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953)  ^ p. 6ll7
20lbid.
^^Higgins, Economic Development, p. I73.
^%ell, op. cit., p. 611.
^^Higgins, Economic Development, p. 174.
2^%t should be pointed out, however, that both Hansen 
and Keynes seem to have a broader view of the factors leading 
to stagnation and an increase in savings. Alvin Hansen in 
his A Guide to Keynes gives a summary of what Keynes believed 
to be the motivations for the current level of savings and 
any increase in the level of savings on pages 70-72. Keynes, 
himself, deals with these factors (which he divides into 
subjective factors and objective factors) primarily in 
Chapters Eight and Nine of his The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money.
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howeverj cain be broadened even further by adding the concepts 
of an oligopolistic market structure and the possibility 
that innovations may be also too labor-saving resulting in 
unemployment as well as too capital-saving. Labor-saving and 
capital-saving qualities of investment relate closely to the 
problems presented by anti-stagnationist growth theorists, 
such as William Fellner, whose theory is discussed and 
evaluated later. Moreover, the trend in wages and prices as 
a possible stimulant or hindrance to continued economic growth 
along the full-employment line may be considered.
Alvin Hansen, himself, sums up his own Thesis by 
stating t^at, in the past at least, economic progress has 
depended upon four things. Briefly, these are inventions, 
the discovery of new territory and/or resources and their 
development, and the growth of population. In a period of 
time when these influences remain strong there will be little 
deviation from the trend line; but in a time when these are 
not operative the emphasis of economic theory will have to 
shift from a study of business cycles to a study of the 
maintenance of continuing full-employment or, perhaps, the 
possibility of a chronic tendency towards a state of less than
^^Alvin Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles 
(New York: W. W. Norton Company, 193üJ, p. 2b9. It should
be noted that Hansen's list bears great similarity to the 
list of innovations—set forth by Joseph Schumpeter in his 
Business Cycles, Vol. I on p. 84. Actually, the term 
"invention as used by Hansen seems to blend itself rather 
nicely into a semblance of the term "innovation" as used by 
Schumpeter.
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full-employment.^^ Hansen argues that, historically, as 
these influences became weak there was a tendency for 
recoveries to become weak. And during the 1930's there 
developed a concern over the factors making for the weak 
recoveries, especially since there also arose the fear that 
these influences might also contribute strongly to an emerging 
state of s t a g n a t i o n . I n  the remainder of this chapter these 
four influences are discussed in some detail. Discussion, 
however, is strictly expository; critical evaluation of the 
thesis is provided in the subsequent chapter.
Population Growth
Population growth is one of the important factors of
the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis. A rapidly expanding
population may mean (so long as there exists adequate
purchasing power on the part of the new and old inhabitants)
that there will be new markets for investors and businessmen.
Therefore, a more rapid population growth would probably mean
a more rapid rate of economic progress, ceteris paribus.
Investment decisions are easier and returns are more certain.
Hansen believes, however, that the great population increase
of the nineteenth century which made possible such great
28industrial and economic progress was unique in history.
Z^ibid., p. 353.
2?Ibid.
ZGlbid.
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If this population increase was unique, then it might be
inferred (ceteris paribus) that the rate of economic growth
might diminish and that investment might decline relatively.
It is, indeed, hard to deny the stimulating effect on
investment and economic growth of a quadrupling of English
population, a tripling of Europe's population and fifteen-fold
increase in United States' population during the nineteenth
c e n t u r y . I n  the nineteen-thirties, however, the United
States was passing into an era of relative population
stagnation, so far as both numbers azid rates of increase were
c o n c e r n e d . 30 Between I85O and 1900, the population of the
United States increased from twenty-three to seventy-six
million.Population increases per decade as high, as
thirty-five per cent have given way to increases of less
than twenty per cent per decade.Indeed, from I900 to 1910
there was an increase of approximately sixteen million
persons, whereas from 1930 to 1940 the increase was less than 
33nine million.Market expansion, thus,., was more promising 
in earlier than in more recent decades.
29Alvin Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1938), p. 2Ô9.
S^Alvin Hansen, Economic Stabilization in an Unbalanced 
World (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1932), p. &I3.
3^U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States: 1958 (79th ed.; Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 5.
32lbid. 
33lbid.
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The decades of the nineteen-forties and the nineteen-
fifties show a population increase of nineteen million and
twenty-six million, respectively.3^ This is an increase of
fourteen per cent per decade. Still, however, this is a
relative decrease from the growth of earlier decades in the
nineteenth century. Also, there is no statistical or
theoretical proof that the increase in the birth rate in the
nineteen-forties and fifties is permanent. It may well have
been caused by sociological factors dominant in those decades.
In fact, Henry Villard goes so far as to say that:
. . . drastic declines in birth rates in many areas 
could result if ready availability of birth control 
or abortion made it possible to eliminate "unwanted" 
children.35
Hansen believes that the decrease in the birth rate 
is in large part a result of the process of economic growth 
itself, especially as this is accompanied by urbanization. 
Modern urban facilities make birth-control techniques known 
and more readily available; the child is no longer an economic 
asset as he was on the farm and must now be educated and 
trained at a cost to the family; and the urban stresses and 
strains may well be unfavorable to f e r t i l i t y . T h e  city- 
born child has become a liability because of the cost of
3^Ibid. ‘
35Henry Villard, "Population and Economic Growth: 
Comment," American Economic Review (Evanston, 111.: American
Economic Association, June, i960), p. 438.
3^Hansen, Economic Stabilization in an Unbalanced 
World, p. 225.
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education, and the breakdown of the old family custom of the 
under-aged child's income belonging to the head of the 
house. Also, t^e fact that modern labor markets often require 
skills and involve dangers which close many Jobs to child 
labor due to legal, union and managerial restrictions is a 
contributory factor. Thus, the former asset may well 
become a liability and result in a lower family standard of 
living in a social framework which emphasizes the height of 
one's standard of living as an important determinant of 
social success or failure.
Other problems, however, accompany the decrease in the 
rate of population growth. The -change in the age structure 
of the population is important. Hansen points, to the German 
situation of the nineteen-thirties as an example of the age- 
distribution p r o b l e m . T h e  problem of a stationary population 
as far as investment is concerned is simply that the economic 
system needs only to replace worn-out machinery whereas a 
growing population necessitates the use of additional machines 
to equip the additional number of workers.3^ In the case of 
a stationary population, it is thus possible to stress consumer 
goods rather than producers goods (assuming that resources 
are mobile, technology forthcoming to make the shift possible, 
and a yiemand for consumer goods) . Finally, as the demand
37ibid., p. 229.
38ibid., p. 232.
39%bid.
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for goods becomes relatively inelastic, due to an approximate
of 
41
saturation consumer wants,services will tend to be
emphasized.
But the situation is not quite this simple. A new
problem arises when there are more older workers in industry,
42as would be in a relatively stationary population. An 
increasing number of elderly people to support involves
4"5
greater costs than the support of an equal number of children.
44However, there could be a higher rate of personal savings
45because of old-age savings. On the other hand, there may
^*^There is still much controversy as to whether there 
is or is not a "saturation point" in relation to consumer 
wants. The economic writings of some for example, stress the 
belief that there is little basis for the concept of the 
saturation of consumer wants. See, for example, E. Swanson 
and E. P. Schmidt, Economic Stagnation or Progress (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940)7
4llbid., p. 233.
^^Ibid.
43ibid.
^^This assumes, of course, that for the time being, 
there would not be a greater number of elderly persons than 
younger persons. Also, it assumes that the funds derived 
from payments to the Social Security System were not lent 
out during the period of surplus which has not been the case 
in the past. Their being lent out to other government 
agencies could be a stimulating factor to decrease the effect 
of any increase in personal savings forthcoming from 
increased Social Security coverage.
45^Hansen, Economic Stagnation in an Unbalanced World,
p. 234.
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be a heavier burden of taxes to reduce the savings of the
rich and less need for personal savings in the economy at
large because of governmental old-age programs and because
of.the declining need for housing and capital equipment.
Indeed, this change in emphasis results in a possible decline
in the ratio of capital to output since the demand for personal
services can be met without the large amounts of capital
investment required by construction and capital equipment
47that are no longer needed. ' This, of course, may well mean
that savings will not find investment outlets since the ratio
of capital to output has declined. If, however, taxes are
taken from the rich to provide for retired workers, this
48may decrease total savings, but, under the present system 
of social security in the United States, this is not the 
method of finding investment outlets for a given level of 
savings in face of a declining ratio of capital to output.
It seems possible that after the situation has balanced out 
there may be as many more saving for old age as there are
46lbid.
^^Alvin Hansen, "Progress and Declining Population," 
American Economic Review, Vol. 29 (March, 1939), No. 1,
Part I, p. 7.
48°The consumption function is, of course, an aggregate 
of the consumption functions of the various income classes 
within the economy. The upper income class would, as a 
whole, tend to have lower marginal propensity to consume 
relative to lower income classes and particularly in relation 
to those of lower income classes who were retired.
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dissaving in retirement. This would, at best, offset the
savings of workers planning for retirement. It would not
influence the amount of savings being carried on by the upper
income class unless the latter were partly subsidizing the
former. If such subsidization were the case, the propensity
to save may decrease. If it were not the case, there may be
no change, or an adverse change, if the dissaving of those
retired did not equalize the saving of those planning to
retire. The problem may be aggravated by a decline in the
capital to output ratio which would decrease the relative
need for capital and accumulations without changing the rate
of capital accumulation. The decline in capital to output
ratio also may be due to the change in the character of
investment outlets caused by the change in the growth and
49structure of the population.
It must be remembered that, as Higgins states, if the 
population growth rate declines, the marginal productivity 
of capital will remain constant only if the amount of savings 
(capital accumulation) d e c r e a s e s . T h e  only time that an 
advanced industrial economy might want an increase in savings 
would be when an expanding population was increasing the 
demand for goods and services— but even then capital accumulation 
must not exceed the population growth if the marginal
49Higgins, Economic Development, p. I85.
5°Ibid., p. 183.
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productivity of capital is to remain unchanged, other
factors held constant.
This analysis relates only to industrially advanced
countries. An underdeveloped country similar to India, for
example, would welcome (for purpose of economic progress and
per capita income growth) a decrease in the population growth.
India, however, is faced with insufficient capital to
provide employment for and goods and services to its growing
population. The United States, on the other hand, has
apparently an adequate amount of capital funds available in
various forms such as the savings of corporations, banks, and
other financial institutions. Indeed, the deposits in mutual
*
savings banks totaled over thirty-four billion dollars and 
the total assets of savings and loan associations totaled over 
sixty-two billion dollars, with cash assets of nearly two 
billion dollars, whereas life insurance companies held over 
one hundred and twelve billion dollars in assets as of 
October of 1959.^^
Such an increase in money savings (similar to that 
found in the United States' economy) along with a decrease in 
population growth would not be unwelcome in an underdeveloped 
economy. Such an increase in savings may, in time, however, 
cause much conern in the United States.^2 This potential
5^Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(Washington, March, i960), pp. 292-297-
^^Refer to footnote 63 below and to pages l4 and 17-21.
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concern may Indeed materialize if population increase changes 
and age-group changes bring about a lower capital-output 
ratio. Such changes in the growth of population and the 
structure of the population would result in a less stimulating 
market for new goods and thus a lowering of the marginal 
productivity of capital. This, in time, could create an 
excess of savings relative to investment needs. The problem 
of savings and capital-output ratios shall be dealt with 
separately later on. It is mentioned at this time merely to 
emphasize that the population, frontier, savings and 
technology aspects of the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis 
are quite interdependent.
The Frontier
Hansen views the frontier as one of the dominant factors 
of economic and industrial progress. The frontier, by giving 
the economy new lands, markets and resources to develop, 
provided a great outlet for Investment funds that were 
accumulating in the more developed areas of the United States.
It might seem that, after the frontier ceased to exist, the 
outlet for these funds might also cease to exist. Indeed, 
it may be said that where Frederick Jackson Turner saw the 
passing of the frontier in relation to the sociological 
effects of the passage of this traditional means by which 
many in America had channeled their hopes for a better 
existence, Alvin Hansen sees the frontier's passage as a loss 
of traditional outlets for investment funds. Thus, the passage
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of the frontier "safety valve"^^ can be said to have both
sociological and economic consequences.
Hansen maintains that the frontier served as a major
stimulating factor to the American e c o n o m y . T h e  frontier,
while lying vacant was not a stimulating factor; rather it
was the attempt of the American people to develop this vast
land mass and to extend our borders from the Atlantic to the
Pacific that provided the investment stimulus.^5
The period from 1843 to 1073 illustrates this point.
Hansen points out that this period was characterized by price 
56increases which were in large part caused by the frontier
53rhe reader could well benefit from an investigation 
of Ray Allen Billington's Westward Expansion published by the 
MacMillan Company of New York in 1949. Specific mention of 
the "safety valve" along with the significance of the "safety 
valve" can be found on page 10 of the ^introduction. The 
reader is also recommended to look at The Frontier in American 
History by Frederick Jackson Turner. In this work. Turner 
analyzes the problems that the closing of the frontier caused 
in economic, social and political history. For a concise 
summarization, the pages from 218 to 221 of Turner's book 
may prove of value and interest.
5^Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 352.
^^The term "frontier" does not refer to a specific 
"line" or "border" but rather to the expanse of underdeveloped 
land beyond an area of relatively developed land. Thus, 
as far as the United States is concerned, the West would 
fit into this definition of "frontier." For further 
clarification, see Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development,
pp. 189-192.
5^Alvin Hansen, Business Cycles and.National Income 
(New York: W. W. Norton ana Company, ±951), p. 5b.
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railroad boom of those years.5? The years of generally 
falling prices between I873 and I897 were due in part to a 
decline in railroad building in the frontier area.^® Economic 
historians seem also to attribute much investment and, thus, 
much of the economic stimulation in the United States during 
the period from i860 to 1873 to railroad building. However, 
overbuilding and overcapitalization brought about a 
termination of further construction which, in turn, contributed 
to the Panic of 1873.^^
It is not difficult to understand (if any population 
loss in the old section was being replenished through a 
higher birth rate or immigration from an "outside" area into 
that section) how the development of a frontier would 
stimulate an economic system. As more and more people moved 
west to escape eastern hardships, more and more investments 
of numerous types took place to accommodate the growing 
sectional population. In the east, on the other hand, the 
population flight westward was being offset by immigration from 
a b r o a d . T h e  east was also being economically benefited by
57ibid., p. 61. 
58lbid.
^^Harold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954j, p. 477. Frederick
Jackson Turner, The frontier in American History, p. 276.
Allen Billington, Westw^d ËxpansiônT Gilbert C. Fite and 
Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United States 
(Boston, Mas8.1 Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1959).
^^Harold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History,
p. 397.
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the flow of capital from abroad and the adoption of 
technology, both to improve existing output and to introduce 
new products. Immigration from abroad, the growth of capital 
and technology, as well as the increasing capital and consumer 
goods demand in the growing frontier area, combined to 
stimulate economic growth in the East. Thus, the increasing 
investment in the West was not offset by declining investment 
in the East.
The western movement had to be accompanied by the
expansion of such facilities as housing, transportation,
communication and the necessary implements for the development
of land and resources. Thus, the construction of these
facilities provided Jobs on railroads in the area and profits
for capitalistic financiers in the financial centers of the
country. The presence of a developing frontier and an
expanding population combined to help make American capitalism
quite unique so far as economic growth is concerned. Indeed,
Hansen goes so far as to state that;
This one central fact of growth and expansion dominated 
the whole of economic life. It minimized the risk of 
new ventures. If optimism had carried railroad building 
too far at the moment, if a city had temporarily over­
built, the damage was short-lived. Expansion and growth 
soon made good the error. Businessmen could look far 
into the future with gigantic plants which had no relation 
to present and which were based upon the expectation of 
growth and expansion.
Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 34?.
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Yet, It cannot be denied that, even under the favorable 
conditions of rapid expansion, heavy losses alongside 
rich gains were sustained. Yet, despite those losses, 
hope always ran high with respect to new ventures. Our 
current less rapidly expanding economy of the pre-war 
century was capable of riding roughshod over risk. I 
think we must face the fact that we live today in a 
peculiarly risky world, and this fact has a repressive 
effect. It makes the problem of adequate private 
investment outlets more difficult.
Thus, the loss of a frontier and a decline in the 
rate of population increase makes investment outlets harder 
to find and more risky. Moreover, the repressive effect of 
excess savings may also take place.
The United States is not alone in the world as a 
former possessor of a frontier. Great Britain had non- 
adjacent frontiers in Canada, India, Africa and Australia 
to which investment funds could flow. From these under­
developed frontier areas, profits could flow back to London 
in much the same manner as profits flowed from our western 
frontier to the financial centers of the east coast of the 
United States. The loss of former colonies along with the 
development of capital accumulation in the colonies ended 
the monopoly given to London financiers by the Mercantilist 
reign of British colonialism. Thus, frontiers declined also 
for Great Britain.
Many argue that investment in the foreign under- . 
developed countries will replace our former frontier as an 
outlet for investment funds. This is, of course, quite
G^lbid., p. 348.
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conceivable in theory; but there still remains the problem 
of what is to be done when these countries are developed suffi­
ciently to use their own domestic capital. Foreign investment, 
then serves only as a temporary outlet for investment funds.
The Institutionalization of Savings 
The concept of savings has been referred to on several 
occasions thus far. It is now necessary to examine in more 
detail Hansen's views on this important element in his 
Stagnation Thesis.
There is some controversy and misunderstanding among 
economists as to whether Hansen is speaking of the rise in 
total savings due to higher income or the rise in the average 
propensity to save. Higgins contends that Hansen refers to 
a rise in the average propensity to save.^3 However, this 
conclusion is not necessary since, even with a constant 
average propensity to save, the increase in the total savings 
due to higher income levels would lead to secular unemployment 
if there occurred a weakening of the basic underlying forces 
of economic g r o w t h . I f  Higgins is correct in this 
analysis, it is possible to state Hansen's fears concerning 
an increase in savings in either relative or absolute terms.
^^Benjamin Higgins, "Concepts and Criteria of Secular 
Stagnation," Income, Employment and Public Policy, Essays in 
Honor of Alvin H. Hansen (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1948), p. 96.
^^Higgins, Economic Development, p. 174.
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One of the main points In Hansen's treatment of 
Increasing savings (as well as the conclusion that he was 
specifically dealing with a rise in the propensity to save) 
is the concept of institutionalized savings. There is, for 
example, an increasing amount of savings being carried on by 
five main groups in the economy: Life insurance companies,
building and loan societies, savings banks, the larger 
corporations (undistributed profits and depreciation reserves), 
and the statutory savings of local authorities.^5 jt may be 
argued that this institutionalization of savings will lead to
^^Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation, p. 308. Also 
refer to Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington, March, i960), 
pp. 296-297 and 42b. Therein it will be found that the 
assets of mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations 
and life insurance companies has increased since 1941 from 
48 billion to 208 billion in 1959. Referring to the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin of December, 1959> p. 1543 the 1941 
savings figures represent a percentage of 1941 National 
Income of 45j6, Personal Income of 49^ and Disposable Income 
of The 1959 savings figure represents a percentage
figure of National Income of 911^ > of Personal Income of 
of Disposable Income of 65^. This is an increase over 194l 
of 4JÉ, and 11%, respectively. This may be significant 
in relation to the answers to two questions: namely
(1) has this percentage increase been a result of an increase 
in the percentage saved out of incomes from 1941 to 1959 and
(2) has there been a decrease in other forms of saving or the 
introduction of new forms of outlets for investment funds. 
Regardless of the answer to these questions, the main emphasis 
of the dissertation will be on institutional blocs to the 
innovation of technology. For a further discussion of this 
problem of savings see page 14 and pages 17-21.
Life insurance companies, building and loan societies 
and savings banks can be said to merely absorb the savings 
of the members of the economy. However, it should be 
remembered that these institutions have made it possible for 
some to save more than previously.
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greater average propensities to save. The corporation saves 
for further financing in a subsequent time period, perhaps 
years in the future. Insurance premiums increase overall 
savings of various classes that might otherwise not save, 
and this must be met.^^ Hansen emphasizes this last point 
by stressing the climb in premium payments from four billion 
dollars in 1910 to over twenty-eight billion dollars in 
1938.^^ This was accompanied by depreciation allowances of 
over five billion dollars and retained earnings of two 
billion dollars per annum from 1925-1929.^^ This represents 
an increase in the savings of corporations. Higgins points 
out, however, that in order for these data to be meaningful 
it is necessary to show that these premiums and retained 
earnings were an increasing percentage of national income.^9 
Also, it is necessary further to examine the strength of 
the growth factors, since the increase in institutional savings
^^A government plan along the lines of health, life or 
retirement insurance of some sort might be a more economically 
feasible plan because of the absence of the need for profit 
and, also, because the government might lend any surplus 
that might accumulate for a time to other government agencies 
through the transfer of government bonds which would 
stimulate the economy by decreasing the effect of the increase 
in savings possibly created by such a program.
^T’nansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 387.
G8lbid., p. 385.
^^Higgins, "Concepts and Criteria of Secular Stagnation,"
p. 97f.
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may not be offset by a decrease in savings in the traditional 
sectors of the economy. If these traditional sources of 
savings are not being offset by taxes or consumption, the 
propensity to save is, indeed, increasing.
It may well be, however, that the individuals paying 
the premiums may regard them as a form of savings. If this 
is the case, the ajnount of savings done through institutions 
similar to insurance companies may merely be a method of 
savings replacing older methods. Any potential increase in 
savings that might result would only be caused by the 
extension of insurance coverage to groups that did not save 
prior to the growth of insurance firms. Moreover, if many 
persons consider home payments as a form of savings, these 
may also merely offset former saving methods. On the other 
hand, it could increase savings as housing was bought by 
more and more persons and interest payments by them resulted 
in a shift of income upwards from the borrowers to the 
lenders.
Much empirical research needs to be done in this field. 
It is necessary to realize that any empirical study involving 
the growth of savings encounters problems of defining 
savings. Are insurance premiums and house payments regarded 
as savings by the payer? Further, is the acquisition by 
insurance companies of corporate securities, savings or 
investment, or both? This, of course, requires a study of 
what securities are purchased (i.e. old or newly issued
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securities) and what the person or corporation does with the 
funds received through the sale of the securities to the 
insurance institution.
Although insurance is definitely a greater percentage 
of National Income today than in decades past, this alone 
does not mean that there has been a rise in the propensity to 
save since insurance-type saving may have merely compensated 
for the decline in former methods of savings.However, 
it must now be realized that the availability of insurance 
to lower income groups may increase their propensity to 
save— if, that is, they were not saving before. Social 
Security fits into this questionable category. Social 
Security payments have increased from two hundred million 
dollars in 1929 to over eighteen billion in 1959.^^ This, 
however, represents a percentage of Gross National Product 
of only .002 per cent and .03 per cent, respectively.^^
This hardly seems significant, especially when the relationship 
of payments currently being paid in to benefits currently being 
paid out (or the financing of other government agencies 
through the process of borrowing from the Social Security 
funds) is-considered.
fOlbid.
^^Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(Washington, March, i960), p. 329•
72%bid. The percentage of income figures are my own 
derived from the given figures on page 329 of the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, March, i960.
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Economie thinking of the Classical and Neo-Classical 
variety assumed a rather optimistic outlook for increased 
savings. Increased savings result in a decrease in the 
interest rate and, thus, an increase in investment. Keynes' 
The General Theory, however, introduces a basic criticism of 
this position. Keynes argued that the interest rate is also 
a cost of holding money and risk-of-lending rate, ' and thus 
it cannot fall below a certain level. Hansen believes 
further that investors prefer liquidity to such forms of 
investment as bonds when the bonds fall below a certain 
interest y i e l d . T h i s  would seem to follow from the concept 
of the interest rate as a cost and risk of borrowing rate.
Due to the fact that the interest rate cannot, therefore, 
move below a certain level set by the cost and risk-of-lending 
rate (even if it can be assumed as a variable), it is no 
longer as automatic an equilibrator as the Classicalists 
believed it to be. If there has been an increase in savings, 
the interest rate will not necessarily and automatically 
equilibrate the level of savings and investment, and the 
problem of absorbing savings becomes, therefore, greater as 
savings become greater.
The problem of increasing relative and absolute
^^Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation, p. 23.
?4lbid.
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savings may seem to be de-emphasized by the upward drift in
the consumption function between the years 1919-1936.'^^
Benjamin Higgins has stressed, however, that the upward drift
took place since there were sharp drops in income during the
periods from 1920-1922 and 1929-1933.
Thus this period (1919-1935) was one in which the 
squeezing out of savings took place with a vengeance.
The result is that the data of consumption and income—  
which by definition are ex post or realized positions—  
record the "upward drift" despite the downward drift of 
the long run ex ante consumption function. . . . The 
upward drift of the consumption function is the result of 
the particular depth and duration of the Great Depression, 
resulting partly from a rising trend in the ex ante 
propensity to save I This part of the Hansen thesis is 
thus an application to the theory of trend of a 
proposition now generally accepted with respect to 
economic fluctuations: the effort to save more, unless
offset by higher investment, will result in the society's 
actually saving less.''
Despite Higgins' refutation of the secular "upward ___ 
drift in the consumption function," there still remains the 
fact that such a refutation may not be necessary. In the 
Hansen model savings are held to be not only greater, but 
also less flexible because of institutionalized savings 
replacing individual's decisions to save;?^ but it is 
unnecessary for the propensity to save itself to rise or 
remain constant for the thesis to be valid. It can, in fact,
f^Higglns, Economic Development, p. 175. 
fGjbid.
77ibid.
78Ibid., p. 174.
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fall, and the thesis still remains valid. It is necessary 
only for ex ante savings to rise in the face of a fall in 
investment due to the weakening of growth forces. 9^"
This mention of the possibility of a fall in investment 
shows once again the significance of the role played by invest­
ment. It is now necessary to furnish a discussion of technology 
(a point discussed in greater detail later) and offsets to 
diminishing returns or innovations upon which the problem of 
stagnation rests in a private enterprise type of economic system.
Technological Factors 
Consideration of the adaptability of technology 
introduces another form of what may be called "savings" but 
which, for the sake of clarity, should more properly be called . 
"capital-savings." Hansen considers capital-savings as a 
danger to economic growth in that capital-savings release 
capital via technological improvements and require less capital 
than do the methods of production used at the time of their 
introduction. Thus, it may be that capital-saving improvements 
replace capital-using improvements. This results in less 
expensive machinery being used at the same time that the 
absolute amount of real savings is increasing.^0 This type
fSlbid.
floThat is, if the average propensity to consume remains 
constant while the savings absorption characteristics of 
investment decline (because of the shift from capital-using 
machinery to capital-savings machinery), there may be an 
increase in the amount of savings in relation to the amount 
which can be absorbed by the investment in capital goods.
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of improvement, therefore, may help to make the equality of
savings and investment more difficult than it was before the
adoption of the new process or machine. This is true since
investment goods are now less expensive and the demand for
goods is not rising. This assumes a relatively stable
population and a decline in frontiers as an outlet for
investment funds. Since the demand for goods is not
rising, the introduction of capital-saving improvements has
the net effect of a release of capital. Thus, the needed
equality between savings and investment would become more
difficult to maintain than before.
Hansen believes that much of the stimulus for economic
progress came from vast capital-using inventions and 
8linnovations. Such innovations were the railroad, the
O p
automobile, electricity and iron and steel. Hansen argues, 
however, that during the present century there is a tendency 
for merely the introduction of new improved processes and
On
new consumer items. ^ These improved processes and consumer 
items are, of course, new ways of doing things plus the
Oh
introduction of television, radio, and air conditioning.
0-1
Higgins, Economic Development, p. 173.
82ibid.
83Ibid. 
G^ibid.
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These are not bringing forth the tremendous amount of 
investment in secondary products such as highways, rails, 
pullmans, oil and gas, structural steel, wire and copper 
investment to meet the needs created by the innovation and 
acceptance of automobiles and railroads.Hansen goes so far 
as to say explicitly that:
Of first-rate importance is the development of new 
industries. There is certainly no basis for the 
assumption that these are a thing of the past. But there 
is equally no basis for the assumption that we can take 
for granted the rapid emergence of new industries as rich 
in investment opportunities as the railroad, or more 
recently the automobile together with all the related 
developments, including the construction of public roads, 
to which it gave rise. Nor is there any basis, either 
in history or in theory, for the assumption that the rise 
of new industries proceeds inevitably at a uniform pace. 
The growth of modern industry has not come in terms of 
millions of small increments_af change giving rise to a 
smooth and even development.
Hansen further reminds us of the rather forboding fact that:
. . . when a revolutionary new industry . . . having 
initiated in its youth a powerful upward surge of 
investment activity, reaches maturity and ceases to grow, 
as all industries finally must, the whole economy must 
experience a profound stagnation, unless, indeed, new . 
developments take its place. It is not enough that a 
mature industry continues its activity at a high level 
on a horizontal plane. The fact that new railroad 
mileage continued to be built at about the same rate 
through the seventies, eighties and nineties was not 
sufficient. It is the cessation of growth, maturity, and 
decline of great industries that the Principle of 
Acceleration operates with peculiar force.°7
Q^Ibid.
^^Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 3^2.
BTibid., p. 363.
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Hansen then points out that it may take years for
QO
new industries of sufficient size to arise. He maintains
that the absence of new industries and the dearth of state and
local governmental projects and financing ability has made
necessary the current increase in federal expenditures for
the maintenance of investment and employment.®^
The problem is not, however, solely the introduction
of new innovations and their acceptance. The problem is
also whether these inventions and innovations are capital-
saving or capital-using. If they are capital-saving, this
releases capital and brings forth unemployment. As savings
in an industrial economy increase, the ratio of capital goods
to income must rise.90 Any capital-saving tendency weakens
economic progress and induces a fall in income as there
develops a divergence between the income level of the time
period and the sum of consumption and investment— that is,
investment falls short of savings.Furthermore, if costs
and wages lag to keep real profits high, this produces a
larger increase in savings than before even if output remains 
92the same.^ In an economy where capital has grown relative
8®Ibid., p. 364.
Q9ibid.
90Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation, p. 44.
^^Higgins, Economic Development, p. 172.
92ibid.
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go
to la b or ,th is  capital-savings concept becomes of major 
significance. If, for example, the frequency of the appearance 
of innovations drops and a tendency for capital-savings 
develops, the marginal productivity of capital would fail 
to bring about the possible cessation of investment.The 
problem seems to be in part, the problem of capital-savings.^^ 
In the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution was 
capital-using and very little went to consumer capital.
In the present century, more capital is going to consumer 
uses which tends to be capital saving.Furthermore, 
the significant rise of depreciation as a source of investment 
funds in producers' equipment industries does nothing to 
solve the problem of finding suitable outlets for consumer 
ca pit al.Also, what might be the result if depreciation- 
created replacement funds were ceteris paribus, more than 
sufficient to replace capital goods and machines?^^ The 
answer can only be: A drop in the level of income. And
this would be especially so if the replacement investment
^^Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 355.
9^Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation, p. 28.
95ibid., pp. 308-315.
96ibid., p. 315.
97lbid., p. 308.
9Qibid., p. 316.
99Higgins, "Concepts and Criteria of Secular Stagnation,"
p. 102.
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releases more capital and if consumer investment might 
also be capital-saving, which it tends to be. An advanced 
economy must, therefore, increase at an increasing rate, for 
investment of one time period generates income, then declines 
via the accelerator. This necessitates new innovations that 
must be even more capital-using.Hansen seriously doubts 
the possibility of such a situation.
The problem is not actually, however, as simple as 
thus far i m p l i e d . 1^2 The real problem is not merely the 
invention, but the adoption and installation. I f ,  for 
example, the invention is capital-saving, its end result may 
not be capital-saving, but, rather capital-using. Probably
■ m  •
all inventions are, to some degree, of a capital-saving 
n a t u r e . 104 This, in itself, does not mean that they are 
capital-saving in the end analysis. The test as to whether 
an invention saves capital is not passed by a Judgment 
concerning the invention per se. The test of capital-saving 
is passed only when the result of the installation is known. 
The installation may result in capital-absorption or 
capital-saving. If the end result of installation and
lOOlbid., p. 101. 
lOllbid., p. 102.
lO^Ibid., p. 101.
103lbid.
lO^Ibid.
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innovation is capital-using, there is more of a chance of
investment being sufficient to offset savings and maintain
or increase the income level. In other words, it is the
question of whether the installation process absorbs or
releases capital.
It should be pointed out that capital-saving inventions
may be capital-absorbing 3^ toto if there is an expectation
of a windfall or monopoly profit, if there is an acceleration
of depreciation which absorbs capital, or if the attractiveness
of a product increases the overall propensities to c o n s u m e .
If any or all of these conditions are met, a capital-saving
invention may be 3^ toto capital-absorbing. It must be
remembered, however, that consumer capital has less of a
secondary investment influence and may be of an overall
capital-saving nature. Also, the absence of a major industry “
of such a stimulating nature as automobiles, steel, electricity
and railroads, coupled with the cessation of population
growth and territorial expansion tends to emphasize replacement
technology.Replacement investment is characterized
by financing through depreciation reserves, which may be
107more than sufficient to maintain.the replacement ' unless 
price level increases and inadequate depreciation techniques 
are prevalent. This discussion of the effects of capital
105lbid., p. 102.
lO^Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 363. 
^®*^Higgins, "Concepts and Criteria of Secular Stagnation,"
p. 102.
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replacement points up again the need for investment that
improves technique and increases per capita o u t p u t . ^08
But here a new problem arises. It involves simply
the shelving of patents and other types of oligopolistic
hindrances which reduce the possibility of the required type of
109investment materializing. Under competition a new technique
or improvement would immediately be adopted even at the cost
of scrapping non-depreciated m a c h i n e r y . U n d e r  the market
structures of monopoly or oligopoly, however, the new
machine or technique may not be introduced until the old
machines are depreciated or the cost-savings brought forth by
the new technique are sufficient to compensate for the
undepreciated value of the old m a c h i n e . A s  a result, the
progress which would come as a result of competition is slowed
and the outlets for new capital formation are put off. This
is detrimental to the maintenance of an equilibrium between
savings and investment and thus the maintenance of full 
112employment. Also, the presence of patent-shelving in
lO^Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, p. 363.
109lbid.
ll°Ibid.
llllbid., p. 364.
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many Industries blocks the Introduction of any type of new 
technique which would make old methods obsolete and result 
In the Introduction of new techniques.^^3 Thus, the 
Institutional arrangements of oligopolies and monopolies 
In guarding against the losses caused by obsolescence, result 
In a decline In the one source of Investment which remains 
after we have lost the potential Investment outlets caused by 
population growth, territorial expansion, and great new 
I n d u s t r i e s . T h i s  major factor, about which only recently 
have adequate studies been made. Is discussed at length 
later. It Is one of the determinants of any Increase In 
savings; and It also Is a determinant of the advent of 
stagnation.
Other Considerations 
Other factors may also enter to stimulate or hinder 
full-employment growth. As has been discussed before, 
prlce-wage policies are of Importance. If costs (including 
wages) lag, this creates an Increase In real profits and a 
corresponding shift In Income upwards and a possible Increase 
In the average ahd marginal propensities to save since the 
upper Income classes with lower propensities to consume would 
be getting a larger share of the Income of the economy. If,
113lbld., p. 363.
ll^Ibld.
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however, wages Increase in relation to prices, real income 
levels are maintained and there is no shift of real income.
If wages shift upwards more than prices, this could impinge 
upon profits to decrease the marginal efficiency of capital.
This would create unemployment as income falls. Just as the 
first possibility would create unemployment because a 
progressively unequal distribution of income and subsequent 
underconsumption. This in no way implies that price-wage 
relationships must remain constant. Indeed, relative upward 
shift in wages (or income) is both desirable and possible, 
but it should not exceed reason until, at least, the investment 
climate is adjusted to a lower profit level. Even the 
adjustment of investors to a lower profit level, however, 
is a relative thing, for even the most adventuresome will 
not adjust to too low a profit level in relation to wage- 
price relationships. The relationship, however, need not be 
constant but, instead, should and must remain reasonable.
Fiscal policy may also be a stimulant. Rising 
government expenditures may be necessary to offset decreasing 
investment outlets in new resources, new territorial development, 
surging population growth and great new industries. Fiscal 
policy can be deflationary, neutral, or inflationary. A 
deflationary fiscal policy would seem to be against the general 
purposes of fiscal policy except for periods of time when 
inflation is considered undesirable. A short-run neutral fiscal 
policy is probably impossible due to time lags between the
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appropriation of funds for projects and their completion, 
unless one is willing to stop the construction of half­
finished dams and highways in an attempt to balance the budget. 
An inflationary fiscal policy must, however, have limits. 
Inflation stimulates growth to a certain extent as costs 
lag behind price increases. Finally, an upward fluctuating 
price level creates the illusion of higher profits (in 
contrast to real profits).
If there is a momentary lag in costs aind wages, 
however, this increase in profits may, in fact be, for a time, 
more real than temporary. A rapidly inflating price level, 
however, is impractical because of the eventual mistrust of 
the currency as a store of value and as a standard of deferred 
payments as a result of its rapid and often unpredictable 
depreciation in purchasing power. Thus, wage-price policies, 
inflationary tendencies, and fiscal policies have much also 
to do with stimulation, but these must change within limits 
if growth is to be maintained. In a time period when prices, 
wages, fiscal policy and inflation tend to be administered 
directly or indirectly, an emphasis and understanding must 
be placed upon the soundness of policy and its overall 
economic effect. If not, catastrophe and stagnation may be 
more the result of bad planning than capital-saving technique 
changes, population growth declines and the absence of great 
new industries and territorial frontiers.
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Stagnation, despite Hansen and the thirties, is not
with us yet. There has been, however, the advent of fiscal
policy particularly as a result of war and defense
expenditures. This has stimulated war industries and economic
development along military lines and has brought about 
developmental projects with secondary investment effects.
Also, public works such as roads and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority have stimulated industry and brought development 
to areas where development was not present prior to government 
spending. Thus, the economy has boomed. The question, however, 
need only be asked as to what would happen if government 
spending for defense and "related projects" were stopped 
either immediately or over time. What investment outlet 
would arise of sufficient size to maintain the private 
enterprise system along a level of full-employment growth?
In the absence of population booms, new territories, new 
resources, and the advent of a possible savings increase 
through institutionalized savings of various forms including 
capital-saving inventions and, monopolistic restrictions on 
technique change, the answer to the question of possible 
investment outlets in the private sector seems grim indeed.
The reader may remember that it is, in fact, fiscal policy 
that Keynes as well as Hansen thought necessary to maintain 
full-employment. The presence of fiscal policy, however, 
does not destroy the concept of stagnation but, rather, 
emphasizes a need for an understanding of the forces leading
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to stagnation in order that fiscal policy may be most 
effective in maintaining economic growth along the full- 
employment level of production.
CHAPTER III
THE CRITICISMS AND THEIR EVALUATION: POPULATION,
THE FRONTIER, TECHNOLOGY, AND MARKET STRUCTURE
■-•W.
Introduction
The Stagnation Thesis has had no lack of critics. As 
may be expected, many persons agree with Hansen while many 
others attack his general analysis. The purpose of this 
and the following chapter is to review and evaluate some of 
the more important critiques of his theory of stagnation. A 
summary of the critiques, however, should not necessarily be 
expected to prove or disprove the Stagnation Thesis itself.
What will prove or disprove any thesis on any subject is, 
in the long run, not the depth and genius of the writers but 
the realities of history itself unless, of course, appropriate 
warnings are obeyed. It must be realized that a response 
to the warning signals may, if heeded, bring about other than 
the predicted end. This, however, does not disprove the thesis, 
but rather shows its usefulness as a warning of what might 
have been. A review and analysis of criticisms should, 
however, provide a deeper understanding (if not appreciation) 
of the thesis itself. It is the purpose of this and the
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subsequent chapter, then, to see what material there is to 
support or undermine the main columns of the Stagnation 
edifice. The present chapter is divided into the following 
sections: population, frontier, technology, and market
structure. Savings are considered in Chapter IV.
Population
The rate of change in population is one of the primary 
parts of the Stagnation Thesis. W. B. Reddaway makes it 
one of his primary points in the general support of the Thesis.^ 
Reddaway is concerned with the effect of the growth of
2
population on the growth of the labor force of the economy. 
Specifically, the reduction in the rate of population growth 
brings about a reduction in the number of new entrants into 
the labor market which causes a twofold disturbance in the 
functioning of the economy.^ The economy, for example, must 
not only adjust to shifts in demand from one industry to 
another, but also to relative and absolute declines in 
population. The inter-industry shift is partly due to the 
change in the age structure, since in an economy dominated by
% .  B. Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining 
Population (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1939).
Zibid., p. 55.
3lbid.
^Ibid., p. 6o.
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elderly persons the structure of demand differs from that in 
an economy dominated by younger persons.^
Reddaway argues that an inter-industry shift in demand 
results in a shift of demand to luxury goods which, of 
course, is related to the changing age structure.^ Even after 
the shift of luxury goods has been accomplished, the problem 
confronting the economy is not solved. Consumption now may 
very well be less constant due to the fact that the demand 
for luxury goods is based on more whimsical and, thus, less 
constant factors than the purchases of non-luxury goods.^ 
Therefore, consumption could become a more volatile variable 
which might have grave repurcussions on the continuation of 
economic progress and confidence.
The change in the age-structure also effects one of 
the assumptions underlying the Classical framework. Labor 
mobility is hindered due to the fact that the predominant age 
group is in the later years of life. This simply means that 
it is more difficult for the worker to change jobs. The 
more elderly worker, for example, cannot learn new skills as
O
rapidly and, thus, the transmission of new skills is delayed. 
Also, the elderly person is more likely to have family and
^Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining Population,
p. 61.
% b i d .
?Ibid.
Gibid.
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property ties in the local community and does not desire to 
move. Accompanying these blocs to labor mobility, there is 
the problem of union co-operation.^
Reddaway maintains that there is a way to avoid the 
problem of a relatively or absolutely declining population.
The solution is to increase the level of real income of the 
consumers.This then would offset the adverse effect of 
the population decline on the amount of capital outlay. Such 
a solution assumes, however, that there is not a saturation 
level of consumer wants. Still, there may, in fact, be an 
upper level of consumer demands beyond which there would be 
little if any increase despite a further increase in real 
income. This would seem particularly true if psychological 
and economic motivations for increasing consumption were 
weakened due to the absence of social class status differentiations 
and poverty. To say that there has been no upper limit to 
consumer demand in the past does not necessarily say anything 
about the future.
Reddaway's analysis yields grim implications as 
regards the change in the age structure. He does, however, 
leave the door open for some ray of hope. The increase in 
income, for example, along with changes in tastes and 
techniques'^ and a lower interest rate may combine to create
^Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining Population,
p. 66.
lOlbid., p. 94. 
l^Ibid., p. 97f.
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12a need for less labor relative to capital. Increases in 
the level of real income increases consumption (assuming the 
insatiability of consumer wants) and the change in tastes 
shifts demand which creates investment opportunities. As 
will be seen later, however, this raises questions about 
the marginal productivity of capital.
As mentioned above, the presence of a lower rate of 
interest may offset the effects of a decline in the growth of 
population. This is due to the fact that a lower rate of 
interest may both stimulate housing and make possible the 
adoption of capital-goods in place of the scarce labor factor, 
Reddaway maintains that since the annual percentage increase 
in new housing has always been small in relation to total 
housing, a lower interest rate may have a rather large effect 
upon total construction.^ lower interest rate may thus 
speed up and continue the replacement of old housing for new 
housing as the heating, cooling and functional improvements 
of homes co n ti n ue . Th i s  may offset the expected decline 
in housing starts- due to the decline in the rate of 
population growth. Hansen, however, reminds us that smaller 
families require smaller h o u s e s . This, of course, adds to
12ibid., p. 101.
13lbid., p. 100.
l^ibid.
l^Aivin Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 28 (August, 1946;, p. l4.
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the economic effect of a declining rate of population growth 
demanding less new housing and, thus, worsens the situation 
in terms of total returns to the construction industry. 
Reddaway however concludes that increases in real incomes and 
a decrease in the interest rate may offset relative or 
absolute population declines.
The emphasis on higher real consumption raises the 
question of the effectiveness of advertising.^^ The question 
must then be asked as to whether or not families with less 
children consume more or less than families with more children. 
Reddaway maintains that the presence of smaller families does 
not mean greater expenditures per family. Thus the amount of 
capital outlay may be adversly affected.^? The answer to
Reddaway lies in catering to increasing consumption
18standards, but he maintains that demand derived from higher 
consumption standards may be riskier than demand derived 
from an increasing population.If, indeed, there is an 
upper limit to consumption, there may not be an effective 
way of increasing consumption through mere increases in real 
income.
^^Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining Population,
p. 107.
17ibid., p. 106. 
iBibid., p. 107.
l^Ibid.
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Reddaway is not alone in his analysis of the effects
of a drop in population. D. Hamberg, for example, points
out that if there were a drop in the rate of population growth
along with an increase in the amount of capital, there would
develop the problem of maintaining the marginal productivity 
20of capital. If the change in the labor force was offsetting 
the rise of productivity which was smaller than the growth
of capital and output, there would be a decline in the marginal
21
productivity of capital. Unless capital growth declined, 
there would develop both an upward wage pressure and excess 
capacity which, when combined, would worsen the decline in
p p
the marginal productivity of capital.
George Terborgh, the writer who most completely and 
violently attacked the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis, also 
includes an analysis of population change in his The Bogey 
of Economic Maturity. Terborgh presents a series of charts 
correlating the growth of real income or industrial production
p-3
to the growth of population. From these charts, he concludes
that there seems to be no correlation between the growth of
24population and economic growth.in general. At first glance 
PO
D. Hamberg, Economic Growth and Instability (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, p. Ijib.
Zllbid.
22lbid.
^^George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity 
(Chicago: Machine and Allied Products Institute, 194$), p. 38f.
24ibid., p. 40.
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Terborgh's analysis seems Impressive. However, there appears 
to be some doubt as to the validity of his analysis and 
conclusion. His data indiscriminately combine countries 
operating under different political and economic systems.
For example, countries in the "underdeveloped" socio-economic 
classification are presented in the same charts as countries 
in the "industrial" or "developed" socio-economic classification. 
Such a procedure, of course, includes the tremendous rise 
in per capita income of countries in thé early stages of 
growth along with the per capita income changes of the type of 
economic system the analysis is concerned with. A-more 
accurate correlation may be made if the countries were 
divided into their various classifications and then examined 
as regards economic growth relative to population growth.
It seems, for example, that Ethiopia may not have an advance 
in real income or industrial production as a result of 
population growth as easily as a more "developed" country due 
to the presence of socio-economic institutions in the more 
"advanced" country. It must be remembered, however, that 
much depends upon the definition of "developed" countries 
which brings out one of the basic problems of statistical 
measurement.
Terborgh, however, does not rely solely on the above 
analysis in his conclusions concerning population and economic
25ibid., p. 229.
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growth. He further contends that there Is no correlation
between population and the growth of per capita production.
To prove this contention, he presents bar graphs that show
such relationships in various countries.Time lags,
however, are not allowed for in such graphs. Also, it seems
that per capita production tests are not valid because this
is not what we really want to measure. Since children will
not produce much until their late teens or early twenties,
there is still the possibility of a growth in total production
in response to greater markets without a corresponding growth
in per capita output. It may well be that even though total
production has increased, a rise in per capita productivity
and the standard of living may not appear until after the
population increase has begun to level off. Thus, a time
lag between cause and long-run effect may be an untested
part of the Terborgh analysis.
Other factors may also be important. Any conclusion,
for example, about the rise in population and the decline in
German per capita production between 1920-1930 must take
into account the Treaty of Versailles Just as the 1930-19^0
rise in German per capita productivity must take into account
28the ascendency of Adolf Hitler. Also, in analyzing England, 
29the bar graph does not mention England's adjustment to a
^^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 43. 
27lbid., p. 42.
28lbid.
29ibid.
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reversal of her former status as an investment center for 
world funds. More simply stated, the graphs for this time 
period cannot show us the varying circumstances within these 
countries due to the extent of the international chaos of the 
period and are, thus, rather meaningless in showing what 
might have happened if the times had been more "normal."
Terborgh*s statistical references are not adequate 
to disprove the stimulating effect of a high rate of population 
growth upon the economy of an "advanced" nation. The decline 
in the rate of population growth thus may result in 
declining consumption rates of growth and, thus, investment 
opportunities. Furthermore, an emphasis upon real income 
growth to offset the decline in population growth might make 
consumption more volatile. Also, there may well be an upper 
limit to the amount of consumption one is willing to do or 
can be induced to do. Thus, even with a policy of increasing 
the growth of real income to offset the decline in population 
growth there may still remain an eventual problem of 
stagnation.
The Frontier
The absence of the frontier also plays an important 
role in the Keynes-Hansen concept of stagnation. Hansen 
believes that with the passing of the frontier one of the 
traditional outlets for capital in the United States economy
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disappeared. George Terborgh, on the other hand, argues that 
the West was never of great significance. He maintains 
that the frontier passed only fifty years ago (the date of 
publication of his book was 19^5) and that the economy has not 
felt a lapse of economic activity yet.^° Terborgh also 
suggests that we have not invested abroad to any great and 
prolonged extent since the passing of the frontier,to offset 
any fall in domestic investment due to the passing of the 
frontier. Hansen, however, points out that I890 was merely 
the textbook passing of the frontier and that the actual 
economic development of the frontier lasted for another
•32
generation.
Terborgh develops his attack upon Hansen further, 
however, by arguing that the West invested less in development 
and facilities than did the East. He uses as examples the 
dominance of the amount of investment in railroads and roads 
in the West and the investments in housing and consumers 
capital equipment in the East.^3 The difference is, of course, 
explainable in terms of the -varying stages of socio-economic 
development of the two areas. Also, price level differences 
between the West and the East in respect to the cost of
SOnerborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 65.
^^Ibid., p. 66.
3^Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," p. 15.
^^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 68.
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housing construction^^ must enter into the analysis.
Terborgh maintains that the amount of capital 
formation per capita was lower in the West than in the East.^5 
However, the major point is not regional per capita capital 
formation so much as overall investment outlets. It is not 
important whether capital formation per capita was greater 
in the East than in the West. What is important is the effect 
that the cessation of the economic frontier (if it has 
completely disappeared) has had or will have upon aggregate 
investment outlets.
It should be pointed out that Terborgh does recognize 
the "after-glow" effect— that is, he realizes that the 
economic frontier and the geographic frontier may not be 
synonomous terms. The "after-glow" effect may show a period
of higher accumulation and investment in the West than in 
the East after the eighteen-nineties.^^ He tests this 
hypothesis on the rate of capital accumulation by a
3^In the West, for example, housing was often 
constructed from the materials at hand-locally. The cost of 
such material was often free since the builder merely had to 
go get his own building material. Also, labor was very 
inexpensive since quite often the neighbors gave their time 
to construct the home or out-buildings for the newcomers.
If neighbors were not to be had, personal labor had to be 
substituted which cost, of course, nothing. Thus, building 
costs were low in the West.
^^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 69.
3^Ibid., p. 72.
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"proxlmity-to-frontier" mechsinlsm, which tests the rate of 
growth in areas within a certain mileage distance from the 
frontier from I890 to 1922. Since Terborgh provides no 
definition of "frontier states" the comparison of states 
surrounding the "frontier states" to the more distant eastern 
states is indeed dubious and overlooks intermediate stages of 
development. Furthermore, the comparison of the states on
OQ
a basis of twenty-four to twenty-four, suffers from the 
same statistical weakness as do his previous charts on 
population, income and productivity— that is, the inclusion 
in each category of areas of differing socio-economic stages 
of development.
Moreover, it would seem that one reason for the 
East having a higher per capita capital formation is because 
of its earlier start in the financial and industrial sectors. 
This historical advantage would seem to drain capital and 
consumer dollars from the West to the East. And, indeed, 
Hansen attacks Terborgh on this ground. Hansen believes 
that the West contributed to capital formation in the East 
and that the West may very well have been at a disadvantage 
relative to the East with respect to capital formation, 
primarily because of the East's financial and industrial 
dominance and the resulting money flow to the coastal
3?Ibid., p. 73.
38ibid., p. 38f.
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financial and industrial c e n t e r s . T h e  industrial and
financial concentration in the environs of New York certainly
would seem to drain funds from the West and thus tend to
increase the amount of per capita capital accumulation in the
East relative to that in the West. David McCord Wright also
discusses this possibility, and states that in his study
of the "after-glow" Terborgh forgot that Ohio may have been
40at a historical disadvantage in relation to New York.
This would explain, then, the absence of a significant 
increase in capital formation in Ohio after the frontier era 
had passed.
Thus far the possible passing of the frontier era, 
and the arguments concerning per capita investment and capital 
accumulation rates between the East suid West have been 
discussed. After all the controversy about per capita 
investment between the East and the West is over, however, 
it appears that the East versus West dispute is not the real 
issue. The real issue is whether or not the passing of the 
economic frontier has had a significant effect upon the total 
outlet for investment funds. In other words, has the passing 
of the frontier in economic terms brought about a decrease 
in total investment opportunities? This question was not
39nansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," p. 15.
^%avid McCord Wright, "The Great Guessing Game: 
Terborgh versus Hansen," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 28 (February, 1946), p. 1$.
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really touched upon by Terborgh and. Indeed, the amount of 
international confusion, national recovery, defense- 
spending and defense-oriented population shifts have probably 
obscurred the evidence so much that a satisfactory empirical 
answer will never be formulated.
In order to resolve the dispute it is necessary to 
find how much capital flowed from East to West during and 
after the period of the frontier, as well as the capital 
formation in the East. If, after the passage of the frontier, 
the flow of eastern funds to the West decreased significantly 
and eastern capital formation did not rise sufficiently to 
offset the decline, then the Hansen thesis may tentatively 
be Judged correct. It would seem that due to the industrial 
and financial dominance of the East, the amount of per 
capita capital accumulation is still higher in the East. 
Therefore, the question can be asked: Are these funds finding
as large a relative outlet in the West as they did before 
the passage of the frontier? However, there still may be 
some doubt whether the frontier has passed away completely 
or is merely starting into a phase of self-development of 
the industrial-urban centers of concentration. If the 
economic frontier has not yet passed, future generations may 
be able to test the validity of Hansen's concept of the 
passage of the frontier bringing about a decline in investment 
outlets.
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Technology
The frontier and population factors are not all that 
Alvin Hansen believes to be sending the economy of the 
United States into a state of maturity. He also considers 
technological decline as one of the factors contributing 
to stagnation. Hansen, as we have seen, believes that the 
rate of technological advancement has slowed down. This is 
due to the decrease in the rate of technological advance and 
to changes in the market structure. We shall, however, deal 
with these two factors separately since changes in the market 
structure involve other considerations which go beyond the 
scope of technology. In a study of the critiques of Hansen's 
concept of the slowing down of technological advance, one 
must return again to Terborgh.
In attacking the technological aspects of the Keynes-
Hansen Stagnation Thesis, Terborgh argues that there is no
apparent let-up in the flow of technology. He attempts to
illustrate this point by using the automobile industry as an
example. Terborgh contends that in the automobile industry,
there has been a marked indication of a continued flow of new 
4linnovations and that these innovations have counteracted 
the "tired" technological impulses of the past.^^ Terborgh 
also points out that throughout recent economic history, at
^^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 85.
42Ibid., pp. 23-26.
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least. It has been old Investment and not new Investment that 
has gotten the largest share of the volume of Investment.
Terborgh, perhaps, could have picked a happier example 
than the automobile industry. The industry, it must be 
remembered, competes by style changes and ever-increasing 
gadgetry. Thus, the flow of technology is related to the 
preservation of style and gadget competition. This artificial 
type of technology can only be maintained as long as the 
public is content to tolerate the wasteful allocation of— 
resources and the expense involved in buying relatively 
functionless gadgets. It may well be that the introduction 
of small, economical foreign and domestic automobiles will 
tend to limit this form of technological "progress" and, 
thus, end the continued flow of technology in the automobile 
industry.
It was mentioned above that Terborgh believes (even 
given a continued flow of technology) that the largest amounts 
of investment funds in the recent past have gone to old 
investment instead of to new investment.(Alvin Hansen, 
as a matter of fact, accepts Terborgh’s contention that only 
fifteen percent of total investment has been in new industries 
or technology of the nature of "innovations.")^^ This,
^^ Ibid. See below for a further discussion of this point,
44%bid.
^^Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic 
Maturity," p. 15.
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Terborgh Implies, would tend to reduce the importance of 
a continued flow of technology or innovations. It follows, 
he -believes, that since the investment in new technology has 
been such a low percentage figure, it has not been of the 
great importance that such economists as Schumpeter and 
Hansen contend.
After accepting Terborgh*s figures of fifteen percent 
of investment going to the development of innovations of 
various forms, Hansen points out that his critic forgets about 
the leverage effect of the multiplier and the accelerator.^^ 
The multiplier and the accelerator combine to increase the 
importance of any amount of new investment by spreading its 
effect over the entire economic structure. Terborgh, on the 
other hand, fails to take this into account. The fifteen 
percent figure may be a small percentage figure, but it 
generates much more investment in other sectors of the 
economy through increasing incomes and consumption and 
brings about a general attitude of optimism on the part of 
both lenders and borrowers in both new and old industries.
Market Structure 
Technology and the market structure are not separate 
considerations. The concept of the decreasing flow of 
technology as an inevitable process of running out of new 
innovations and the possibility that the structure of the
46%bid.
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market itself may or may not place institutional blocs in the 
way of technological change are interrelated. The technological 
dimensions of the stagnation thesis depend not only upon 
whether technology inevitably continues, but also on whether 
its adoption is possible under the prevailing market situation.
An analysis of the market structure as a contributing 
factor involves a study both of the restrictions to 
technology and of price-wage rigidities. Although these are 
interrelated factors, many economists emphasize one or the 
other. Reddaway, for example, argues that imperfections of 
the market structure can prevent the adoption of technology.
He maintains that, in an imperfect market structure it might 
be possible for old firms to prevent the introduction of new 
techniques by refusing to adopt them. Such firms that 
control the industry could prevent new firms from entering 
the industrial market by placing financial and other 
institutional barriers before the potential entrants.
However, recent studies indicate that the most significant
47barrier to the entrance of new firms is product differentiation. 
Also, the dominant firms could prevent the introduction of 
the technique (after they had prevented the entry of other 
firms) because of the fact that they do not want to destroy 
present capital values and need not fear the adoption of
^^See J. S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 195^)i also see his Industrial 
Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959)  ^ Chapter 5.
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the technique by the other ''competitors" who are also 
interested in maintaining present capital values.^® Thus, 
capital-outlay may be prevented due to institutional factors 
prevalent in the market structure of the economy. Imperfections 
in the market structure, therefore, may prevent technological 
change. It may be remembered that Reddaway is also concerned 
with the risks of planning for higher consumption levels in 
an economy with a relatively static population.
Other economists have been concerned with the 
problems posed by the market structure. Hamberg, for example, 
also believes the market structure to be an important factor 
in the functioning of the economy. He maintains that each 
firm's receipts are in the aggregate a function of the 
expenditures of other f i r m s . T h i s  implies that a firm 
cannot increase its receipts unless the expenditures of other 
firms increase. The increase in the expenditures of other 
firms depends, of course, upon psychological and 
institutional factors prevailing in the economy. Hamberg 
points out, for example, that new and/or small firms may not 
be able to get the capital necessary for expansion or entrance 
into the m a r k e t . T h i s  places the impetus to further 
investment in the hands of the larger and established firms.
48‘Ibid.
^^Hamberg, op. cit., p. 106. 
30ibid., p. 113.
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The existing owners of the larger firms may be unwilling_to 
dilute their control through the sale of securities that 
would enable them to get the funds necessary for expansion.
On the other hand, caution may prevent the existing owners 
from dipping into the liquid assets of the larger and 
established firms for investment purposes.Thus, expansion 
may be prevented by the unwillingness of ownership either to 
dilute its control or to use the liquid assets of the firm. 
Economic growth, therefore, is prevented or, at least, 
limited.
Involved with the above is, of course, the presence _ 
of patents and patent-shelving. These patents may actually 
prevent competitors from entering the market and inhibit 
the introduction of technological changes in the productive 
process.53 The company with the patent may desire not to 
use the patent productively because by innovating the invention 
it may destroy its present capital value,^ Where inventions 
do become innovations, it is often, Hamberg believes, in 
the field of non-competing products or after the full 
exploitation of old methods has been a c c o m p l i s h e d . 5 5  After
51jbid., p .  1 1 4 .  
52lbid.
5 3 i b i d . ,  p .  1 2 2 .  
5^Ibid., p .  1 2 3 .
55ibid.
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this form of Innovating has taken place, there usually
follows a "pause-for-breath" period which places investment
56
back at its previous level.
Hamberg also deals with four other problems that 
may tend to inhibit the introduction of technology. First 
of all, there may be a change in the attitudes towards 
technology sind technological change.5? Great Britain and 
Prance, for example, have both gone through significant periods 
where technological change was not the modus vivendi of
58economic thinking. Second, the presence or growth of various 
forms of trusts might inhibit investment activity through the 
creation of the fear of excess capacity and the loss of 
investment capital.^9 Investment, therefore, would at 
least be postponed. Third, the advent of an imperfect market 
structure brings about large-scale industrial complexes or 
trust devices which introduce the rise of business 
bureaucracy.^® Business bureaucracy is just as desirous of 
status quo and Job security as are other bureaucratic 
institutions and, as a result, may cause technological
56lbid., p. 124.
57lbid., p. 127.
58ibidi
59lbid. 
GOibid., p. 128.
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Innovation to be postponed or "watered-down" to a considerable
extent. Fourth, any tendency towards absentee ownership could,
of course, deprive the sirea of necessary investment funds.
Although Hamberg mentions only briefly the problem
of excess capacity in relation to the growth of trusts,
J. Steindl, in his Maturity and Stagnation in American
Capitalism, makes excess capacity at full-employment the central
theme of his analysis. Excess capacity, Steindl maintains,
is a phenomenon of imperfect competition and is often present
in oligopolistic industries.»In such an industry, the
marginal cost for each unit of labor increases as full
capacity is r e a c h e d . T h e  excess, however, is a manifestation
64of fluctuations of a boom-type nature. Also, the growth 
of a market is a function of time and, thus, many oligopolies 
build excess capacity to provide for future increases in 
the demand for their pr od u ct . Th u s,  some excess capacity 
is planned. Other excess capacity, however, can be due to 
unplanned shifts in the demand for the product.
Gllbid., p. 130.
Steindl, Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism (London: Oxford University Institute of Statistics,
T952)V P.“ 5.
63Ibid., p. 7.
G^ibid., p. 9.
GSibid., p. 10. 
G^ibid., p. 11.
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The concept of excess capacity throws a peculiar 
light on the concept of investment. Investment becomes
6ydependent upon endogenous factors instead of exogenous factors. '
Any change in investment may be determined by a change in
internal accumulation.^® If profit margins are inelastic
upwards, the restoration of desired excess capacity increases
the profit margin, but if the profit margin is inelastic
downwards, a reduction in utilization will bring less 
69investment. If the latter case exists, a given amount of
utilization can be restored only by price policy and not a
decrease in investment because the latter would lead to
70greater excess capacity.' In essence, a price cut may be 
easier than a change in investment with some excess capacity 
so, as a result, investment may be determined as a function 
of utilization.^^
A brief analysis of a firm with excess capacity and 
which is in a dominant position in its industry may provide 
an example of investment as a function of utilization. A 
decline in growth reduces the profit margin by cutting
GTlbid., p. 134. 
G^ibid.
®9lbid., p. 135.
fOlbid.
Tllbid., p. 127.
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utilization of sales per unit of m a r g i n . T h e  consequence 
implied by this is a slower rate of investment due to the 
fact that excess capacity will be kept.^^ To adjust, the 
firm will lower prices instead of investment. Investment, 
thus, becomes a function of utilization^^ which is correlated 
with profit.
What reasons are there to believe that undesired excess 
capacity discourages investment? In the first place this 
appears to be a natural implication of the idea of 
planned excess capacity. If entrepreneurs regard a 
certain amount of excess capacity as desirable, this 
naturally implies that a greater or smaller excess 
capacity will not find their approval. It implies, in 
other words, that they are not indifferent about the degree 
of utilisation actually realised. Their response, if 
they desire ein adjustment, can be only of two kinds: they
can either try to influence the market, e.g. by a price 
cut, or else they can slow up or accelerate the pace of 
investment. The first type of response, we know, is 
often not practicable. The second is always possible 
(though not necessarily very adequate in the short run).
We should expect it to occur at least in those cases 
where the first type of response must be absent, and 
quite likely we may expect it generally.7°
Steindl points out that his theory of excess capacity 
has certain similarities to the acceleration principle except 
that the acceleration principle assumes full capacity and that 
capacity expands "pro rata with demand" whereas his own
72gteindl, Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, p. 122.
73ibid., p. 127.
?4lbid.
75lbid., p. 129.
T^ibid., p. 127.
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theory "attributes only a partial influence to demand. "7^?^
Demand is not the sole factor, but will be only a modifying 
factor "acting via utilization.
Steindl emphasizes the importance of utilization and
profit margins. They are, in mature economies, interrelated
and have an adverse effect upon investment.
. . . the squeezing of profit margins happens through the 
competition of entrepreneurs which is essentially a 
process of squeezing out the weakest competitors. It is 
obvious that this mechanism worked relatively well in a 
system where there are plenty of small producers, and 
plenty of competitors anyway. Thus, no difficulties of 
this type should appear in early capitalism, and even in 
fully developed capitalism for quite a time. In a mature 
capitalism, however, where large-scale production becomes 
the only possible form in mainy industries, and where, 
moreover, the number of competitors is reduced to a very 
few in a great number of cases, the profit margin becomes 
inelastic in a downward direction. Thus, a new type of 
cumulative process becomes possible: suny reduction of
the rate of capital growth will reduce the degree of 
utilisation, and this will further reduce the rate of 
growth of capital. Thus, a given reduction in capital 
growth will lead to a further decrease in the rate of 
growth. This cumulative process may again tend to a 
definite limit, so that the rate of growth will settle 
down at a lower level, but it is not certain whether it 
might not continue, theoretically, without limit.
The inelasticity of gross profit margins in an 
economy dominated by monopoly will thus reinforce any 
given fall in the rate of growth of capital. But, as 
pointed out earlier on, the effects of monopoly will not 
only be to make profit more rigid, it will be to raise 
them and moreover, entrepreneurs will have a greater fear 
of excess capacity under a regime of monopoly. For both 
these reasons there will be a tendency for the rate of 
growth to fall. Utilisation will be lower than it was before 
monopoly became dominant, and, moreover, the investment 
attributable to the influence of any given level of 
utilisation will be lower owing to the fear of excess 
capacity.
TTibid.
78lbid.
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The difference in the level of investment activity 
in different stages of the secular development can thus 
be explained in terms of an endogenous theory, taking 
account of well-known structural changes such as the 
development of monopoly. From the above discussion it 
appears likely that utilisation operates as an adverse 
influence on investment in the period of economic maturity 
in-contrast to earlier periods, when it did not do so, 
and quite probably was high enough even to contribute 
a positive influence on the level of investment.79
Thus, we have a theory tying price rigidity, monopoly 
influences, the accelerator, excess capacity and the degree 
of utilization into a thesis involving a possible secular 
decline in investment and growth.
Thus far the discussion has involved the critiques of 
individual persons. It seems, however, that the next critics 
can be grouped together since they represent a more or less 
common viewpoint. These critics are the members of the 
so-called Chicago School— namely. Prank Knight, David McCord 
Wright Sind Henry C. Simons. These economists emphasize the 
importance of wage-price flexibility. Knight believes that
wage-price flexibilities are vastly important in bringing
ftoforth investment and investment opportunities. He believes 
in an infinitely elastic demand for capital, but realizes
8lthat circumstances may hinder the normal process of growth.
79%bid., p. 137.
SOErnst W. Swanson and Emerson P. Schmidt, Economic 
Stagnation or Progress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1946), p. Ü6.---
Sllbid., p. 27.
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The main impediment is price-wage rigidity caused by
go
monopoly influences in the market place. Other possible 
hindrances could be high interest rates, taxes or tariffs.®3 
Mainly, however, th|e^  emphasis is upon price-wage rigidity
g2i
as a determinant of stagnation. As a result of their 
beliefs, these economists stress a public policy which 
emphasizes the maintenance of or the return to competition 
instead of the lessening of s a v i n g s . ^5
Since monopoly is the main problem that the members 
of the Chicago School confront, they point out that there 
seems to be a pricing pattern that is higher than the 
general level and price rises that are against the general 
t r e n d . T h i s  is also complicated by the presence of labor- 
union monopoly which actually results in benefits to only a 
few w o r k e r s . I n  all, they seem to believe that stagnation 
is a cost-push concept where unions and enterprise monopolies 
result in a three-fold process of increasing wages, increasing 
prices and curtailing output in which cost-price flexibility
QQ
is lost. Wherever technology is introduced, it is
GZibid.
83ibid., p. 28.
Q^Ibid., p. 29.
®5ibid.. p. 27.
86ibid., p. 29.
Bflbid., p. 30.
88ibid., p. 31.
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accompanied by no subsequent decrease in prices or increase 
in output which does nothing to help the overall picture of 
economic growth.®^ Thus, the absence of cost-price flexibility 
is a factor leading to stagnation but, unfortunately, these 
men fail to tell us how to get away from what seems to be the 
inevitable concentration of large-scale, basic industries, 
such as for example, steel.
One of the members of the Chicago School, Henry 0.
Simons, maintained in his A Positive Program for Laissez Faire
that monopoly is the great enemy to fear. He goes so far
as to state explicitly that:
It seems clear, at all events, that there is an intimate 
connection between freedom of enterprise and freedom of 
discussion, and that the political liberty can survive 
only within an effectively competitive economic system.
Thus, the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all 
its forms: gigantic corporations, trade associations and
other agencies for price control, trade unions— or, in 
general, organization and concentration of power within 
functional classes. Effectively organized functional 
groups possess tremendous power for exploiting the 
community at large and even for sabatoging the system.
The existence of competition within such groups, on the 
other hand, serves to protect the community as a whole 
and to give an essential flexibility to the economy.
The disappearance of competition would almost assure the 
wrecking of the system in the economic struggle of 
organized minorities; on the political side, it would 
present a hopeless dilemna.°®
The implication of the above is clearly the "Elimination
89lbid.
9°Henry C. Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, 
Public Policy Pamphlet, No. I5 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1934), p. 4.
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of private monopoly in all its forms. . . This does
not, however, involve policy towards the public utilities
which Simons believes to have been a f a i l u r e . in relation
to natural monopolies, he states that:
. . . the state should face the necessity of actually 
taking over, owning, and managing directly, both the 
railroads and the utilities, and all other industries 
in which it is impossible to maintain effectively com­
petitive conditions.93
Furthermore,
Even if the much-advertised economies of gigantic 
financial combinations were real [the reader should 
remember here the analysis of Stelndl], sound policy 
would wisely sacrifice these economies to preservation 
of more economic freedom and equality.94
Laissez faire, to repeat, implies a division of tasks 
between competitive and political controls; and the 
failure of the system, if it has failed, is properly to 
be regarded as a result of failure of the state. . . .95
Another member of the Chicago School, David McCord
Wright, maintains that consumption is parallel to production
and that there is a stability in the relationship between the
q6capital stock and the subsequent output of goods.^ Thus 
Wright stipulates that the economy is never saturated and
91lbid., p. 11.
92lbid.
93ibid., p. Ilf.
94ibid., p. 13.
95ibid., p. 15.
9^avid McCord Wright, A Key to Modern Economics 
(New York: MacMillan and Company, 1954), p. 4W3.
98
consumer frontiers can be opened and economic expansion 
continued.97^  Wright is quick to point out, however, that 
this process will take place only if there are no interventions, 
Essential to such a growth process as postulated by 
Wright is the concept of competition where new inventions are 
innovated and where consumer wants are satisfied by new 
goods coming forth onto the market. In a system of imperfect 
competition, this would not be the case if entrepreneurs 
decided to protect the position of corporate ownership; to 
protect the value of present facilities; to postpone or 
limit innovation in face of depreciation losses; to allow 
the fear of dipping into liquid assets to prevent them from 
investing; or to allow the established business bureaucracy • 
to maintain the status quo. Even if we grant him his 
assumption that consumption parallels production and the 
constancy of the ratio between capital stock and output 
(which we cannot), we may criticize Wright on the grounds that 
he assumes virtually pure competition and an uninhibited 
movement of capital, which is no longer present. The realities 
of the present market structure seem to make the analysis 
of Wright rather unrealistic, but does point to the 
possibility that imperfect competition does, in fact, enhance 
the danger of stagnation. Wright explicitely believes, for
97lbid.
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example, that monopoly reduces Innovation and that, as a 
result, intensive growth factors cannot be relied upon.^® 
Wright also, however, argues that a re-distribution of income 
may also inhibit in nov at i on . He  does admit, however, that 
Hansen's plan for the increasing of consumption and the 
decreasing of profits through a process of eliminating 
instability has its merits and possibilities.Such a plan 
need not involve a drastic re-distribution of income and, thus, 
would not inhibit innovation. It seems, however, that 
monopoly influences would inhibit innovation much more than 
a more equitable distribution of income and, thus, higher 
propensities to consume would ever do. It seems, at least, 
that all the writers that have been discussed are in agreement 
that an imperfect market structure does present a significant 
hindrance to continued economic growth along the level of 
full-employment.
98i)avid McCord Wright, "The Great Guessing Game: 
Terborgh versus Hansen," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 28 (February, 1946), p. 2l.
99ibid.
100.'Ibid., p. 20.
CHAPTER IV
THE CRITICISMS AND THEIR EVALUATION: SAVINGS, CAPITAL
SAVINGS, AND DEPRECIATION RESERVES
The Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis also considers 
an increase in savings as a cause of stagnation. Savings can 
increase from three general sources. First, consumers and 
corporations can save relatively or absolutely more. Second, 
the trend of technology can release capital through capital- 
saving innovations. Finally, the economy can witness an 
increase in the amount of reserves set aside for depreciation. 
Each of these will be dealt with separately.
Consumer and corporate savings can take the form of 
pergonal savings and retained earnings (undistributed profits). 
Hamberg postulates that the reduction in the rate of population 
growth may reduce personal savings.^ At the same time, 
the reduced need for corporate expansion reserves could 
decrease the amount of corporate savings.^ Both of these 
would help to mitigate the possibility of stagnation insofar
^D. Hamberg, Economic Growth and Instability 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 19^6), p. lY0.
2lbid.
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as it results from savings.
Hamberg, however, is not thoroughly optimistic. He 
reminds us that sixty percent of savings are carried on by 
corporations.3 (It should be noted that this figure of sixty 
percent includes depreciation reserves.) While Hamberg 
postulates that corporate investment may use most, if not 
all of these corporate savings, there still is the need to 
absorb the personal savings of the economy.^ All in all, he 
is rather inconclusive on this point.
Terborgh, on the other hand, is more definite. He 
attacks Hansen on the grounds that as the population rate of 
growth declines, the rate of savings also declines as more
5
and more savings are offset by dissaving. Saving, according
to Terborgh, is for the purpose of purchasing capital goods
in the future and is not merely for the accumulation of
personal wealth.^ Therefore, he concludes that:
. . . since, as we have seen, a substantial portion of 
saving is not so motivated, but rather incident to the 
purchase of particular capital goods, the falling off in 
the component amount of capital formation attributable 
to population growth results in a partially compensatory 
reduction in savings. A stationary population may be 
expected to save less than a growing population of the 
same size and income. To this extent, the problem of
3lbid., p. l8l.
^Ibid.
^George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity 
(Chicago: Machine and Allied Products Institute, 1945), p. 51.
^Ibid., p. 59.
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oversaving in a stable society (if there is such a 
problem) cures itself.'
Terborgh points out that the number of persons over 
sixty-five has increased substantially from 80/IOOO in I850 
to 170/1000 in 1940 and he postulates 310/1000 by 2000.®
Thus, the dissavings being carried on by pensioners is 
substantial and will continue to grow. Therefore, it follows 
that the possible loss of investment outlets is neutralized, 
as far as any inherent tendency towards oversaving is concerned, 
by a reduced amount of funds requiring absorption due to the 
dissaving of elderly groups.^ Savings, therefore, are offset
by dissavings. This, however, assumes a pattern of income 
distribution different from the present pattern. Hansen 
also points out that there may be a transition stage from a 
period of a preponderance of children (upon whom money is spent) 
to the period of a preponderance of elderly persons who 
d i s s a v e . This transition stage would be dominated by a 
middle-age group that is saving.!^
Terborgh next attempts to point out that it was not 
oversaving that caused the depression of the Thirties, but
Tibid., p. 60.
®Ibid., p. 61.
9lbid., p. 62.
l^Alvin Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of
Economic Maturity," The Review of Economics and Statistics,.
Vol. 28 (August, 1946), p. 16.
lllbid.
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that it was the depression that brought about oversaving and 
12underspending. This may be true to an extent. No doubt the 
depression did make things worse. It is possible that a mild 
recession may be a breathing period or a mere psychological 
reversal, but it seems that such a drastic phenomena as 
1929-1939 should be based on something more basic. Terborgh, 
in effect, is rejecting the concept of the upper turning point 
by saying that oversaving and underspending corresponded with 
and did not precede the drop. It could well be that the above 
point ignores the investment decisions in relation to 
consumption ajid savings habits of the time and the accumulation 
of the yet unrecognizable effects of declining population 
growth rates and the decline in the rate of internal, frontier 
development along with the absence of any great new industry 
to offset these other tendencies.
In his reply to Terborgh, Hansen points out that the 
volume of capital formation is related to output and that an 
increase in the volume of output is linked both to the growth
of the labor force and to an increase in per capita
productivity.^3 Terborgh admits this, Hansen points out, but 
discounts it.^^ Hansen is aware that Terborgh realizes that
l^Terborgh, op. cit., p. l82.
^^Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic
Maturity," p. 13.
l^ibid.
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one-third of the capital formation has been linked to 
population growth, but he believes that the latter fails to 
realize the importance of the decline in population growth 
because he refused to recognize the occurence of its effect 
late enough— in 1 9 1 4 . From the period between I870 and I88O,
the per annum population increase was 2.6 percent and from
—  - 161900 to 1910, it was 2.1 percent. During this time, the 
increase in productivity was 1.5 percent per annum so there 
was no great problem in the direction of stagnation.1? The 
Thirties, however, Hansen concludes, were a result of the 
effect of 1929 plus a recognition of declining absolute growth 
and the resultant effects through the principle of the 
accelerator (which Hansen reminds us is based on absolute 
increases and not percentage increases).^® Therefore, the 
spirit of optimism that dominated earlier periods of time was 
gone. Population growth and the volume of output are related, 
but increases in productivity also enter into lend a hand.
As population growth declines and productivity increases, 
there will be a building-up of savings which may not find 
investment outlets in subsequent time periods. Thus, savings 
may be a problem. If, however, there was no increase in 
productivity, this would imply a cessation of investment
15ibid., p. 14. 
l^ibid.
ITibid.
l®Ibid.
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which would mean that there would be no outlet for current 
savings. Population increases, then, seem necessary for 
continued investment outlets offsetting the levels of savings. 
This brings us back to the interrelation of all the factors 
leading to economic stagnation.
The second form of savings can be discussed in relation 
to capital-savings. Hansen, Pellner points out, states that 
even with price-rigidities, the "deepening" of capital would 
be compatible to economic growth whereas the "widening" of 
capital would not be compatible to growth. Pellner, however, 
emphasizes the fact that price-rigidities affect the forth­
coming of investment and cannot be overlooked.Also,
investment, Pellner contends, depends upon the behavior of
20the cost structure. Keynes holds wages rather unadjustable
21and Hansen holds prices rather unadjustable. Both Keynes
and Hansen point out, Pellner states, that improvements get
weaker as the economy goes beyond the state of extensive
22growth and becomes advanced. This is where Hansen begins 
to talk about the need for a deepening of capital in the face 
of a widening of capital in order for economic growth to be
l^William Pellner, "The Technological Argument of the 
Stagnation Thesis," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 55 
(August, 1941), p.
2Plbid.
Zllbid.
22ibid., p. 640.
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made compatible to price rigidities. Hansen contends, however, 
that a deepening of capital is not what current technology 
is bringing about, but that, rather, a widening of capital 
seems to be manifesting itself which tends to raise capital- 
input rather proportionately to output.
Pellner attempts to test the contention that the 
current century has seen a widening of capital. He presents 
tables that show that over the period of the decade of the 
nineteen-twenties, such a widening of capital may have taken 
place, but is careful to point out that there were shorter
p2i
time periods when a deepening of capital may have occurred. 
Nevertheless, he shows that the capital stock per unit of 
labor employed did, during this period, increase tremendously. 
This, however, needs more emphasis than merely stating that 
short periods within the decade showed deepening effects 
along with an increase in the amount of capital per unit of 
labor employed. If output increased in proportion to capital, 
but labor decreased relative to capital, might this not lead 
to eventual stagnation?
After stating that the presence of capital deepening 
innovations are not found exclusively in the nineteenth century, 
Pellner points out that they would still be unable to stimulate
23%bid., p. 641. 
Z^ibid., p. 645. 
25lbid., p. 646.
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p6economic growth In the presence of wage-price rigidities.
Hansen, of course, contends that cost-savings industries do
not lower the prices of their products or increase their 
27output. ' This leads Hansen to a preference for a deepening
28of capital over a widening of capital effect. Pellner,
however, contends that all innovations (i.e., capital
deepening or capital widening) result in lower costs.
Since they both lower costs, they both lower money income if
the real flow of services does not increase as costs decline
(i.e., either/or lower prices and increased output).
Pellner agrees that the original stimulus may offset the cost-
saving and, thus, income decreasing effects of the innovation
without a real increase in goods and services, but he maintains
that long-run effects will outweight the short-run stimulus
SIas the innovation effects wear-out. All capital innovations 
increase capital stock and, thus, the higher maintenance 
costs (regardless of deepening or widening effects) must be 
offset by savings in operating costs if they are to be
zGlbid., p. 647. 
27lbid., p. 648.
28ibid., p. 649.
29ibid.
30lbid.
31ibid.
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cost-saving. Continual improvements with continued price 
rigidities, furthermore, have a continued long-run deflationary
33
effect. In each time period, for example, new investment
would be required to bring forth new innovations which would,
Pellner thinks, maintain the income generated by the production
of new equipment. However, the money generated by cost-saving
industries declines as each time period advances resulting in
a decrease in money income as price rigidities r e m a i n . 35
This is d e f l a t i o n a r y . Thus, Pellner concludes that the
statement that innovations are now less stimulating
. . . can only be interpreted to mean that these 
innovations failed to increase the output of the cost- 
saving industries to any considerable extent. This can 
be a consequence of rigid price policies, or a consequence 
of a small demand-elasticity for the products of those 
industries in which the technological progress happened 
to occur. It cannot be the consequence of the alleged 
but unproven circumstance that the innovations of our 
generation require less capital per unit of output. An 
economy in which rigid industries are introducing "deepening" 
innovations is exposed, after a brief initial period, to 
exactly the same deflationary pressures as an economy in 
which rigid industries introduce "non-capital-using" 
innovations.37
The above point must be well taken. It seems to be a 
rather devastating attack upon the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation
32pellner, "The Technological Argument of the Stagnation 
Thesis," p. 649.
33ibid., p. 650. d
3^Ibid.
35ibid.
3% b i d .
37ibid., p. 651.
109
Thesis. Actually, however, it is not. It is merely a clari­
fication. It is true that both capital-widening and capital- 
deepening innovations will have eventual depressive effects 
upon the economy if rigidities block the increase in the output 
of real goods and services. However, might not the point be 
well taken that a capital-deepening innovation would be less 
deflationary than a capital-widening innovation because the 
latter does not absorb savings which are increasing relative 
to population, whereas the former absorbs part of this 
additional amount of savings? Therefore, the capital-widening 
innovation in the face of rigidities will be deflationary both 
because it is cost-saving and because it does not aid in the 
absorption of increasing amounts of savings whereas a capital- 
deepening innovation may be deflationary because of its cost- 
saving nature in the face of rigidities, but less deflationary 
in the absolute sense because of the fact that it absorbs part 
of the increase in absolute savings. Thus, we must look at the 
relative overall effects of these different types of innovations 
without, at the same time, making capital-deepening innovations, 
in themselves, the cure-all but, rather, only a part of the 
prescription.
The Swanson and Schmidt critique of Hansen's thesis 
is similar to Pellner's. These men emphasize that all 
improvements lower costs and, thus, whether or not an
S^Ernst W. Swajison and Emerson P. Schmidt, Economic 
Stagnation or Progress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1945), p.31.---------
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improvement is capital-widening or capital-deepening is not 
greatly significant. Since both types of improvements lower 
costs, it follows that income will also be lowered unless the 
real flow of services is increased (through lower prices sind 
increased output).^9 This implies that price rigidities are
4odeflationary. In their analysis, improvements lower costs
which must be accompanied by an increase in real output which,
of course, necessitates an elastic demand curve. From this
we can go one step further into the competitive framework
and return to the basic concept of an infinitely elastic
4ldemand curve for capital. If the product has an inelastic
demand curve, net additions to output will only be made when
42sales are expected to advance. The solution is to crack
213
the market structure of imperfect competition — which is
often easier said than done.
Swanson and Schmidt are confident of the workability
of the competitive model. As a matter of fact, significant
interference arises only through government stifling of free 
44enterprise. Their position, however, seems to be based on 
a completely unrealistic belief concerning the extent of imperfect
40ibid., p. 32.
4llbid., p. 34.
42ibid.
43Ibid., p. 36.
44%bid., p. 37.
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competition in the market, the necessity in some industries 
of large scale production and the possibility of returning 
to the competitive framework. The presence of inelastic 
demand curves is not so easily solved. Also, the adoption 
of technology in an imperfect market structure of large-scale 
industry may not occur because of both the market structure 
and because of the realities of large-scale industry. This 
is a basic contradiction of the Chicago School.
It should be pointed out that neither the writings of 
Pellner nor of Swanson and Schmidt contradict Alvin Hansen.
Both, after we escape from the competitive framework, emphasize 
that in the presence of an imperfect market structure, price 
and output rigidities will have a deflationary effect upon the 
introduction of either capital-widening or capital-deepening 
improvements. The main difference, then, between Hansen and 
his critics is that the latter are, given an imperfect 
market structure, more pessimistic.
After our study of capital-savings, the last factor in 
the general area of savings still remains to be discussed. That 
factor is depreciation. George Terborgh, whose book The Bogey 
of Economic Maturity was supposed to be the coup de grace to 
the Stagnation Thesis, deals with depreciation rather 
extensively. The Stagnation Thesis maintains that depreciation 
allowances finance the replacement and acquisition of new stocks.
^^Terborgh, op. cit., p. 99.
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Terborgh maintains that as the amount of replacement capital
rises, more replacement opportunities would arise.Terborgh
is aware that Dr. Oscar Altman of the Securities Exchange
Commission had, before the Temporary National Economic Committee
hearings, maintained that from 1923-1929 (a period of boom),
seventy-five percent of all fixed capital requirements were
47internally financed. ' This was due to the fact that
. . . depreciation allowances are sufficient not only to 
maintain the productive capacity of industry but to 
increase it substantially . . , because the accruals over 
the life of the machine will typically replace it with 
a machine of higher capacity, and in consequence, demand 
for individual savings will appear only when the expansion 
of total productive capacity is rapid— too rapid to be 
covered by depreciation allowances.
Terborgh, to counteract Altman's testimony, refers to 
Alfred Sloan of General Motors and Owen Young of General 
Electric who maintain that there is a place for private savings 
in the American economy and that the only thing that keeps 
private savings from entering into corporate investment is 
the dominant policy of the government. Earlier, in reply 
to the question of the ability of General Motors to completely 
finance itself internally, Alfred Sloan had admitted that 
. .if things continue in a reasonable way, the way we 
expect, that is true."^^ The latter statement by Sloan seems
46ibid.
47lbid., p. 28.
48lbid., p. 29.
49lbid.
50lbid.
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to be a mere hedging around the original explicit meaning of 
his original statement, which admitted General Motors' 
independence from the external market for funds.
As we have seen, the Stagnationists contend that 
depreciation allowances finance both replacement and new 
capital whereas Terborgh, despite the testimony of Sloan, 
contends differently. The Stagnationists further believe that 
since replacement is self-financing, an increase in the ratio 
of consumption to capital formation diminishes the amount 
needed to finance "new" investment so that savings become 
excessive whereas Terborgh believes that an increase in the 
capital-consumption ratio increases the amount of goods to 
be replaced and that, eventually, the replacement demand would 
exceed the funds raised for replacement.^^
To prove his contention, Terborgh points out that 
there is partial replacement and displacement of capital 
items such as automobiles, locomotives, houses, and so on.^^ 
This reselling of production equipment consists of "murder 
by degrees" as the item loses its function.53 Production 
machinery and capital items gradually gravitate towards 
inferior uses over their lifetime and, as age advances, the
51lbid., p. 102.
52lbid., p. 103.
53ibid.
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service which good renders is less and less as functional
degradation sets in,^^ Quite often, a capital good is
replaced before it is Junked which results in displacement
by newer machines followed by complete replacement.^5 As a
matter of simplicity
. . . one half of replacement is spread evenly over the 
service life, the other half occurring at the time
of replacement.3d
This " . . .  raises the ratio of consumption and retirements to 
capital formation" but also " . . .  raises the ratio of 
replacement to consumption."5?
The above increase in the ratio of replacement to 
consumption
. . .  is a corrollary of the façtJbhat when the 
production of a capital good has been rising retirements 
are lower than consumption (depreciation). Being lower, 
they rise faster as we pass from higher to lower 
production growth rates, overtaking consumption at a 
growth rate of zero. Since by our assumption only one 
half of replacement is timed at the retirement of capital 
goods, they fall below consumption on a rising production 
growth trend by less than retirement, but like the 
latter rise relative to consumption as the growth trend
declines.5°
Terborgh presents a chart of the ratio of capital 
replacement to the consumption of capital for selected lifes
5^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 104f.
55ibld.
S^ibid., p. 108.
57ibid., p. 110.
58ibid.
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of capital g o o d s . P r o m  this chart he concludes that:
(l) The ratio of replacement to consumption rises as we 
pass from higher to lower rates of growth in capital 
formation. (2) With a given growth rate, the replacement- 
consumption ratio is higher the shorter the service life 
of the capital-goods. We may infer from these observations 
that economic maturity might conceivably raise replacement 
relative to consumption (l) by slowing down the growth of 
capital formation, and C2) by shortening the average useful 
lives of capital goods.
Terborgh deals with the shortening of the average
useful life capital good first. In this, he maintains that:
. . .  if the attELinment of economic maturity . , . does 
result in a lower growth rate in aggregate capital 
formation than obtained while population was increasing, 
we will have a considerably higher proportion of our 
capital goods in the upper age brackets. . . . What 
should be the effect . . .  on the life expectancy of these 
goods? It should tend to shorten them by making the 
supply of aged units relatively redundant.
Furthermore, Terborgh adds that:
’ A slower growth rate for capital formation, and an age 
distribution of the stock weighted more heavily in the 
upper age brackets, do not automatically bring with 
them an increased demand for low-grade as against high- 
grade services. Unless the pattern of demand does 
shift in this direction, however, the increase in the 
proportion of aged units tends to make them redundant, 
to lower their market values, and to advance the age of 
retirement.
The shortening of service life, therefore, increases 
the replacement consumption ratio. This, however, does not 
answer the question of whether or not the demand for investment
GOlbid., p. 112.
59lbid.
60]
Gllbid.
G^Ibid., p. 113.
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funds will or will not decrease. Under the assumptions of
half-displacement and half-replacement investment demand,
and the shortening of the useful life of the capital item,
. . . economic maturity would increase replacement 
opportunities even more than it increased the flow of 
goods from this source. The proportion of such funds 
available for financing capital e%3)suision would be less 
than before.
Thus, there is no such animal as the "universal and automatic 
generation of investment funds by the consumption of existing 
capital g o o d s a n d ,  thus, new investment funds are still 
required.
The question arises as to why replacement financing
cannot be done internally. The answer is that they can be
but are not. They could be
. . .  if the capital good is valued at the full future, 
or realization, value of its unconsumed services.
Since these services can be drawn off only over a period 
of time, and since future values are always discounted, 
the present worth of remote services is less than their 
eventual realization value. For this reason, the decline 
in capital value as a reservoir of unused services is 
drained and is by no means parallel with the shrinkage 
in the volume of such services remaining.
On the following page, Terborgh concludes that:
Although it is its content of unconsumed services that 
gives value to a durable capital asset, capital consumption 
is not measured by the amount or proportion of such 
services used up but rather by the exhaustion of capital 
value.oo
G^Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity, p. 115. 
G^ ibid.
GSlbid., p. 120f.
66lbid., p. 122.
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After stating the above, Terborgh goes on to say that 
depreciation allowances are not as important as they have been 
made out to be due to the fact that most public bodies and 
private concerns or consumers do not, in fact, make depreciation 
allowances.This, however, does nothing to discount the 
importance of depreciation allowances that are made by larger 
companies— like for example, the two hundred corporations 
that hold about fifty percent of the corporate wealth in the
nation.
The entire analysis seems, to break down over the
definition and purpose in accounting of depreciation. Terborgh
admits that depreciation is taken out of gross income based
on an estimate of the service life of the good.^9 This,
however, he relates to services rendered and states that the
decline in capital value has no relation to the services 
70rendered. A car, for example, depreciates rapidly in terms 
of trade-in, but not in terms of cost-accounting on a straight 
line life-of-asset basis or on a service rendered basis.
This Terborgh relates to machines. From this, he then seems 
to indicate, the result would be that the owner of the asset 
would have to spend new investment funds in order to purchase 
a new machine because of the difference between book-value
67ibid., p. 126.
A. Adelman, "The Measurement of Industrial 
Concentration," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 33 
(November, 1951 )7~pTT77^
69lbid., p. 127.
70lbid., p. 121.
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and trade-in value. The question arises, however, as to how 
many persons do in fact trade in machines yearly— or cars for 
that matter. Indeed it would seem that they would wait until 
the amount from gross income equaled the cost of the machine. 
This would especially be true if the market structure were 
oligopolistic and the replacement stimulants of pure 
competition were not present. Oligopoly seems to be most 
realistic in the major industries where depreciation-type 
accounting is carried on. Thus, Terborgh's analysis breaks 
down.
Terborgh next attempts to disprove the self-sufficiency
of corporations from the external market for funds. This he
does while admitting the self-sufficiency of many of our
largest corporations.Only a few, however, he contends,
are self-sufficient and, therefore, no statement as to the
possibility of external investment funds not finding outlets
elsewhere can be made. He states that
To select a few of the former [self-sufficient 
corporations] as representative of the whole is as 
meaningless as it is misleading.72
The same thing, of course, can be said of the practice of
excluding the self-sufficient corporations which are leaders
in their respective oligopolistic industries. Thus, they do
become important as they grow larger and more inclusive.
Tljbid., p. 151.
72lbid.
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Terborgh points out that Ford Motor Company has not used 
external funds, but that its smaller suppliers have.73 This 
may be true, but the accelerator wears off suid the economy Is 
left with the effect of a non-lncreaslng demand for capltal- 
goods. Also, what Is to prevent (especially In a rather 
concentrated market economy) these supplier firms from eventually 
generating their own self-sufficiency for expansion— an 
expansion which would be unlikely unless there was a growth 
of Ford Motor Company which, due to market conditions, seems 
unlikely on a large scale. Therefore, the writing off of the 
total effects of Internal financing upon the outlets for 
external Investment funds seems to overlook the realities of 
the overall balance of the market structure.
In reply to Terborgh, Hansen points out that 
accounting (and depreciation) methods are spreading and that 
the I93O-I940 period offered no outlet for net savings.?^
If Hansen Is correct In his belief about the spread of 
accounting and depreciation practices, this may Increase 
the savings of Individual enterprises, small businesses and 
other Institutions. This may result In an Increase In 
absolute If not relative savings and may. In time, free 
many other businesses from the external market for Investment 
funds at a time when personal savings may well be Increasing
73ibld., p. 157.
7^Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," p. 16.
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due to the transition stage of the age-structure shift, 
higher income levels or the saturation of consumer demand.
This, indeed, is not a pleasant thought for those who think 
in terms of a savings and investment equilibrium and the 
maintenance of what is hoped to be a full-employment level of 
income.
In addition to the criticism leveled by Hansen,
Terborgh receives a further critique from David McCord Wright
who feels that The Bogey of Economic Maturity by Terborgh
is a work where
Scholarly discussion is frequently interspersed with 
outbursts of rather elaborate sarcasm. One frequently 
feels as if inconclusiveness of evidence were being 
atoned for by positiveness of assertion.75
More specifically, Wright feels that Terborgh contradicts 
himself when he admits to the presence of internal financing 
and then proceeds to say that there is no tendency towards 
self-financing.^^ Also, Wright holds that any potential 
replacement boom caused by a change in the grouping of 
replacement needs would only be temporary.Thus, the danger 
of the advent of stagnation due to increases in depreciation 
reserves seems, after Hansen and Wright, still something that 
remains with the United States economy.
75i)avid McCord Wright, "The Great Guessing Game;
Terborgh versus Hansen," Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 28 (February, 1946), p. 18.
7^Ibid., p. 19.
77lbid., p. 20.
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Concluding Remarks
Before disposing of the criticisms of Hansen and his
Thesis, It Is proper to return again to the works of Hansen,
himself. Many persons have used the post-World War II
period as an Indication of the Invalidity of the concept of
stagnation In the United States economy. Indeed, Hansen,
himself, asks the question as to why the post-World War I
period was a period of stagnation whereas the post-World
War II period Is a period of general expansion.*^® The
answer to the challenge that such a question presents can be
found within the framework of the Stagnation Thesis.
It must be remembered that. In reply to Terborgh,
Hansen stated that stagnation Is not the Inevitable result
of capitalism— merely of laissez faire capitalism.
Furthermore, the period after 1914 found economists bewildered
and governments unprepared to assume the responsibility for
80full-employment. Still, however, economists thought only
81In cost-prlce terms Instead of In aggregative terms. Also, 
the recognition that deflationary policies did not weed out 
Inefficient firms and help, thus, to bring about an equilibrium
f^Alvln Hansen, The American Economy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957J, P. 1.
f^Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," p. 13.
Q^Hansen,. The American Economy, p. 7.
8llbld., p. 8.
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was not yet obvious to policy makers. In reality,
deflationary adjustment processes used by mlcro-economlsts
did not. In fact, result In the weeding out of Inefficient
firms, but did result In an Immobilization of labor.®3 Thus,
the policy considerations of Classical and Neo-Classical
economics were not realistic and the economy was faced with
an accumulation of changing patterns which were not yet
fully recognized or understood. A change, however, was about
to take place.
The change that took place was the growth of a public-
private economy (a mixed economy) emphasizing social welfare
ftil
and full-employment. Also, there was the recognition that 
such a combination might do much to bring forth the reality 
of progress without Instability.®^ There was also the 
recognition that capital formation In a rich society need 
not come from the mal-dlstrlbutlon of personal Income—  
especially when recent years have seen two-thirds of the 
capital formation being accomplished through Internal 
f i n a n c i n g . T h e  change that took place, however, was the 
scrapping of laissez faire for a mixed form of planned
®2lbld., p. 9.
®3lbld.
®4%bld., p. 10.
®5lbld., p. 11.
®®Ibld., p. 35.
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capitalism. This was the tonic that Hansen had prescribed.
Hansen proceeds to analyze the policies of the economic
planners after World War II. First of all, the War and the
economic stimulus of the War had brought about adequate
aggregate demand— a cornerstone of economic stability.
Also, various readjustment aids were introduced plus the
widening and stabilizing of consumption through fiscal
measures and fiscal stabilizers,®® Many fields of construction
were also stimulated through the rather extensive mortgage 
89debt program. Most important, however, was the declared 
policy of the federal government in relation to its important 
place in maintaining adequate aggregate demand.9^ * Even the 
Eisenhower Administration pledged the federal government to 
a policy of maintaining full-employment.^^ All in all, the 
post-World War II reality has, thus, been a period of growth 
and moderate inflation with a reliance upon fiscal policy 
as a major tool for the maintenance of full-employment.^^ In 
many ways, the moderate inflation has done much to stimulate 
the economic growth but, on the other hand, may be a by-product
^^Hansen, The American Economy, p. 26.
®8lbid., p. 38.
®9ibid., p. 32.
90ibid., p. 39.
S^ Ibid., p. 118.
92ibid., p. 58.
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of full-employment.
Hansen, however, is not thoroughly optimistic about 
the nature of the economic system that we are building. In 
the first place, long term growth is not a function of 
capital accumulation but, rather, of research and invention.
In the second place, there is the presence of the poorest 
elements yet unreached and whose welfare cannot be completely 
satisfied in the market place (e.g., the need for educational 
and recreational f a c i l i t i e s ) I n  the third place, the 
rising consumer emphasis upon gadgetry may well, in the long 
run, become a detriment to a truly satisfying level of full- 
employment.^^ This introduces the problem of the necessity 
of considering social ends and social alternatives when we 
plan economic goals.9^ On the optimistic side, however, it
93ibid., p. 134.
94%bid., p. 146.
95ibid., p. 145.
96jhe problem of economic goals and social goals 
conflicting as to desirability can, I think, be seen by the 
present mode of living of the United States' family. Possessions 
and gadgetry have come to be equated with personal success to 
such an extent that the individual is in a never ending cycle 
of purchasing new or higher quality goods to keep ahead of 
the neighbors. This could be at the sacrifice of more important 
family goals. Also, it could lead to a rise in mass 
frustration on the part of many which might be disrupting to 
the society in the long-run as well as making the -individual 
feel himself to be a personal failure in life if his material 
"standard of living" is not as high as some other person's.
Thus, economic full-employment must be considered alongside 
of social and psychological problems as well. This, however, 
is the point of departure for a subsequent work.
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must be emphasized that Hansen stresses the importance of 
the growth of monetary and fiscal operational freedom.9?
Also, he feels that economics must continue to advance 
towards becoming an operational science through the 
introduction of the mixed economic system and the welfare and 
full-employment commitments that are now the "modus vivendi" 
of economic thinking.9®
William Pellner, however, criticizes Hansen’s study 
of the post-World War II economy. The criticism is more of 
a short review of some of the problems that may eventually 
arise in our economy instead of an attempt to refute Hansen. 
Pellner, for example, asks what might be the results if 
inflation should get out of hand when the promulgators of 
wage-push growth theory try to increase real economic 
status,99 so that the price level increase might exceed the 
rate of increase in output which Hansen, Pellner contends, 
admits to be signal of d a n g e r . P e l l n e r  is not afraid of 
inflation, per se, but merely points out that inflationary 
acceleration is inherent in wage-cost i n f l a t i o n . If,
97Hansen, The American Economy, p. 173.
98 i M d ., p. 259.
99william Pellner, "The American Economy," Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 66 (October, 1958), p. 450.
lOOlbid., p. 449. 
lOllbid., p. 450.
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Indeed, this should be the case, it leads to policy
considerations that might allow wage-cost push, but which
102prevent its acceleration.
Pellner points out also that the welfare state may 
not necessarily create high pressure d e m a n d .
Pellner asks why a positive redistribution of income 
necessarily can be said to offset the negative effects of 
taxation on the rate of investment especially if the 
investment-to-output ratio r i s e s . A l s o ,  might even defense 
spending reduce spending for goods and services elsewhere 
(let alone spending for transfers) because of taxation.
The latter two points seem to be answerable by 
pointing out that a lower net profit level may be acceptable 
to investors if instability is not a problem and if the 
change in net profit levels does not decrease beneath 
reasonable levels or within too short a time period for
lO^A policy to end the danger of inflationary acceleration 
might involve some government control of prices and wages in 
major industries on a more or less planned basis of wage 
increases. Also, however, Pellner‘s criticism of Hansen on 
this point introduces us to the question of whether or not 
the inflation is a wage-price spiral or a price-wage spiral 
or a tendency of the two to be part and parcel of the same 
co-operative movement on the part of labor and management.
This, however, should be left for another study.
^^^Pellner, The American Economy, p. 450.
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psychological adjustments to be made. In speaking of 
offsetting expenditures of one sector (private) by increasing 
expenditures of services of another part of the same sector 
(private), it is necessary to analyze the propensities to 
consume of the various sectors and their subparts. The 
question as to the necessary creation of high pressure demand 
is not, however, so easily answerable if the level where the 
lowest incomes are substantial enough to provide their 
recipients with a decent level of consumption with what they 
consider to be an adequate amount of "luxuries." The 
occurrence of such a phenomena, however, would not refute 
stagnation, but would merely re-emphasize the growth of 
savings included within the Stagnation Thesis. In short, 
the Stagnation Thesis, thus far, seems to pass the test of 
critics especially when it is realized that the present 
economy functions under the policies that grew out of or 
were implicitely or explicitely recommended by the followers 
of the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis.
CHAPTER V
PELLNER AND DYNAMIC GROWTH INTRODUCTION
The interjection at this point of the growth thesis 
of William Pellner temporarily transfers us from the area of 
dynamic stagnation-type analysis to dynamic growth-type 
analysis.^ Pellner believes that the economy will not 
suffer from stagnation but, instead, will follow an upward 
course. He begins his analysis of the process of economic 
growth from an equilibrium level between realized savings and 
planned investment. He points out that the interaction of 
the multiplier and the accelerator will bring about a higher 
level of income in subsequent time periods and, thus, a 
higher level of realized savings. The higher level of 
realized savings must be absorbed by a higher level of planned 
investment. A higher level of investment activity depends upon
^The word "dynamic" here refers to the fact that both 
the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation Thesis and the Pellner Growth 
Thesis involve forces of motion of either an endogenous 
or exogenous nature that are at work in the capitalistic 
economic system. These forces tend to bring about another 
economic stage in the development of the capitalistic system 
as we know it. Thus, a "dynamic" thesis involves forces 
setting and maintaining the economy in motion towards a 
further level (upwards or downwards) or state of development.
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the growth of technological offsets to the diminishing
returns to capital. He is, thus, interested in the process
of smooth, uninterrupted growth and the ability of the
economy to carry out its savings and investment plans.
He analyzes this process within the framework of a stable 
2
price level. This thesis involves a study of how the 
economic forces should act if continued and uninterrupted 
growth is to be maintained.
There are three corollaries which are the pre-conditions 
of the process of uninterrupted growth. The first of these
corollaries is the improvement process which serves as an
•a
offset to diminishing returns to capital,-' This process 
involves both the "quantitative sufficiency and the 
qualitative adequacy of offsets to diminishing returns,"^
The second corollary relates to the mobility of resources 
and structural changes,^ The third corollary involves the 
legal and institutional compatibility of the efforts to 
regulate credit,
p
William Pellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic 
Activity (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^6), p, 167,
3lbid.
4
Ibid.
5lbid,
^Ibid.
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The third corollary places counter-cyclical emphasis 
upon monetary policy. Fiscal policy is, Pellner believes, 
inappropriate for the maintenance of continued dynamic 
growth. He points out that deficit spending involves high 
corporate and individual taxes which may have a lowering 
effect upon the long-run growth path because they stem from 
equality-security policies.^ Pellner also contends that 
the so-called built-in-stabilizers do not function to prevent
Q
cycles. This raises the question of whether or not fiscal 
policy is capable of coping with unemployment. Fiscal 
policy does not, for exeimple, deal with the- underlying 
causes of massive unemployment.
Fiscal policy, then, has its definite limitations.
If, for example, there is unemployment even though at the 
full-employment level, investment and savings are equal, 
fiscal policy would be inappropriate. Such unemployment 
would be caused by an insufficiency of physical capital stock 
that could be constructed without inflation. This would be • 
the case when the labor supply was growing more rapidly 
than the supply of capital funds or the labor-saving 
characteristics of improvements were releasing more workers 
from jobs them could be re-absorbed given the supply of 
capital.9 This type of unemployment could not be solved
?Ibid., p. 318.
Qjbid., p. 359.
9lbid., p. 360.
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by deficit financing because easy credit and capital formation 
could be forthcoming.^^ What is actually needed is not 
deficit spending, but an increase in savings, consumer 
taxation or wage reductions so that additional capital can 
be formed without inflation.
Fiscal policy is also inappropriate in cases of
IPregional and occupational unemployment. This is due to the 
fact that deficit spending would both block mobility and 
create inflationary pressures in other sectors of the
l'a
economy. On the other hand, if unemployment is caused by 
insufficient rates of return to capital due to the scarcity 
of factors cooperating with capital, deficit financing could 
help by reducing tax payments in relation to total government 
spending.Even here, however, a guarantee of full 
employment through fiscal policy would create a pressure for 
higher wages. The pressure for higher wages could become so
great that wage rates might increase faster than output per 
15man-hour. Fiscal policy is, thus, a dangerous tool even 
though it may be partially effective at first. In the other
lOpeiiner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 360.
^ Ibid.
13%bid. ■
l^ ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 361.
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types of unemployment discussed above, deficit spending is 
inappropriate. Also, government investment or spending 
would inevitably con^ete with private investment and 
spending,This, Pellner fears.
Since Pellner both fears fiscal policy and thinks it 
largely inappropriate, he recommends and states his analysis 
within the framework of a balanced budget. Long-run growth, 
then, depends upon private investment. Monetary policy is 
the most sufficient and the quickest way of dealing with 
variations in the level of employment. Pellner also assumes 
that the improvement process has and will continue to adjust
1 o
to relative resource scarcities in relation to capital.
Thus, he provides a model which assumes such adjustability 
and a balanced budget as well as the non-relevancy of 
stagnation. Also, Pellner is speaking in real terms with 
price-wage changes calculated out.
Relation of Pellner*s Model to the 
Domar-Harrod Model 
Pellner provides us a model similar to that of Harrod
l^ibid., p. 363.
l?Ibid., p. 367.
iGlbid., p. 387.
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and Domar.^^ Both models are within the Keynesian framework 
and both use the concept of changes in investment generating 
an increase in income and necessitating a higher level of 
investment in subsequent time periods.^® Harrod and Domar, 
unlike Pellner, have rigid price levels and input-output 
ratios. The Harrod-Domar analysis, Leland Yeager contends.
^^The reader can refer, if he pleases, to specific 
works on or by Harrod and Domar. Such works include Essays 
in the Theory of Economic Growth by Evsey D. Domar published 
in 1957 by the Oxford University Press, New York. Evsey
Domar also has an article in the Economic Journal entitled 
"Depreciation, Replacement and Growth, '■ MacMillan and Company, 
London, 1959, page 1. Another article may be found in 
Econometrica, Vol. XIV, April, 1949, entitled "Capital 
Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment," pages 137-147.
The American Economic Review of March, 1947, Vol. XXXVII has 
an article by Domar entitled "Expansion and Employment," on 
pages 34 through 55 while the December, 1948, Vol. XXXVIII, 
edition has an article entitled "The Problem of Capital 
Accumulation," on pages 777 to 794. Also, R. P. Harrod's 
Towards a Dynai^c Economics published by the MacMillan 
Company of London in 194Ü is of great interest. Harrod also 
has articles in the Economic Journal of September, 1938,
Vol. XLVIII, on page 405 entitled "'Scope and Method of 
Economics," and the March, 1939, Vol. XLIX, on pages 14 to 
33 entitled "An Essay in Dynamic Theory." Book reviews 
and comments by other economists include: Joan Robinson,
"Mr. Harrod*s Dynamics," Economic Journal, Vol. 59, P.
David McCord Wright, "Economic Growth: Econometric Models
in Relation to^the Social Setting," American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings (Evanston, 111. : American Economic
Association, May, 1952), p. 496; Louis Dow, "Essays in the 
Theory of Economic Growth," Southern Economic Review 
(January, 1948), p. 362; R. G. Hawtrey, "Mr. Harrod's Essay 
in Dynamic Theory," Economic Journal, Vol. 49 (March, 1939), 
p. 458.
20lt is not quite correct to say that both work 
within the Keynesian framework. They both use the general 
conceptual analysis of Keynes and both use his concept of 
the multiplier. They both, however, add the concept of the 
accelerator to the concept of the multiplier.
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would go so far as to say, for example, that: . . a moving
full employment equilibrium can endure only if Income grows
at a definite rate fixed by the propensity to save and the
21accelerator or capital-output ratio. . . ." Domar,
himself, states that:
. . . the maintenance of a continuous state of full 
employment requires that investment and income grow at a 
constant annual percentage (or compound interest) rate 
equal to the product of the marginal propensity to save 
and the average (to put it briefly) productivity of
investment.22
The Harrod-Domar growth thesis, thus, involves a
rigid and mathematically precise model of growth. Yeager
criticizes this mathematical preciseness. To the implied
Harrod-Domar conclusion that " . . .  equilibrium can endure
only if income grows at a definite rate fixed by the
propensity to save and the accelerator or capital-output
ratio, . . . "  Yeager replies that this assumes a precise
relationship of savings and investment to income.^3 Yeager
believes that savings and investment depend upon other
factors besides income and that they are, at least, more
pliunstable than the Harrod-Domar assumptions allow. The
^^Leland Yeager, "Some Questions about Growth 
Economics," American Economic Review, Vol. 44 (March, 1954), 
p. 55.
^^Evsey D. Domar, "Expansion and Employment,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 37 (March, 194%), p. 4l.
23yeager, op. cit., p. 57.
2^Ibid.
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concept of plajined Investment equaling actual savings is 
unrealistic. David McCord Wright points out that we know 
very little about parameter values^^ and, also, that such 
values are valid only so long as the sociological conditions 
which formed the atmosphere under which the parameter values 
were formed remain constant.Sociological values may 
change making the concept of rigid capital coefficient and 
parameter values a questionable method of explaining dynamic 
growth in the long run.^?
Yeager also deals with the Harrod-Domar thesis' claim 
that any increase in productive capacity raises real income
pQ
by a definite amount to absorb the new productive capacity. 
Yeager does not deny that real income must increase to absorb 
productive capacity, but merely attacks the constancy of 
such output and income increases.
If the above criticisms sure relevant, then the 
Hsurrod-Domar rigidities become irrelevant for growth study 
purposes because, in reality, rigidities are not prevalent. 
What is needed, then, is a growth theory that does not use 
precise parameter and coefficient values but, rather, one 
that implicitly or explicitly assumes the non-rigidity of
25oavid McCord Wright, "Economic Growth: Econometric
Models in Relation to the Social Setting," Americ^ Econome 
Review Papers sind Proceedings, Vol. 42 (May, 1952j, p. 502.
ZGlbid., p. 496.
ZTlbid., p. 497.
Z^Yeager, op. cit., p. 57.
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2Qsuch values ^ while realizing that the maintenance of full
employment depends upon the maintenance of an equilibrium
between planned investment and actual savings in subsequent
time periods. Also, a growth thesis must include an adequate
analysis of the fact that
. . . investment appears on both sides of the equation; 
that is, it has a dual effect; on the left side it 
generates income via the multiplier effect; and on the 
right side it increases productive capacity— the
effect.30
•51
Such a theory of dynamic growth is provided by William Pellner.
^^It must be realized, however, that any growth theory 
must still assume a relatively limited range within which the 
values usually fluctuate. If it were not for these relative 
limits, the picture would be one of chaos and confusion with 
no systemitization and general predictive value.
3%omaz', op. cit., p. 46. The effect is spoken of in 
terms of Domar's analysiseof the dual nature of the process 
of investment. For example, in the formula
Æ  g  = KT" (where is the multiplier and ^  is 
the supply side or the annual increase in productive capacity), 
investment generates income through the multiplier, on the 
left side of the equation whereas on the right side of the 
equation, investment is generally productive capacity.• This 
generation of productive capacity is the 0" effect.
Investment, thus appears on both sides of the equation.
Domar states, however, that only additions to investment 
(net investment or the increment to investment) both enlarges 
productive capacity and, at the same time, increases National 
Income through the multiplier effect. If investment and income 
do not grow at a required rate, Domar goes on to say that 
unused capacity will develop. Therefore, as £ar, as maintaining 
growth is concerned, it must be remembered that via net 
investment there is a correlation between the multiplier and 
the accelerator that need not necessarily lead to continued 
dynamic upward growth.
S^The most comprehensive volume of William Pellner's 
Thesis of dynamic growth is found in his book. Trends and 
Cycles in Economic Activity (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1956), p.-^ rg.  --------
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The Three Corollaries 
It has been seen that Pellner works within the concept 
of a balanced budget and uses monetary policy as a counter­
cyclical tool and as a growth corollary. Also, it must be 
pointed out that Pellner talks in terms of real wages and 
real prices, that is price and wage changes are corrected 
for in the analysis. With these assumptions in mind a close 
examination may be made of the main parts of Pellner's 
thesis: Namely, the growth corollaries, the output-increment,
the accelerator (and the relationship of the latter two in 
regcird to the consumption function), and the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of the first growth corollary.
The three corollaries which are the pre-conditions 
of smooth, uninterrupted growth are: The improvement process
which, as noted before, serves as an offset to diminishing 
returns to capital and involves a varied combination of 
natural-resource saving, labor-saving, and capital-saving
■ap
improvements. Pellner analyses the improvement process 
through the concept of increasing the marginal productivity 
of the most rapidly increasing factor— capital.^3 He 
maintains that the improvements must be labor and natural 
resource-saving relative to the effect on the demand for 
capital if economic growth is to be continued. This involves
32lbid.
33lbid.
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qualitative considerations as well as quantitative 
considerations. There may well be, for example, enough new 
investment to offset savings, but there still may be 
unemployment due to too great a labor-saving effect of the 
improvement. We shall return to this in more detail later.
The second corollary is the mobility of resources and 
structural changes ”. . .  where the specialized resources 
change their regional and occupational specialization rather 
rapidly in response to changes in demand.”3^ This simply 
means that there is mobility between occupations in a given 
area and between sections so that labor resources and capital 
can move from industry to industry or section to section 
in response to changes in demand or marginal productivities. 
Strictly speaking, it is no more than the mobility concept.
The third corollary is the legal and institutional 
compatibility corollary which " . . .  relates to the avoidance 
of an imbalance between money supply and output by stipulating 
that neither of these should become scarce or overabundant 
relative to the other."35 Here Pellner is working within the 
framework of monetary policy instead of fiscal policy and is, 
thus, working within the framework of a non-inflationary 
balanced budget. This is a departure from Hansen.
The improvement process is the most important of 
all the three corollaries. If offsets to diminishing returns
34lbid., p. 225.
35ibid., p. 236.
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in the form of improvements are forthcoming, then the 
economy would grow along the full-employment curve. It is 
the opinion of the author, however, that a sole emphasis 
upon the improvement process would confuse the basic issue 
of economic development. If one assumes that there is an 
improvement process bringing forth the right kind of and 
enough new investment to maintain the full employment of 
the factors and to fill the gap between income and consumption 
caused by savings, one cannot assume all to be well and good. 
The corollaries are not independent, but interdependent. 
Furthermore, the presence of one is not enough to offset the 
absence of others. The improvement process cannot come into 
being without mobility of labor, resources and capital. Nor 
can it come into being without an expansion of the money 
supply to meet the needs of a growing economy. Investment 
takes money and the banking system must provide it especially 
in the absence of fiscal policy and government investment. 
Therefore, only when all three corollaries are operative at 
the same time can dynamic upward growth take place. In 
order for an automobile to take its owner any place, it must 
have wheels and gas as well as an engine. The same is true 
for dynamic upward growth.
__ - Offsets to Diminishing Returns 
In a model of dynamic growth, however, it is not 
enough to say that new investment must offset savings. In a
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static system. It is sufficient to say that investment must 
absorb savings. In a dynamic system, however, the accelerator 
and the multiplier are introduced. This means that new 
investment of period one generates a higher income level in 
period two which requires a higher level of new investment to 
match the higher absolute amount of savings. Thus, new 
investment of one period calls for more new investment in 
subsequent periods. Consequently, profits of period one 
investment depend upon the investment of greater amounts of 
planned investment in period two. The profitability of 
investment in period two depends upon offsets to diminishing 
returns quantitatively and qualitatively— the improvement 
process which is the first corollary. This assumes, of 
course, mobility and monetary compatibility which will hence­
forth remain an underlying assumption of subsequent analysis.
Before one undertakes an analysis of the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of the offsets to diminishing returns, 
one must understand the concept of the capital-output increment 
per unit of investment.This simply refers to the incremental 
output that is derived from additional units of new 
investment and, thus, the yield on the additional unit of 
investment. It must be remembered that Pellner is speaking 
in real terms in which wages and prices are either constant 
or compensated for by the variables of the model.
^^"The Capital output increment per unit of investment," 
is henceforth referred to as the "output-increment."
l4l
The output-increment deals with output and yield.
With each additional unit of Investment, there Is, one may 
assume, some marginal output or output-increment. Thus, 
there are more products being produced and offered for 
sale by the productive process. These products, since they 
have a price and a market, bring a yield to capital. If 
the total yield Is high In relation to the original Increment 
of Investment, the output-increment Is said to be high. This 
means that, relative to the size of the additional Increment 
of Investment, the value of the additional goods forthcoming 
Is high or. In other words, the average Investment cost for 
the Individual goods forthcoming Is low. If the additional 
Increment of goods Is of such a magnitude as to be profitable 
for the firm. Industry or economy to Invest, the output- 
increment can be said to be high. If the output-increment 
Is low, the amount of goods forthcoming from any additional 
Increment Is correspondingly low and thus unprofitable.
Thus, a high output-increment Involves a relatively large 
value of goods forthcoming from a unit of Investment and 
thus a high yield. On the other hand, a low output-increment 
Involves a relatively small value of goods forthcoming from 
a unit of Investment and, thus, a low yield on the 
Investment. In the former case, the stimulation to Invest 
would be higher than In the latter case and, allowing for 
Institutional factors. Investment would more than likely 
be forthcoming In greater quantities.
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The output-increment is essential to an understanding 
of Pellner‘s growth thesis. A high level of investment is 
made possible by a high output-increment which makes for 
a high inducement to invest. Investment, as in the Keynesian 
analysis, keeps the economy progressing and sets the stage 
for the next time period. Indeed, present planned investment 
can be said to determine future consumption and investment 
(ceteris paribus). An analysis of Pellner's consumption
37function will make this concept clearer and more precise.
c ra o (U
H5*
Aggregate Output or Income
Pig. 1. Relationship between Output and Its 
Constituents in a Condition of Uninterrupted Growth.
In the above diagram is equal to the income
level of the first time period which, for convenience, is 
assumed to be independent of former time periods. The portion
3?Pellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity, p. 112.
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of the line that is shown by the points shows
the total amount of consumption going on in this time period 
out of total income. The difference between P^Y^ and C^Y^ 
is, of course, P^C^ which equals the amounts of savings. The 
amount of savings forthcoming must be absorbed by an amount 
of investment equal to savings so that the gap between C^Y^ 
and P^Y^ will be filled with the consumption of goods.
In the static concept of the consumption function, 
the water tank analogy worked quite well. Now, however, this 
analogy is not satisfactory because Pellner introduces the 
concept of a growing economy, but it is hard to conceive 
of a growing tank of water. When the accelerator is 
introduced (and in Fellnerian analysis, there is a great 
emphasis on the accelerator), one realizes that a magnification 
process is being set into motion. This simply refers to 
the fact that the forthcoming investment stimulates the 
capital goods industries which further stimulates the 
economy. This is due to the fact that the accelerator has 
taken effect.
Pellner defines the accelerator in terms of capital
requirements. This definition is really essential to the
basic understanding of the basic and intricate analysis which
he presents to his readers. Pellner defines or explains
his concept of the accelerator in the following manner:
Assuming that Y^Yo is the output increment, we may 
multiply Y^Yg by the new capital requirement per unit
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of output Increment and thus obtain C,P, as the Justified 
amount of new Investment In period one. The algebraic 
capital-output requirement (the accelerator) may be 
defined as the net capital formation per unit of output-
Increment. If so defined, the accelerator Is, of course,
the reciprocal of the output-lncrement per unit of new
capital formation.38
The above definition simply means that given an output-
lncrement, there Is an additional amount of net capital formation.
In the first time period, for example. Income stood at
and consumption at C^Y^. Investment, on the other hand, stood
at P^Ci which made It equal to savings. Now, In the Keynesian
«
framework, this analysis would be the end of the equilibrium 
process. Pellner, however. Introduces the output-lncrement 
and the net capital formation derived from the output-lncrement. 
Since there Is an accelerator effect taking place. It follows 
that there Is an Increase In productive activity and employment. 
Since there Is an Increase In productive activity and 
employment. It further follows that there Is an Increase In 
Income. Thus, the Investment P^ C-j^  of the first time period has 
generated new Income and has resulted In time period two.
In time period two, there Is an Income level of PgCg.
The consumption level Is CgYg and the savlngs-lnvestment 
level Is PgCg. From a definitional standpoint, there are 
no differences between Income time period one and time 
period two. Dlagramatlcally, however, there are two Important 
differences. In the first place, PgCg Is absolutely larger
38Ibid., p. 140.
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than PjCj. In the second place, CgYg is absolutely larger 
but relatively smaller than C^Yi.39 This means simply that 
in the second time period there must be more investment 
forthcoming to offset the relative decline in consumption. 
Thus, income level PgCg must call forth a greater amount of 
investment in order for an equilibrium between savings and 
investment to be brought about. If the amount of investment 
should fall short of or exceed PgCg, t h ^ e . %quld be a 
decrease in the income level or a more than ordinary increase 
in the income level, respectively.
Prom the above, it can readily be seen that
profitability in time period one depends upon the amount of
investment forthcoming in that time period plus the amount
of investment forthcoming in subsequent time periods. If,
for example, the realized savings PgCg is greater than
planned investment in period Yg, the income level will fall
to a lower level and the profitability of whatever PgCg
happens to be will be decreased along with the profit yield
of P^C^— the investment of the preceding time period. Indeed,
Pellner states that:
The profitability of investment remains sufficient 
only if the physical productivity of investment is 
sufficient in each time period and if a sufficient 
flow of further investment is generated in subsequent 
time periods. Where the latter condition is not
39The term "relatively smaller" can be best appreciated 
by referring again to the diagram on page 142 of this 
dissertation.
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satisfied, the total demand for goods does not balance 
with the total supply at the initial prices.^0
It can, thus, be said that " . . .  the profitability
of investment in any time period hinges on further planned
investment in subsequent periods, . . . which assumes the
profitability of investment in subsequent time periods.
It is obvious also that there is a greater chance
that savings will be equal to investment if the output-
increment per unit of investment is great. This assumes,
42of course, offsets to diminishing returns. A large output-
increment means that for each unit of investment there is a
relatively large increment of output and, thus, a relatively
high yield from a relatively small increment of investment.
Thus, entrepreneurs will be willing to invest. As can be
seen, however, diminishing returns are important.
Technological or organizational improvements must be
forthcoming at a rapid enough pace to offset the diminishing
returns to scale of capital or, in the Fellnerian sense,
to shift the marginal productivity schedule of capital
upwards and to the right in order to keep the marginal
4'5
efficiency schedule of new investment unchanged.
^^Pellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 117
4llbid., p. 114.
42lbid.
43ibid., p. 205.
147
If, however, there Is a need for ever greater amounts of
Investment forthcoming in subsequent time periods to make
present and future investment profitable, the marginal
productivity schedule of capital must shift upwards and to
44the right by an ever increasing amount. This places an 
even heavier burden on offsets to diminishing returns than 
the static considérations do— and, indeed, the pressure of 
offsets to diminishing returns is, as higher levels of 
income are generated, becoming more intense.
It is Pellner>s assumption that the marginal 
productivity schedule of capital and the marginal efficiency 
schedule will not shift to the left that places him among 
the anti-stagnationists.In his anti-stagnationist 
analysis, Pellner argues that as the investment needs rise 
from time period to time period and from income level to 
income level, the marginal productivity of capital will, 
in fact, shift upwards and to the right by ever greater 
amounts in order that the marginal productivity schedule of 
new investment will remain at a more or less constant level 
(that is to say that new investment in period two will be, 
more or less, as profitable as the investment in period 
one). This outward shift in the marginal productivity 
schedule of capital is made possible by Pellner’s first
44ibid.
45Ibid., p. 203f.
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corollary of dynamic equilibrium— the improvement process.
The improvement process keeps the output-increment relatively
high in order to keep the marginal efficiency schedule at a
relatively constant long-run level.
The above dependence of offsets to diminishing returns
to keep the output-increment high also assumes that the
height of savings to finance these technological innovations
or improvements is relatively more important than absolute
consumption. His main worry seems to be that the level of
savings may not be sufficient to provide investment funds
at a reasonable cost to the borrower. Pellner does point
out that savings must not be too great— which he seems to
describe in the mal-distribution of income framework where
the income and savings are in too few hsinds to generate
economic growth and stability due to underconsumption.
Pellner points out that in the United States, the relative
amount of savings has increased slightly instead of 
47decreased. ' This phenomena, he believes, may be due to the
48redistribution of income downwards. The crucial point, 
however, is that absolute savings rise during the growth 
process. Therefore, while savings may rise relatively, the 
increase is slight. The crucial thing again is the absolute
4Gibid., p. 196.
47lbid., p. 120.
48lbid.
increase In savings.
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. . . the proper functioning of a private enterprise 
economy depends on its ability to produce a flow of 
savings which is sufficient to maintain appreciable 
growth rates, and on its ability to match these savings 
by a flow of net capital formation.50
The question remains to be answered as to how Pellner 
believes that the improvement process will shift the marginal 
productivity schedule of capital continuously upwards and 
to the right in order that the marginal efficiency of new 
investment will remain constant and the savings necessary 
for this ever increasing investment need will find outlets in 
investment opportunities in the formation of capital. Since 
Pellner attacks the stagnationists, he must answer this 
question. The remainder of this chapter will, therefore, 
deal with this improvement process assuming, for convenience 
only, that his second and third corollaries are met automati­
cally. The reader will remember that his second and third
51corollaries involved the mobility of resources and the 
proper regulation of the supply of money and credit.
Pellner analyses the improvement process qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Quantitatively, this involves simply the 
extent and the influence of the improvement upon the whole 
economy in maintaining continued full-employment and growth.
^9peliner. Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 120.
50lbid., p. 137.
51lbid., p. 215.
52lbid., p. 230.
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Qualitatively, this involves the relative changes in the
various marginal productivities of the factors of production
through labor-saving and natural resource-saving improvements.
Improvements may increase the marginal productivity of
capital in relation to labor and natural resources or they
may increase the marginal productivity of labor in relation
to resources and capital or raise the marginal productivity
of resources in relation to labor and capital. Any improvement
slanted too little towards increasing the marginal productivity
of capital in relation to labor and resources will not
prevent the yield of capital from falling when capital
input is increasing relative to the other f a c t o r s . A n
improvement which is too labor-saving will create unfavorable
wage trends and means that there is not enough capital to
absorb labor at existing wages.^ This could be cured by
decreasing real wages or increasing savings to stimulate
the construction of equipment without inflation.^5 since
Pellner believes that there is an increasing amount of
capital input relative to natural resources and labor, the
improvement must raise the marginal productivity of capital
given the amounts of co-operating natural resources and 
56labor. Therefore, the type of improvement needed would be
53ibid., p. 212.
54lbid., p. 213.
55lbid.
S^ibid., p. 212.
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labor-saving and natural resource-saving relative to the
57demand for capital. This emphasis on raising the marginal
productivity of capital and the importance of a labor-saving
parallel introduces two forms of unemployment— the unemployment
caused by the insufficient profitability of new investment
necessary to offset savings and unemployment caused by the
fact that at the present technological level there does not
exist enough capital to make for full-employment.^® As is
stated above, these two types can be eliminated by more
investment and lower wages and/or increased savings so
that capital formation can continue without inflation,
respectively.
Pellner further maintains that the two types of
unemployment can co-exist. This would be the case where
unemployment could be eliminated by increased investment
without inflation, but where the additional investment
forthcoming from the existing stock of capital was insufficient 
' 5Qto equip the labor f o r c e . T h i s  could happen if 
improvements (even if labor-saving) were incapable of preventing 
a fall in the marginal productivity of labor and capital,
More simply stated, this dual type of unemployment is caused 
by the fewness or the weakness of improvements towards
57ibid., p. 213.
SQibid.
59ibid.
GOlbid., p. 214.
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maintaining the marginal productivities of labor and capital 
which Is simply the Insufficiency of overall cost saving 
not simply an overslanting towards capital-saving or labor- 
saving Improvements.^^ Such a thing cannot happen, however.
If the " . . .  average product per unit of factor falls to
6p
decline even for the most rapidly growing factor." More
completely, Pellner summarized by stating that:
With the proper slanting of the labor-saving, capital- 
saving and natural resource-saving character of 
Improvements, It would In this case be possible to 
ensure that the marginal productivity of no factor should 
decline. For example. If the average product of the most 
rapidly rising factor (which Implies a rise In the 
average product of the other factors), and If the 
elasticities of all average product functions stayed 
unchanged In the successive equilibrium points, so that 
the gap between average and marginal product, too,
"  ■ stayed constant for all factors, then the marginal
productivity of the most rapidly rising factor would stay 
unchanged and the marginal productivities of the less 
rapidly rising factor has not declined over time Implies 
either that the marginal product of no factor has declined 
or that, with a different "slanting" of the same total 
cost-saving effect toward the Individual factors, none 
of the marginal products would have declined. It Is 
reasonable to conclude that In this event the overall 
strength— overall cost-saving effect— of the Improvements 
has been sufficient. Later, we shall see that. In the 
United States at least, the overall strength of the 
Improvement does^seem to have been sufficient In the 
foregoing sense.°3
If the improvements mentioned above are merely 
quantitative, they may still qualitatively be excessively
^^Pellner, Trends and Cycles In Economic Activity,
p. 214.
&3lbld.
G^Ibld.
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capital- or labor-saving, or both, which would result in
non-favorable tendencies in the marginal productivities of
64one or both of the factors. Also, this would mean a
decline of the elasticity of the average product of capital
and/or labor since the increase in the average product of
these factors depends upon the constancy or increase in the
average product of c a p i t a l . T h e  real yield to capital
might, then, be falling as real wages were rising or wages
falling as the yield of capital was rising as the case may 
66be. In summation, then, if capital is the most rapidly 
rising factor, the improvement must increase the marginal 
productivity of capital and, if there is not enough capital 
to hire all of the labor, it must also increase the marginal 
productivity of labor. If the average productivity of the 
factor input (including the most rapidly increasing factor 
input) does not change, then the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of the improvement are sufficient. Thus, with a 
correct balancing of quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of the improvement to offset diminishing returns, the 
improvement process will bring forth new investment in such 
a manner as to make for dynamic growth along the full- 
employment line.
p. 215.
GSlbid.
G^ibid.
154
When It Is said that qualitative and quantitative
Improvements will maintain dynamic growth along the full-
employment line, the Implicit assumption Is that the economy's
Improvement process does. In fact, adjust to the changing
technological needs of the economy. This Is a large and
Important assumption. Pellner, thus, attempts to prove that
the system has generated such technological flexibility as
needed to maintain average productivity per factor Input.
Pellner states that In the United States, labor-saving
Improvements have not resulted In unemployment,^? and that
the average product of capital has not significantly 
68
declined. Thus, the Improvement process seems to have 
carried out the necesbary conditions for dynamic growth and 
this has been further pointed out by the studies of Albert 
Rees and I. B. Kravis to which later reference will be made.^^ 
The fact that the Rees study shows a relative decline In 
per unit output per unit of labor and capital relative to 
the per unit output per unit of labor and the Kravis study 
shows a slight Increase In the relative amounts going to 
labor, seems to Indicate that the Pellnerlan system's 
non-preclseness Is more practical than Harrod-Domar rigidities.
GTlbld., p. 217.
G^Ibld.
B. Kravis, "Relative Income Shares In Pact and 
Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. 49 (December, 1959),
p. 917.
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The yield of capital has declined but, in the long run,
70not significantly. Pellner, then, maintains that since
the decline in the yield of investment has not significantly
declined to render the inducement to invest a serious blow,
the rising trend in real wages improves the workability of 
71the system. Thus, dynamic growth in the economic sense
leaves room for social improvement within, of course, limits.
This is of particular interest when one considers that
capital stock is rising in the United States at a rate of
increase twice that of the growth of population and the labor 
72
force. Without such a quantitative and qualitative 
balance, the rate of return to investors would have 
declined over the past one to two centuries rather 
significantly.^^ In relation to the Keynes-Hansen Stagnation 
Thesis, this seems to place the greatest emphasis upon 
technology and minimizes the importance of frontiers and 
population growth. Later references, however, will be made 
concerning this point.
The above may be summarized quite simply. The 
improvement process must raise the marginal productivity of 
capital to keep the yield of capital from falling. This 
implies that labor-saving and natural resource-saving
^Opellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 218.
71lbid.
f^Ibid., p. 243.
?3lbid., p. 237.
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improvements relative to savings must be present. The 
labor-saving quality, however, must not be too labor-saving 
or the amounts of new investment to offset the savings of 
the period will not be sufficient to end labor unemployment. 
Thus, the proper balance would involve an improvement which 
increased the marginal productivity of capital (which is the 
same thing as offsetting diminishing returns to capital) 
and was, also, labor-savings to only an extent necessary to 
keep the yield of capital relatively the same. Indeed, large 
scale technological unemployment might, in the Keynesian 
sense, bring about a tendency towards under-consumption instead 
of dynamic upward growth. It is taken for granted that the 
mobility corollary is operative to re-absorb those who have 
been technologically unemployed in one industry (due to the 
labor-saving quality of the improvement) into another 
industry or in the capital goods industry. This may or may 
not be the case.
Pellner proceeds to examine the trend in yields in
the United States to give some verification to his thesis.
He finds that there has been a rise in per capita incomes
7kin the United States for one to two centuries.' This 
represents a rise in the distributive share going to labor 
and a decline in the relative shares going to capital.jje
74Ibid.
75ibid., p. 238.
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points out that this does not imply (necessarily, I believe)
that there has been a rise in capital requirements per
unit of output. It indicates, rather, that since capital
is the fastest rising factor, improvements have been of such
a qualitative nature as to raise the marginal productivity
of capital but, at the same time, they have not been labor-
saving enough to prevent relative labor scarcity from
resulting in a shift of income share from capital yields to 
77labor wages. There has developed, however, no long-run 
scarcities of factors nor, of course, an overshooting of the 
labor-saving improvements.Thus, Pellner shows that there 
has been, in reality, a historical tendency of improvements to 
be of a relatively sufficient qualitative and quantitative 
nature to offset the diminishing returns to capital— even in 
the face of a rapid rise in the supply of capital. He admits 
that the nineteenth century population increase will not 
repeat itself nor will the growth of the stock of natural 
resources nor the stimulating influence of colonization.
He contends, however, that the United States has seen decades 
of declining population growth before and observes that the
80frontier is not new in passing. He further observes that,
T^^ellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity, p. 238.
77lbid. 
fGlbid. 
79lbid., p. 388. 
80lbid.
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in the past, the Improvement mechanism has adjusted to these 
changes and sees no reason why it cannot again adjust.®^
The past, however, does not prove the future and it must be 
observed that past population change fluctuations were not 
long run and, thus, may be irrelevant.
It must also be pointed out thatr'if the present 
tendency of lower capital yield continues, there may 
eventually be a point reached where the yield would decline 
too much. This could usher in either stagnation or 
institutional change. If this possibility is overlooked, 
it can be maintained that there has been technological 
improvements of a sufficient quantitative and qualitative 
character to offset diminishing returns to capital. Also, 
it can be said that there has not occurred a significant 
shift from capital yield to real wages. This is due to the 
contention that the relative insufficiency of the labor- 
saving improvement has not caused substantial labor scarcity. 
So far, no significant downward trend in the yield of 
capital has occurred. If past history, however, generates 
overconfidence, it may well be the prelude to disaster in 
the future.
A Summary of the Research 
Other economists have been interested in analyzing 
the trend in output. Albert Rees, for example, points out
G^Ibid.
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that since 1929, real wages have increased more than
82productivity — a phenomena explained by the changes in the 
supply of labor and capital.^3 From 1929 to 1957, real wages 
in terms of 1957 dollars rose from .826 cents per hour at 
work to 2.24 dollars per hour at work. This represents a 
rise of two hundred and seventy-one percent. During the same 
period, output per man hour in manufacturing rose from the 
1929 index of 100 to an index of 213 representing a rise of 
two hundred and thirteen p e r c e n t . R e e s  points out that 
productivity increases could have been due to harder work 
or better skills on the part of the workers, more capital 
or more non-production workers employed per production worker, 
or the improved quality of resources.
Rees also points out that prior to 1913, the output 
per unit of capital declined and man-hour output increased. 
After 1919, however, the output per unit of capital rose, 
but more slowly than the output per man-hour so that the
®^Albert Rees, "Patterns of Wages, Prices and 
Productivity," Wages, Prices, Profits, and Productivity 
(New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University Press,
1959), p. 11.
83ibid., p. 12. 
G^ibid.
85ibid.
86]
87ibid., p. 28.
84 id., p. 15.
GGibid., p. 21.
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output necessary to cover capital costs decreased to enable
QQ
more to be made available for the augmentation of real wages.
Even though the output per unit of capital has risen, there
has been no increase in the returns to capital,®^ This
phenomenon may be due to the fact that the rising average
productivity of capital may have been offset by an increase
in the stock of c a p i t a l . S u c h  an increase in the stock of
capital, despite the average productivity of capital
increase, would tend to keep the contribution of the marginal
unit of capital constant so that the yield would also
remain fairly constant.
In summation, one might say that since the returns to
labor have increased more than proportionately, the returns
to capital and non-productive workers may have risen less.
Indeed, in 1929, production workers received a wage equal to
forty percent of the salary of the non-production worker
whereas, in 1957j the former was receiving a wage equal to
op
sixty-four percent the salary of the latter.^ Part of this 
rise may have been due to union pressure or the threat of 
union pressure.^3 Rees points out that the rise in real wages
Q^Ibid., p. 29.
89Ibid. 
9°Ibid.
91lbid.
9^Ibid., p. 31. 
93lbid., p. 33.
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from 1936 to 1937 must have been, at least, partly caused by 
the threat of unions due to the fact that an unemployment 
total of eight million for that year hardly seems to indicate 
a rise in real wages because of an undersupply of labor.
However, Rees is careful to point out that real wages began 
rising long before the advent of the threat or-actuality of 
unionization.
Chart I shows the rise in the output of goods from 
1889 to 1957.^^ Except for a few periods, the trend line is 
generally upwards. Distinct periods can be noticed. The 
first period lasts until 1915 and is characterized by a 
gradual rise in both curves. Immediately after 1915, there 
is a general, but sporadic, rise in the output per unit of 
labor and capital and a decline, until 1920, in output per 
man-hour. After 1920, there is a rapid rise in the output 
of labor and capital and an even more rapid rise in per 
man-hour output. This rise lasts until 1929. After 1929, 
there is a fall in the output per unit of labor and capital 
until 1933, but a rise in output per man-hour or labor in 
manufacturing. After 1933, both trend lines travel upwards 
until 19^5 with the exception of the period from 1942 to 19^5 
during which the output per man-hour in manufacturing stays 
relatively constant due, probably, to military use of labor
5^ees, "Patterns of Wages, Prices and Productivity," p.22,
95ibid., p. 15. Chart I is drawn from the figures in 
columns six and seven of the Table referred to by this 
footnote.
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In the armed services and in industries where the emphasis 
was upon blunt output rather than productivity. Prom 1945 
until 194%, there is a general decline in both trend lines 
but, after 1947, both trend lines slope upwards rather 
steeply as the so-called cold war and foreign demand for 
United States* goods becomes effective through foreign 
aid and other international developments. All in all, however, 
the trend in both the output per unit of labor and capital 
and the output per man-hour in manufacturing has been upward.
In some rather lengthy periods (1933 to 1944 and 1947 to 1957), 
the upward trend is most striking. It can also be seen 
that the output per man-hour has increased more rapidly than 
the output per unit of labor and capital combined. This 
Rees has pointed out.
From Chart I, one may draw the conclusion that the
general trend in productivity is upwards. Capital has accumulated
and has been invested in ever greater amounts over the period
from 1889 to 1957 and productivity per man-hour has increased
q6to increase real wages. The return to capital, as Rees 
has pointed out, has not increased, but this, he believes, 
may be due to the increased quantity of capital (in relation 
to the labor f o r c e ) . Nevertheless, there does seem to be 
some validity to Pellner*s analysis which places the emphasis
9^Ibid.
97ibid.
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for dynamic growth on the proper amount of labor-saving and
natural resource-saving innovations, technological changes,
or managerial improvements. In the following chapter,
however. Chart I will be viewed from a standpoint which
does not allow for such an optimistic conclusion concerning
the apparent impressive rise in productivity and output.
John W. Kendrick deals, also, with the problem of
measuring the general trend of per unit output. He believes
it necessary to relate output to some tangible inputs in order
to determine net savings in the real costs per unit of 
98output. Also, he points out that output measurements do 
not measure increases in quality.^9 Kendrick states that 
from 1899 to 1953 average productivity increased at a rate 
of an average of one sind three quarters percent a year.^^^
In the thirty-three industries from which he derives his 
output and productivity figures, there has been no long-run 
negative changes in productivity,^®^
Kendrick also is explicitly interested in the relation­
ship between labor and capital during this period. Like Rees,
Kendrick concludes that the output of labor per unit has
John W. Kendrick, ^oductivity Trends: Capital and
Labor, Occasional Paper 53 (Washington, B.C.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1956), p. 2.
99lbid., p. 5.
l®®Ibid., p. 8.
lOllbid., p. 9.
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had a tendency to rise faster than the output of capital 
102per unit. There has, also, been a tendency over the time 
period to substitute capital for labor or, in other words, 
to invest in labor-saving innovations or changes.103 The 
tendency has, however, been mixed since in some industries 
(tobacco, oil refining and production, and gas utilities), 
the rate of labor-saving innovations has proceeded at a 
rate of one percent a y e a r . 104 Qn the whole, however, no 
general conclusions can be drawn except that innovations have 
been both labor-saving and c a p i t a l - s a v i n g . growth in 
productivity, then, seems to be rather independent of factor 
input changes over this p e r i o d . I n  some groups of 
industries where capital has been generally substituted for 
l a b o r , t h e  growth of capital has not greatly exceeded the 
output growth.
The summary of Kendrick’s study of output trends can
be put in his own words:
Despite the greater increase in capital than in labor 
inputs, output per unit of capital has generally risen 
over the long period. Innovation has therefore been
lO^Ibid., p. 10.
103lbid.
IQ^Ibid.
lO^Ibid., p. 11.
lO&Ibld.
lOTlbid.
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capital-saving as well as labor-saving on the whole. In 
the few groups that are exceptional In this respect, the 
growth of capital has only slightly exceeded the growth 
of output. The almost universal gains In productive 
efficiency may thus be regarded as established Irrespective 
of the weighting system employed In combining the factor 
Inputs In the various Industry g r o u p s . 108
Prom this, one may conclude, along with Kendrick, that
projections have very little appeal since more might be lost
from a refinement of variations In Industrial changes. In
segment changes, and In the changes In the economy as a
whole In regards to output and productivity forecasts.109
Moses Abramovltz also attempts to study the trends
In output In the United States. He asks how large the
Increase In aggregate output per head has been, whether or
not there has been significant retardation or acceleration and,
lately, whether or not output fluctuations have been present.H®
Abramovltz finds that there has not been any
111significant trend In the growth of total output per head.
He admits that there may be evidence from the national
product estimates that a decline In the rate of growth Is
taking place— more particularly In total output than for
IIPoutput per head. This decline, Abramovltz points out.
^QQjbld. ,  p. lOf. 
l ° 9 lb ld , ,  p. 23.
ll^Moses Abramovltz, Resources and Output Trends In the 
United States Since 1870, Occasional Paper 52 (Washington,
D. C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958), p. 2.
m i b l d ., p. 6. 
ll^Ibld.
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therefore, is not due to the productivity of resources 
but, rather, to a decline in the rate of growth of labor 
and capital input per head.^^^
Abramovitz also points out that the rate of growth 
has not been even. The increase in the net national product, 
for example, has varied and has increased at an average
l l i i
rate of three and a half percent a year. At the same 
time, the net product of capital increased at a rate of 
nearly two percent per a n n u m . S i n c e  I870, the rate of 
growth has been smaller and, as a matter of fact, the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed much faster 
rates of growth than the second quarter of the twentieth 
century— a quarter of depression except for wartime spurts,
In general, the most significant finding is that growth may 
be slowing because of the use of less resources per head 
with the exception of a recent rise in the amount of 
capital used per head.— Productivity, however, has been 
rising, Abramovitz believes, at a fairly rapid pace and is,
to him, one of the most significant facts about the post-Civil
T1 8War period of economic development. 
llSlbid.
p. 7.
llGlbid., p. 15.
llTibid., p. 18.
llGlbid.
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Summary
Prom the brief review of Rees, Kendrick and 
Abramovitz, one can see that there is the possibility that 
innovations of a significant labor-saving character are 
taking place and that the trend in output per man-hour is 
continuing to increase at a significantly rapid pace. Indeed, 
the Rees data shows a rather rapid rise in the output per 
man-hour. From the trends which seem to be rather evident 
from Chart I and the findings of Kendrick ard Abramovitz, 
one might assume that there may well be some historically . 
accurate and continuing trends in the upward increase in 
productivity and output per man-hour over the period of 
the last sixty to seventy years. Although these men are 
careful to indicate that no definite conclusions can be 
reached, Pellner, at least, implicitly assumes that the 
economy can depend upon these rises in productivity and 
labor-saving innovations to maintain the process of dynamic 
growth. The picture is, at best, a mixed one, and the 
researchers such as Kendrick and Abramovitz are careful 
not to project or to make too binding a conclusion as to 
the rate of the substitution of capital for labor in the 
form of labor-saving innovations and changes. This in itself 
may be significant.
A brief review may now be in order to bring 
Kendrick, Rees, Abramovitz and Pellner into a proper 
alignment with one another. Pellner, in the first place.
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believes that the economy has grown because of the proper 
amount of labor-saving changes and the proper Increase In 
the use of capital and the accumulation of savings to make 
possible the more capital Intensive economic system. 
Furthermore, he believes that present Investment will 
generate a higher level of Income to make necessary greater 
amounts of Investment In the future. This Investment will 
be forthcoming In ever greater amounts only If the 
Improvement factor can generate labor-saving devices to 
enable the marginal efficiency schedule of capital to remain 
relatively constant— a rather fine balance between too high 
a labor cost and too much technological unemployment.
Rees points out and shows by his tables and charts 
that productivity has Increased and that, even If per 
man-hour output has Increased faster than the output of labor 
and capital and that real wages have Increased more than 
proportionately,the economy has witnessed a relatively 
continuous rate of growth. It seems from his figures that 
the advent of depression relief, unionization and war have 
lifted somewhat the Increase In real wages, but also 
productivity changes have Increased rather rapidly the output 
per unit of labor and per unit of labor and capital.
Kendrick and Abramovltz both come to no definite 
conclusion and refuse to project the trends Into the 
future. They do, however, seem to Indicate a rise In
^^%ees, op. cit., p. 15.
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productivity and capital substitution, although Abramovltz
sees a possible decline in the rate of growth relative to
other periods of the nineteenth century which may be due to
an over expansion decade or an over depressive decade in
120the quarters studied. Even though the conclusions as to 
the exact rate of capital for labor substitution are 
veiriable and inconclusive, there has been a general tendency 
for the productivity and labor-saving trends to behave as 
Pellner believes. From these studies there seems to have been 
the proper rate of labor-saving technology (although the 
range limit may be wider than Pellner intimated) and rise 
in productivity. Pellner*s first and primary corollary—  
the improvement factor— seems, therefore, to hold true.
The corollaries as to mobility and the compatibility of 
credit and money policy and availability shall be assumed 
relevant (at least in the long run) even though there are 
certainly institutional factors which must be considered, 
but which are outside of the scope of this present work. The 
following chapter, however, will cast some doubt as to 
whether or not the first corollary of Pellner is, in fact, 
as verified as the studies of Rees, Kendrick, and Abramovitz 
might tend to indicate.
^^^Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 14.
CHAPTER VI 
CRITICISM OP THE PELLNER GROWTH THESIS
Like any economist or writer who has contributed any 
amount of original thought, Pellner has critics who attack 
him from many sides. One may attack Pellner from the 
standpoint of the flaws in his theoretical analysis or the 
flaws in the statistical data that have been used to verify 
his analysis. This chapter will take the opportunity to do 
both. Before I begin criticising Pellner, however, I should 
like to state that I think that Pellner's concept of the 
capital-output increment and the interaction of the accelerator 
to bring forth a process of dynamic growth is a most useful 
contribution to economics. My attack is not based on the 
analysis itself, but, rather, on the corollaries underlying 
it— the assumption of an almost automatic continuation of 
the improvement process and the mobility factors. It is my 
personal conviction that the improvement process and the 
mobility factor are not as assured as Pellner believes.
Since Pellner attacks the basis of the stagnation 
concept of diminishing technology (to an important enough
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scale to keep the economy at a low level of employment). It 
Is only natural that Alvin Hansen would have much to say 
concerning Fellner's analysis.^ Hansen's major point is 
that Pellner presents us with various problems which cannot 
be resolved within the framework of his assumptions.
Pellner, for example, talks of the steady growth of
technology, but fails to consider as important the post-
2
Napoleonic depression. It may well be true that the post- 
Napoleonic depression was caused by the sudden advent of^ __ 
peace in Europe along with the fading away of one stage of 
economic development prior to the emergence on a sufficiently 
large scale of the next phase of the industrial revolution.3 
This, however, points out that the improvement process is 
not an assured phenomena and that, between stages, there can 
be partial stagnation.
The above reference to the post-Napoleonic depression 
begs another question. The reader might profit by asking 
himself if the improvement process would have been sufficient 
to stimulate the amount of growth needed to keep the economy 
advancing in the post-World War II period. The present writer 
can think of no single innovation that was of sufficient 
size to bring about a continuation of dynamic growth at the
^Alvin Hansen, "Trends and Cycles in Economic 
Activity," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39 
(May, 1957), P. 105. "
2lbid.
3lbid.
173
high level of employment being maintained at that time.
Indeed, the question may even be asked as to whether there 
was. In fact, any technological Innovation of Importance at 
that time. Peace-time use of atomic power was talked about, 
but very little done about It and, even If there had been, 
the adaptation of nuclear power would have been a slow 
process of replacement of re-adaptatlon of existing facilities 
over a long period of time which probably would not have 
then (or In the future) brought forth enough new Investment 
to maintain the desired amount of employment and growth.
It seems that what stimulated the economy after the Second 
World War was the fear of war with the Soviet Bloc, the 
financing of foreign demand for United States' capital and 
consumer goods to build or rebuild foreign economies 
destroyed or awakened by the war, and the accumulation of 
purchasing power throughout the war years on the psirt of 
the citizens of the United States. Thus, government spending 
for defense, foreign aid, and for certain domestic sectors 
provided the economy with what might seem to be the necessary 
Investment stimulus which probably would have been absent 
If the economy had been forced to rely on the private sector 
entirely.
The above reference to government spending quite 
naturally takes us to the field of fiscal policy. Pellner 
believes that fiscal policy or deficit spending Is the doom
174
of private enterprise.^ This seems to be contrary to fact. 
As Hansen has pointed out, the prosperity which we are 
currently in has been relatively long.^ It has, also, been 
largely related to the height of government spending both 
here and abroad.^  Pellner, on the other hand, fears that 
public spending will replace private investment and, thus, 
eventually, private enterprise. Pellner fails, however, 
to realize that public spending may well be in a field where 
the self-liquidation necessary for private investment is 
not relevant. In this case, if the public did not invest, 
investment would not be forthcoming in an area of potential
7
development. Such things come to mind as highways and 
other internal improvements that cannot economically be 
provided by private enterprise, but upon whose existence 
private enterprise depends. Pellner may be partly right in 
assuming that in some cases public investment might supplant 
private investment but, even so, this generates private 
investment in other fields to serve the public welfare or 
the section which is benefited thereby. The Tennessee 
Valley Authority is an example of public investment which 
resulted in further private investment in industry, tourism,
^Ibid., p. 107.
5lbld., p. 114.
Gibid.
?Refer to J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 
chapters on Social and Investment Balance.
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and agriculture— due largely to the stimulation of the public
Q
investment. Also, Fellner forgets that Europe has not 
seen a decline in private investment outside of certain
Q
fields.^ Indeed, the profits received from public stimulation 
may well go for research in private industry to bring forth 
innovations.
Hansen also attacks Pellner for his emphasis on 
improvement, credit and mobility without any attention being 
paid to adequate aggregate demand.^ Fellner feels that 
if the improvement process is sufficient and if the mobility 
of resources and the adjustability of credit are compatible 
to growth, adequate aggregate demand will a priori be
1 p
forthcoming. Hansen, on the other hand, believes that 
adequate aggregate demand brings—forth the investment needed 
by the improvement process and, also, mobility.Mobility 
would seem to be greater when union members are less afraid 
of permanently losing Jobs and when workers' present income 
is of sufficient size to enable them to move elsewhere to 
earn a sufficiently greater income depending, of course, upon 
one's definition of income. The Hansen-Fellner disagreement,
^Hansen, "Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,"
p. 112.
9lbid., p. 113. 
lOlbid., p. 114. 
lllbid., p. 109.
IZlbid., p. 112.
13lbid., p. 109.
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therefore, raises a most important question. Does the 
Improvement process generate adequate aggregate demand through 
Investment or does adequate aggregate demand provide the 
stimulus for Investment? In other words, would an economic 
system of an advanced, private enterprise economy stage of 
development like that of the United States, Invest before 
demand was adequate or would they rather Invest In order to 
catch up to or channel adequate demand towards their own 
products? It Is- a chlcken-and-the-egg type controversy.
Which comes before the other— demand or Investment? Fellner 
assumes that Investment, mobility, and credit generate 
demand. Hansen believes that adequate aggregate demand Is 
necessary for Investment and mobility. It does. In fact, 
seem unlikely that a private entrepreneur would Invest with 
the hope of stimulating economic growth. It seems more 
likely that he would Invest to catch up with aggregate 
demand or to lower per unit cost of production In the face 
of a demand for his product. If the Innovation be a new 
Industry (like aluminum at the end of the last century), the 
same analysis would apply due to the fact that this Investment 
was made not to create adequate aggregate demeind (since the 
economy was at a sufficient height to support metallurgical 
Industry), but, rather. In the hope of shifting the 
already existent aggregate demand from other metals to 
aluminum. The steel Industry, Itself, did not grow because 
net new Investment In steel would create Jobs demanding
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steel, but because there was adequate aggregate demand for 
steel. It seems, therefore, that in a developing economy, 
adequate consumer purchasing power is essential to start 
and maintain investment.
In speaking of investment, Pellner introduces the 
capital-output increment. He explicitly states that dynamic 
growth is best carried forth when the capital-output 
increment is low.^^ This, it seems to me, makes it impossible 
for anything but adequate aggregate demand to be present 
along with a high marginal propensity to consume. Unless 
we assume that the mere fact of investment creates enough 
demand to sustain the present as well as the future yield on 
capital through offsets to diminishing returns to capital, 
we cannot escape the dangers of inadequate aggregate 
demand. Unless t M s  adequate aggregate demand is high and 
the marginal propensity to consume is high, the consumption 
increase will be relatively small in comparison to a low 
capital-output ratio. Furthermore, a nation with a 
relatively decreasing population would put a greater strain 
on the sufficiency of sustaining profit yields on new 
investment regardless of the height of the capital-output 
increment and would, at the same time, place a third burden 
on offsets to diminishing returns. In the first place, 
offsets to diminishing returns must keep the yield of capital
^William Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic 
Activity (New York: Henry dolt and Company, 1957), PP. H4-
1 1 ^
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high when capital is accumulating more rapidly than the 
population. In the second place, it must keep the yield on 
capital high in the face of a relatively declining population 
increase. In the third place, it must offset diminishing 
returns to bring forth ever greater relative and absolute 
amounts of investment in subsequent time periods. These 
burdens are not to be taken as lightly and assumed away 
as easily as Pellner seems to do.
Albert Rees has provided statistical proof of the
increase in per man-hour output of- labor and per man-hour
output of labor and capital.^5 % e  indexes have increased
very greatly, especially in more recent decades maintained
by war or government spending on a large scale. This seems
to give credence to Hansen's belief that government spending
16might foster research and development. Rees shows the 
great increase in output per man-hour by drawing the curves 
for the absolute levels of the particular years. This 
proves that the economy has grown (if we assume that the 
population hag" not offset output gains). There is little 
doubt in most people's minds that the total level of the 
economy has grown and that the population is better off.
Does, however, the increase in aggregate output per man-hour 
even on a rapid scale prove the existence of dynamic growth
^^Refer to chapters II and IV.
^^Hansen, "Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,"
p. 114.
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or the absence of stagnation? My personal conviction is that 
the increase in aggregates is insignificant. We are not 
interested in how .high the lines go but, rather, in how 
rapidly they are changing from year to year. If the 
change in output per man-hour is not rapid or consistent 
enough, the increase in the height of the lines is 
irrelevant.
In order to determine whether there is sustained 
growth from year to year and over a long period of time, 
one must look at what is relevant. That which is relevant 
as to whether there is truly dynamic growth or stagnation is 
simply the measurement of the changes from year to year.
Even if the long-run trend line is upwards, this does not 
mean that there has been constant and consistent growth. 
Indeed, the growth may well be due to factors outside of the 
area of the private economy.
Charts II and III are drawn from the same data that 
was given in Chart I on page 162 of Chapter IV. Charts II 
and III measure the deviations of output per man-hour in 
manufacturing and the output per unit of labor and capital 
from year to year. If, for example, a particular 
year's output per man-hour or per unit of labor and capital 
level is below, equal to, or above the output per unit level 
of the preceding year, that particular year will be 
represented by a minus, zero, or plus position on the graph.
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respectively.This enables the reader to study the actual 
distribution and consistency of upward and downwsird 
deviations in per unit output levels and changes as well as 
an opportunity to correlate these levels and changes with 
economic factors generally known to predominate at any 
particular time or period of time. One may safely assume 
that if output per unit deviations are mostly in the plus 
category, the economy is generally rising over time and 
that Pellner‘s principle of present investment yield 
depending upon subsequent investment is generally being met. 
If, however, there is a preponderance of zero or minus 
deviations from year to year, one may come to the conclusion 
that the general trend is not upward and that present 
investment is not being made profitable by subsequent 
investment through period to period shifts of the marginal 
productivity schedule of capital upward and to the right.
One can see from Charts II and III on page I80 
that, indeed, the process of growth has not been constant.
It is evident that there has been great deviations in the 
changes in output levels per unit from year to year. Also 
it can be seen that there has, in fact, been a rather large
ITif, for example, the level of per unit output on 
Chart II for the year 1958 were 214 and the level of per 
unit output for the year* 1959 were 216, the deviation would 
be a plus two and would appear as such on Chart III. If, 
however, the level of per unit output for 1959 was 210, this 
would represent a per unit of output fall of four index 
points and would thus appear as a point below the zero 
line with the magnitude of minus four for 1959.
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number of minus and zero deviations from year to the next 
year. One can also see that since 1933, there has been a 
rather steady upward trend in per man-hour output in both 
indexes. Tables 1 and 2 break the data of Charts II and 
III down into more manageable periods from which we may 
draw more definite conclusions.
Prom Tables 1 and 2, we can see the consistency and 
the rate of output per unit changes for each year. We 
immediately notice some rather striking tendencies in the 
data. Between the years I889 and 1957, the annual deviation 
of the index of output per man-hour has been a minus relation 
to the preceding year thirteen times which, in percentage 
figures, is equal to twenty-two percent of the years. During 
this same period, the deviation shows a zero change from the 
preceding year five times out of fifty-eight. Thus, in 
eighteen years out of fifty-eight, there has been a fall 
or no change at all in output per man-hour from one year 
to another. In percentage figures, this is twenty-nine percent. 
We can also see that annual deviations of one percent 
and less have occurred twenty-five times out of fifty-eight 
for a percentage figure of forty-one percent. This means 
that in almost fifty percent of the years, the rate of change 
has been plus one index number or less— mostly less. This 
hardly seems to’indicate dynamic growth or present time 
period investment being justified by investment and yields in 
subsequent time periods or an appropriate shift in the marginal
TABLE 1
ANNUAL DEVIATIONS' OF INDEX OF OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR, MANUFACTURING
Years 1889-1957 1889-1932 1933-1957
Total 58 33 25
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of • 
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More 13 13 2256 10 10 30# 3 3 12#
0 5 18 29^ 4 14 43# 1 4 16#
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+2 2 27 48# 1 18 54# 1 9 36#
+3 or 
More 31 58 100# 15 33 100# 16 25 100#
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TABLE 2
ANNUAL DEVIATIONS OP INDEX OP OUTPUT PER UNIT OP 
LABOR AND CAPITAL, PRIVATE ECONOMY
Years 1889-1957 1889-1932 1933-1957
Total 58 43 25
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tions
Percen­
tage
of
Cumu­
lative
Devia­
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+3 or 
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productivity schedule of capital with enough consistency to 
satisfy the corollaries of dynamic growth in Pellner*s growth 
model.
The picture looks worse when one looks at the time 
period between I889 and 1932. In this period, the output 
per man-hour in manufacturing has a negative relationship ten 
times out of a possible thirty-three occurrences of annual 
change. This is a percentage of thirty percent. A zero 
or less deviation from the preceding year occurred forty-three 
percent of the time during the span from 1889-1932. Fifty-one 
percent of the time, there occurred an index of plus one or 
less— again, mostly less. Therefore, a rate of growth of 
plus two or more occurred only forty-nine percent of the time. 
This hardly seems to be the dynamic growth discussed by 
Pellner.
Prom the time period 1933-1957, one sees quite another 
picture, however. In this time period, the general change 
in yearly deviations is of the plus category. In only three 
out of twenty-five years, for example, did the level of 
output per man-hour drop from one year to the next. Only 
thirty-two percent of the time was the rate of change from 
one time period to the next a plus one or less. This can be 
compared with the fifty-one percent figure for the 1889-1932 
period. In sixty-eight percent of the years, there was, in 
fact, a change in the level of output per man-hour of plus 
two or greater. This does sound like dynamic growth. There
186
is, however, a point to be made. During the time period from 
1933-1957# the Federal Government has, in general, been 
enacting a policy of fiscal balances or stimulation through 
social investment, expenditures and defense. During this 
period, however, there has been no appreciable decline in 
the scope of activities being carried on by the private sector. 
We are not now, despite fiscal policy, socialistic.
The Charts have shown that from the years I889 to 1932, 
there have occurred deviaticms from year to year in output 
per man-hour of plus one or less fifty-one percent of the 
time with a great preponderance of this percentage figure being 
represented by minus or zero deviations from the preceding 
year. This is a sharp contrast to the period of 1933 to 
1957 where the number of deviations from year to year of plus 
two or more are in preponderance. This contradicts Pellner 
on two points. In the first place, there has not been, prior 
to 1933, a general or consistent rise in output per man-hour 
helping to shift the meirginal productivity schedule in the 
appropriate direction. Neither, then, has there been a 
general tendency for subsequent investment and yields to 
justify past investment and keep the yield on capital at the 
same level. In the second place, in the post-1933 period 
(despite the fiscal policies feared by Pellner), there has 
not been a marked or even evident decline in the private 
sector of the economy.
The data in Table 2 presents the Annual Deviations
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of the Index of Output per unit of Labor and Capital. These 
are more convincing. During the period from I889 to 1957, 
twenty-three percent of the deviations from one year to the 
next represent minus changes. Thirty-five percent of the 
deviations are either minus changes or zero changes. In all, 
thirty-one changea in the yearly deviations were of the 
magnitude of plus one index number or less— mostly less.
In the period from I889 to 1932, the evidence is even more 
striking. Thirty-six percent (that is, twenty out of forty- 
three deviations) are zero or minus deviations from the 
preceding year. Fifty-eight percent are of plus one or less 
whereas only forty-two percent are of plus two or greater 
magnitude. Certainly, one cannot believe that this almost 
fifty-fifty split in the direction of deviations from year to 
year indicates dynamic growth.
From the data from 1933 to 1957, however, a change 
can be seen. Only seventeen percent of the deviations are 
of a zero or minus nature. Furthermore, only twenty-four 
percent are of a plus one and under compared with fifty-eight 
percent from I889 to 1932. This is a rather significant 
change. More importantly, one might say that the change 
in the percentage representation of the plus two or more 
category from a 1889-1932 height of forty-two percent to a 
1933-1957 height of seventy-six percent is of major 
significance. Again, it can be pointed out that the 1889-1932 
period was a period of more or less "laissez faire" with
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unconscious fiscal policy whereas the 1933-1957 period was 
one of conscious fiscal policy on the part of the government 
plus a rather high level of spending and taxing.
The data on the per unit output of labor and capital 
tend to caste doubts upon Fellner's analysis from three 
points of view. In the first place, the fact that the level 
of per unit output of labor and capital combined has not 
risen as fast as the output per mem-hour indicates that 
capital has not had as rapid a rate of growth of yield as has 
labor, Fellner’s position that the improvement process must 
involve labor-saving and capital-consuming innovations to 
raise the marginal productivity schedule of capital by ever 
greater amounts upwards and to the right in order to offset 
diminishing returns on ever greater investment levels is 
greatly weakened, but not, of course, destroyed. In the 
second place, the fact that the 1889-1932 period shows a 
marked tendency to have a far greater amount of minus, 
zero, and plus one and less deviations than the 1933-1957 
period means that there were greater stagnation tendencies 
in the former period. This indicates that the process of 
dynamic growth and ever-advancing movement upward and to the 
right of productivity schedules have not historically been 
consistently maintained. Furthermore, in the third place, 
the better performance of the 1933-1957 period indicates that 
the advent of fiscal policy during the latter period— even 
with higher taxes— has maintained a more progressive economic
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growth than the former period without the destruction of 
private enterprise which Fellner believes to be inevitable 
under an atmosphere of government fiscal policy and planning.^®
Fellner *s analysis, therefore, has been shown weedc 
not only on the grounds of the range of necessary productivity 
schedule shifts but also on two further grounds. First, that 
there has historically been a rather consistent rise in output 
per man-hour and per unit of labor and capital, and second, 
on the grounds that fiscal policy wrecks private enterprise, 
and initiative due to the absorption of private investment 
outlets and heavy taxation.
It might also be of benefit to look briefly at the 
process of labor-saving innovations. The thinking on the 
matter usually maintains that the labor released by labor- 
saving devices is absorbed by the concerns making the labor- 
saving devices. This, however, may not be so. The machines 
that replaced the laborers have already been made. Labor 
is fired not in time to make the machine that replaces it 
but, rather, as new machines are being installed. Also, 
it takes highly skilled labor in the machine goods industry. 
Furthermore, the machine goods industry tends to be 
geographically concentrated and probably draws from a rather- - 
tight skilled labor pool in the local area. Therefore, 
technical skills and the lack of widespread geographic
l^Hansen, "Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity," 
pp. 111-112.
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distribution limit the mobility of the replaced labor. In
a rapidly expanding economy such as our own, the problem
probably has not arisen because of the rise of new industries
and services, which once more contradicts Pellner's belief
that fiscal policy and deficit spending destroys private
%
enterprise and initiative. A proper study of where replaced 
workers tend to go should be made dealing with the present 
period.
If, however, the labor-saving innovation results in 
a correspondingly lower price for the goods being produced, 
this will increase real income which will^increase demand.
The increase in demand will be an absolute increase, however, 
auid not a relative increase due to the marginal propensity to 
save. This will mean that demand probably will not rise by 
the amount needed to offset the unemployment caused by 
technology. Thus, unemployment will not be ended by thé* 
absorption of the replaced laborers due to a possible increase 
in demand. If, on the other hand, the labor-saving innovations 
result in higher profits and little or no reduction of 
prices (which might be the case in a monopoly or an oligopoly 
market structure), the increase in income will go to upper 
income classes who have a very small marginal propensity to 
consume and a high marginal propensity to save or to the 
corporation's retained earnings account. If the result of 
the labor-saving device is slanted towards the increase in 
upper class money incomes or the retained earnings account
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Instead of the real Incomes of the society as a whole, the
increase in demand will be very little, if any, and will
result in a continuation of a rather large level of technological
unemployment. This, then, tends to belittle the typical
arguments about the replacement of labor and its absorption
due to increased demand for labor by the machine goods
industries or by greater demand due to an increase in real
Income for the society as a whole. Also, it casts serious
doubt upon the validity of Kellner's belief that demand
should be de-emphasized and that capital accumulation should
be emphasized.19
The reader should also remember the Abramovitz study,
where it was found that there is a tendency for productivity
00
increases to mean the use of less capital per head. Fellner, 
however, stresses the growing need for more and more capital 
accumulation to meet greater and greater Investment needs 
to satisfy the period to period process of dynamic growth.
This dynamic growth is intensified by Kellner's accelerator 
principle of one time period's investment stimulating a 
greater income level of income needing absolutely and 
relatively more investment to maintain the resultant income 
level and process of dynamic growth. The Abramovitz
l^Kellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity,
p. 122.
20j5oses Abramovitz, Re so w e e  and Outpub Trends in the 
United States Since I870, Occasional Paper 52 (Washington,
D. C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956), p. 6f.
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findings tend to take the emphasis off of an ever 
Increasing amount of capital accumulation and might. In fact, 
shift the emphasis to more consumption and less savings.
This seems to be an Important and crucial antl-Pellner finding. 
It does not, however, mean that antl-stagnatlonlsts can use 
It successfully unless the average and the marginal propensity 
to consume rise to such a point as to make Investment nominal. 
This seems rather Improbable especially when one considers 
Institutionalized savings by Individuals and corporations 
through social security. Insurance, and retained earnings.
Another criticism relates to the emergence of the 
so-called organization man. This creature Is not the type 
of person to shift the marginal productivity schedules 
further upwards atnd to the right. Instead, he Is the status 
seeker trying to find and maintain his own niche In the 
corporation. If he has Ideas, he refrains from speaking, but 
rather he remains diligently carrying out the prescribed orders 
under the prescribed techniques. The committee to which he 
belongs often meets simply to be meeting or, at best, reaches 
no decision as to change In, at least, a conceivable length of 
time. It Is a private report hearing society going over things 
it already knows and knocking anything new around so much that 
when It comes out of committee It Is so narrowed In Its 
application that It Is either unworkable or so unimportant 
as to be not worth the time of putting It Into effect. The
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innovating individual would leave such a meeting angry, 
frustrated, repressed or looked upon as a bad risk for the 
stability of the company and his fellow workers. The 
organization man seems to be a threat to the innovating 
process and, thus, to the fulfillment of Pellner‘s first and 
primary corollary.
In conclusion, it might be said that Kellner's 
analysis is greatly weakened. His emphasis on investment 
prior to effective demand seems to place the cart before the 
horse in an industrial economy. His fear of fiscal policy 
and planning is not Justified by the facts. Indeed, if we 
compare the 1889-1932 record of growth to the 1933-1957 record 
of growth, his position is refuted. Furthermore, the general 
and continual rise in output per man-hour and per unit of 
labor and capital has not, until the advent of fiscal policy, 
taxation, and deficit spending, been fulfilled. Managerial 
improvements and labor-saving devices present serious 
questions as to labor mobility. This is particularly true 
for an economy that does not have the rapid growth of new 
industries and services made possible by continued fiscal 
support of prosperity. Also "organization type" individuals 
are not the innovators necessary for shifts of the productivity 
schedules. In all, one can say that although the concept 
of dynamic growth is useful, the basis of Fellner is greatly 
undermined. There has not been the historical growth of 
which he speaks and relies upon, and his emphasis upon
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capital accumulation and private Investment seems unsupported 
by the facts. One cannot say that the dynamic growth 
discussed by Pellner Is the general rule. Indeed, the facts 
seem to Indicate that It has not been the general rule prior 
to government spending, planning and fiscal manipulation. 
Hansen, then, seems historically and practically more relevant 
to our economic past and future.
CHAPTER VII 
THE BLOCS TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
The process of technological invention and innovation 
seems to be the crucial factor in the maintenance of dynamic 
growth. William Fellner points out that the economy needs 
a balance of labor-saving and capital-using innovations in 
order that dynamic upward growth might continue. He makes 
this so-called improvement process the primary corollary to 
his theory of economic development. The absence of a frontier, 
a decrease in the rate of population increase, and the 
increase in the importance of depreciation reserves are made 
.insignificant factors if, in fact, the correct balance of 
capital-using and labor-saving innovations can be maintained. 
Pellner is confident that such a balance can be maintained 
providing that there is price flexibility, effective monetary 
policy, a form of workable competition (which is implicitly 
assumed, but not explicitly stated), and sufficient mobility 
of resources.
Pellner is perhaps correct in his optimism concerning 
the technology in a more or less flexible and competitive 
economy. He may not be correct, however, in an era where
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oligopoly and administered pricing is the general policy of 
the day. It may very well be true that more rapid obsolescence 
of capital goods might stimulate investment. For example,
Robert Eisner contends that the decrease in longevity from 
twenty-five to twenty years would increase the demand for 
replacement in relation to total output.^ This, however, is 
true only so long as obsolescence continues to grow shorter.
The accelerator would have an adverse effect upon the economy 
when the decrease in longevity began to be lessened. Thus, 
Eisner must assume a continued lessening of the life of capital 
without limit.
Also however we enter into the problem of whether
technology is widely shared. If technology becomes a means
of forcing competitors out of the market, gains in one
area could be offset by bankruptcies elsewhere. In its
investigation of patents, the Temporary National Economic
Committee found that
Ours has become a machine economy, and the advance of 
all the sciences has been enlisted in the service of 
the making of wares. It is today hard to think of a 
trade whose operation does not rest upon an intricate 
and dynamic technology. Whatever an industry, a legal 
right to enter is of little avail unless the adventurer 
has access to the industrial art.2
^Robert Eisner, "Technological Change and Aggregate 
Demand," American Economic Review, Vol. 46 (March, 1956), p. 100.
^Temporary National Economic Committee, Patents and 
Free Enterprise, Monograph 31 (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 194l), p. I58.
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In a society in which knowledge accumulates slowly and 
inventions are technical events, patents stand out sharply 
as exceptions to the general rule and leave the fund of 
accumulated knowledge little disturbed. In a highly 
dynamic society in which productive process is subject to 
rapid obsolescence and "improvements are matters of 
conscious design, such private claims may blanket the 
whole of technology.3
All of this leaves its impress upon the pattern of free 
enterprise. In industry after industry access to the 
common body of knowledge is not enough. An improvement 
reduces cost, improves quality, produces a new ware, 
adds a smart wrinkle— and puts at a competitive 
disadvantage all who do not have access to it. An 
industrial art is made the creature of conscious 
development; before an innovation becomes common property, 
another follows and the art is kept blocked off. It is 
beyond the reach of all who are within, or would enter, 
the trade, save upon terms dictated by a privileged 
competitor. An exclusive right to a step in a process 
thus becomes a monopoly of a whole technology.^
Thus, even if technology is increasing in an industry,
this may not aid the economy, but rather lead to further 
concentration in the hands of a few at a significant cost 
to the many.
John Jewkes casts serious doubt upon the usefulness 
of large-firm research organizations for the development and 
adoption of technological improvements. He points out that 
during the nineteenth century most inventions came from 
persons with little scientific training and simple laboratory 
apparatus.^  Judging from history, Jewkes maintains that
3lbid., p. 159.
4lbid., p. 161.
5john Jewkes, "The Sources of Invention," The Freeman 
(April, 1958), p. 57.
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crucial inventions have no prejudice concerning the time of 
their arrival and, hence, there is no pattern or cycle of 
inventions,^ Invention, he believes, seems to need duplication, 
waste and untidiness that would be unthinkable to 
administrative planners which makes research institutions 
impractical.' He agrees with Einstein, whom he quotes:
"I am a horse for a single harness and not cut out for landau
Q
or teamwork." This fits Jewkes' contention that any
orgajiization is as strong as its weakest mind and that the 
single mind is the most efficient organization.9 Indeed, he 
fears that organizations might even stifle inventive genius.
For proof of this, he points to the dearth of inventions coming 
from teams in both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Even where teamwork has developed something of value, it has 
usually been based on the previous works of a single person 
(radio, recording, catalytic cracking, titinium and plastic) 
or of a single firm (continuous hot stip rolling of steel, 
Terylene and D.D.T.).^^ Large firms have given us such things 
as Nylon, Freon and Tetraethyl lead.^^
In studying the twentieth century Jewkes still
^Ibid.
?Ibid.
Bibid., p. 54.
9lbid., p. 55. 
lOlbid., p. 49.
' lllbid., p. 46.
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maintains the usefulness of Individual research as compared 
to institutionalized research. He finds that out of sixty 
Inventions studied, over one-half were the result of pioneer 
work carried out by Individuals with limited r e s o u r c e s . Thus, 
there seems to be a strong case against Institutionalized 
research for the purpose of bringing forth Inventions due to 
historical lessons and the Incompatibility between 
administrators and Inventors. Any further attempt to 
Institutionalize Inventions or technological research might 
conceivably reduce the number of Inventions forthcoming. This 
might reduce the effectiveness of technology as a force In 
dynamic upward growth and bring about an eventual stagnation 
of the economy as the burdens of Institutional planning and 
administrative restrictions rob the Inventor of his essential 
characteristics that make him "a horse for a single harness."
Gordon Bloom Investigates the problem of technological 
progress In relation to wage pressure and Institutional 
hindrances Inherent In unlon-management relations and the 
purpose for which management carries on research. Bloom 
works within the framework of a multi-product plant and 
competition based not on price and cost differentials but 
upon product or quality differentiation. He does this by 
attempting to find some correlation between unlon-wage 
pressure and technological advance.
p. 49.
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Bloom points out that wage increases may affect the 
volume of expenditures, Influence the nature of research, 
affect the proportion of exploitable discoveries, or change 
the average gestation period of I n v e n t i o n s . H e  points out, 
however, that expenditures on research have Increased since 
1920, whereas wage pressures have Increased only since the 
nineteen thirties.Also, his survey of fifty directors of 
corporations seems to Indicate little correlation between 
wage pressure and expenditures for research or exploitable 
Ideas coming from r e s e a r c h . H e  finds that most research Is 
carried on for the purpose of product differentiation and 
Improvement or for the development of new products Instead 
of for cost-reductlon.^^ Thus, It appears doubtful that wage 
pressure has much Influence on expenditures or the amount of 
profitable suggestions. It also seems to confirm the further 
proposition (discussed earlier In Chapter III) that the 
market structure Is essentially an oligopolistic one which 
makes possible the hindrance of technological change. Bloom 
thinks that research expenditures are allocated on some basis 
of percentage to sales or by using the budgets of other
l^Gordon F. Bloom, "Wage Pressure and Technological 
Change," The American Economic Review, Vol. 4l (September, 
1951), p .“o t :
l^ibid., p. 607.
l^ibld.
l^ ibld.
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companies as guideposts for research policies.Apparently,
the idea comes first and the allocation of money comes 
18later. It seems that research expenditures are more closely
correlated with business cycles pressures than wage pressures.
Bloom does admit, however, that in a market structure
which competes by product improvement, wage pressures could
20increase the rapidity of product differentiation. This 
seems to be rather doubtful due to the fact that the demand 
curve of many basic oligopolies is inelastic which makes 
research expenditures less effective as a means of maintaining 
profits than the method of price leadership. Also, when 
considering an imperfect market structure, it must be 
remembered that unions themselves have an effect on the amount 
of labor-saving improvements put into effect. Since labor- 
saving improvements decrease the number of needed workers, 
this displaces labor. This the unions do not want and will_ 
attempt to stop. Thus, union rules and regulations may be
orientated towards blocking the introduction of technological
21change.
Prom the above, it may be concluded that there is 
little correlation between union-wage pressure and cost-saving
ITlbid., p. 610. 
iGlbid.
19lbid., p. 611.
20lbid., p. 612.
21lbid., p. 617.
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research. Also, there seems to be a possibility that there 
is no direct relationship between wage pressure and product 
improvement because of the nature of the oligopolistic market 
structure and the demand curve facing many oligopolists.
Finally, the growth of union pressures to maintain employment 
may tend to block technological improvements and, thus, 
break down and make ineffective any correlation that might 
otherwise exist. Thus, due to the nature of the market 
structure and the present means of competition, the product 
demand curve and the attitude of unions towards labor-saving 
technological improvements, labor-wage pressure may have no 
effect upon research expenditures or the number of profitable 
improvements. There may, indeed, be an adverse effect due 
to a combination of the union and oligopolistic market 
structure realities. Thus, institutional blocs to technological 
change may develop.
A study of blocs to technology must, however, consider 
the analysis of Thorstein Veblen. He believed that the course 
of development of capitalism would lead to a dominance of 
financiers instead of the owners of industry. This would 
tend to stagnate the economy because the financiers will not 
be interested in output but rather in financial matters.
Indeed,
. . .  as fast as commercial considerations, considerations 
of investment, come to rule industry, the investors' 
interest comes also to exercise an inhibitory surveillance 
over technological efficiency, both by the well-known 
channel of limiting the output and holding up the price
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to what the traffic will bear,— that is what it will 
bear in the pecuniary sense of yielding the largest net 
gain to the businessmen in interest— and also by the 
less notorious reluctance of investors and business 
concerns to replace obsolete methods and plant with new 
and more efficient equipment.^2
. . . from the standpoint of the community at large and 
its material interest, the out-of-date equipment and 
organisation should profitably be discarded— "Junked" 
as the colloquial phrase has it— sind the later
contrivances substituted throughout; but it is the
discretion of the businessmen that necessarily decides 
these questions, and the whole proposition has a different 
value as seen in the light of the competitive pecuniary 
interests of the businessmen in control.23
Veblen, thus, places a great deal of emphasis upon
the growth of financial dominance over business affairs.
He refers to this concept as the " . . .  restraining dead hand
of their past achievement. . . . On the basis of this, he
concludes that an advanced industrial country has economic
disadvantages in relation to a newly industrialized country.
It will also be pointed out below that this concept might well
contribute to stagnation. Veblen looks at the United States
economy and concludes that:
American business is eminently of a financial character, 
Eind the traffic of these financiers runs within the 
closed circuit of money-market strategy, with any 
industrial effects of this financial management coming 
in as incidentals. The controlling incentives are those 
of the market for securities, not those of the output of
goods; and the final decision vests in the investment
banker, not in the engineering staff of the manager of
^^Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial 
Revolution (London: MacMillan Company, 1$15J, p. 30.
23lbid., p. 126f.
Z^ibid., p. 128.
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the works. The discretionary direction of affairs has 
in effect passed into the hands of these financiering 
houses, whose ostensible relation to the industrial 
concerns is that of underwirters only. While these 
financiers exercise the discretion, they have no 
responsibility for the conduct of the industries dependent 
on their discretion.^5
It could be argued, however, that many large 
industries or corporations have, perhaps, escaped the hands 
of the banker except when they wish to issue new securities.
As was found earlier in the testimony of Alfred Sloan, many 
corporations of great size have depreciation reserves of 
sufficient size to escape the money-market even for new 
investment. The spread of depreciation practices may increase 
this tendency into other industries and even into small 
business. Thus, for large-scale business, the banker may 
be divorced from investment decision. This is not due 
primarily to the fact that business investment decisions are 
held back by union pressures or by the conservatism of 
financiers. Indeed, it is because of the very nature of 
large-scale industrial enterprise itself. Thus, we may be 
approaching a period of built-in-stagnation.
Marvin Frankel amplifies the economic theory of 
Veblen concerning " . . .  what is now in a degree an obsolete 
state of the industrial arts. . . According to Frankel:
25lbid., p. 321f.
zGibid., p. 127.
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The relevant hypothesis can be stated as follows: As an
industry (or industrial economy) grows and adapts to 
changing and increasingly complex production methods, 
interconnectionsj more or less rigid, develop among its 
technological components— among machines, plant, 
transport network and raw material supplies— that make 
increasingly difficult the introduction into the system 
of new, cost-saving changes.^7
In such a theory, there are three problems. The first 
is that of undepreciated costs and future outlays. The 
second problem is that of the interconnections of the 
production process. The third problem is the pattern of 
ownership between the various phases of production from raw 
materials to eventual sales. These can all lead to a hindrance 
of technology.
The first two problems can be handled together and 
will be the main ones dealt with. If undepreciated machinery 
is to be written-off to adopt the new method, the new method 
will only be adopted if total profit (the excess of total 
revenue over total cost) is greater than the total revenue
pO
less future costs of the old method. This is, of course, 
common sense. The problem is whether or not new methods 
can meet the test of increasing profits after the loss from 
the writing-off of undepreciated capital is deducted. This 
involves a close consideration of the production process in
^^Marvin Frankel, "Obsolescence and Technological 
Change," American Economic Review, Vol. 45 (June, 1955), 
p. 297.
28lbid., p. 299.
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an advanced Industrial economy.
The production process is both interrelated and
pQ
complex. ^ Therefore, a technological improvement must not
only prove profitable at one state, but must offset costs of
adapting the other stages to the improvement in the one
stage. It may well be, for example, that an improvement in
one process or step in production may make changes necessary
in preceding and subsequent steps— the type of quality of
the raw material, labor and ma n a g e m e n t . O n  the other hand,
if ownership is fragmented throughout the stages, it may be
impossible to consider such a technological improvement that
relates to several production stages.3^ Thus,
Confronted with this situation, the enterprise would 
compare the new and old methods not on a component or 
machine basis but on an entire plant basis since only by 
replacing existing plant in toto could it utilize the 
new machine. Even if, on the machine basis, profits 
from the new method exceeded revenue less future cost 
of the old method, comparison on an entire plant basis 
probably would find profits from the new method below 
revenue less future costs of the old method; rarely 
would the gains resulting from improvements in a single 
machine suffice to warrant immediate replacement of the 
entire plant.32
This would be especially difficult if the obsolescent period
29ibid., p. 301.
30lbid., p. 309.
31jbid., p. 310.
32ibid., p. 302.
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of the various stages differed one from another.33 The use of 
an old method, then, would continue until all stages were 
depreciated. This would involve the round-about process of 
putting-off the introduction of technology.3^ Therefore, 
development and upward dynamic growth would be stopped due to 
the complexities of large-scale enterprise.
A concept of stagnation is then contained in the process 
of growth of large-scale business enterprises and concentration. 
Research is carried on for product differentiation and can 
even be limited in its effectiveness by the realities of price 
leadership. Price leadership helps to make product research 
that might be otherwise correlated with wage pressure 
unimportant because of the presence of an inelastic demand 
curve. Because of the phenomena of inelastic demand, the 
industry need not spend so much time getting ahead cost- 
reduction wise. They may simply increase prices. The extent 
of the lessening of technological change or improvement caused 
by this phenomena, of course, cannot be known without 
clairvoyance. On the other hand, union restrictions of 
technological innovations may lessen growth. On top of this, 
the restraints manifested in the complex interrelationships 
of production and obsolescence make the improvement process 
of Fellner doubtful and seems to indicate a built-in type 
of stagnation. Essentially, built-in-stagnation involves the
33ibid.
3^Ibid.
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development of what Frankel calls a "profit-gap." This gap 
is the difference between the profits required when inter­
relatedness is dominant in industrial enterprises and the 
required profits when there is no interrelatedness.35 The 
fact that when interrelations develop, the cost-saving element 
of the innovation must cover not only the losses incurred in 
scrapping one machine, but also, the cost of scrapping or 
adapting machines, raw materials, labor or management in other 
stages of production. Such a burden may prove too much for any 
technological innovation. Thus, the hindrances to technological 
progress and dynamic upward growth are built into the economy 
because of the size and complexities of modern industry.
The problem of undepreciated machinery and the problem 
of whether total profit is greater than the total revenue less 
the future costs of the old method can be seen quite easily.
The essential, basic and strategic industries of our economy 
are interrelated, large-scale industries. Also, they are to 
a greater or lesser degree oligopolistic market structures.
Since they are interrelated, they have various stages in the 
process of production. Each stage follows the preceding stage 
and prepares the product for the subsequent stage. The 
following illustrates such an industry (or firm).
A — ^ B — > C — * D . . . n
35ibid., p. 307.
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That is A starts the manufaotur1ng process going and feeds 
the product to B which in turn chsuiges or adds to the 
product and sends said product to C. Prom C the product goes 
to D and from D it goes down the production line until the 
process of production is completed and the consumer has 
the product. This implies, of course, that part of the 
production process may involve packaging, advertising and 
distributing of the product as well as its actual manufacture.
Two things need to be borne in mind. First, A feeds 
B. Thus B is determined by A. Next B feeds C which means 
that C is determined by B which in turn is determined by A. 
Therefore, we have
B = f(A)
C = f(A + B)
D = f(A + B + C)
n = f(A + B + C + D .  . . n - l)
This says that each stage in the process of production is 
dependent upon the preceding stages of production. Thus, 
a change in preceding stages of production necessitates a 
change in all stages of production. Also, a change in a 
subsequent stage of production necessitates changes in 
preceding stages of production. This is because of the second 
problem that must be borne in mind, namely, that any change 
in any stage of the production process changes the quality 
of the product or the amount of the product produced in any 
time period. If this be the case, preceding stages may have
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to prepare the product differently or faster and subsequent 
stages will also have to be changed so as to handle the 
product differently or-faster. The greater and more Important 
the technique change or the change In the step In the process 
of production. It follows that the greater will be the need 
for (and cost of) changes elsewhere.
Again, however, the model may be referred to for 
an analysis of the depreciation problem. The structure of 
the Industry (or firm) Is as follows:
A — — )^ C — »D . . . n 
Each of the stages of the process of production (or more 
exactly the machines Involved In each of the stages of 
production) are being depreciated. Two problems Immediately 
arise. First, the life of the machines vary or are likely 
to vary. Second, the machines may not have been Installed 
at the same time which means that they probably will not be 
completely depreciated at the same time. Thus, there Is a 
strong llkllhood that the machines will not depreciate at 
the same time.
The effect of this on Innovation can be seen If It 
Is assumed that A Is completely depreciated and can be 
replaced. However, A ' enters to represent a new technique 
or a new type of machine which can replace A and lower the 
cost of production of that stage In the process of production. 
Thus, we have
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A —* B — >C — »D . . . n
T
A'
The question arises as to whether A' can be innovated or as 
to whether A should be replaced with an old type machine—  
another A which can be symbolized by the expression Ag. An 
analysis of depreciation answers this significant question.
A is completely depreciated, at this time. B, C, D, 
etc., however, may not yet be completely depreciated. B 
may be more completely depreciated than C, etc., or vice 
versa. Since,the other machines in the subsequent stages of 
the process of production are not depreciated. A* cannot yet 
be innovated. A' cannot be innovated because if it were it 
would change in some way the quality or quantity of the 
product at this point which would necessitate changes in 
or replacement of subsequent machines. Since these machines 
are not yet depreciated, they will not be changed 
substantially, and will not be replaced by machines of another 
type. If, however, the innovation came at a point near the 
end of the production process (n - 1') it might then be 
innovated since only one subsequent state exists (n).
N - 1' would not be innovated however, if it required 
changes not only in the subsequent stage, but also in 
preceding stages. The managers would decide (as they did in 
the case of A') to replace the old, depreciated machine with 
a similar machine until the other stages of production were 
not completely depreciated. Since, however, complete
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depreciation of the other machines will not coincide with 
each other (particularly since we have replaced old A with 
a new Ag) B will depreciate before Ag is depreciated and 
also possibly C. Thus, even though B may be now depreciated 
and C may be more completely depreciated than before. A' 
will not yet be innovated because Ag is Just beginning to be 
depreciated. The vicious cycle continues. A' will never 
be innovated unless the savings compensate for the expense of 
scrapping the undepreciated machinery from B through n.
Frankel believes that A' will be innovated if it 
(the new method) brings about a total profit (the excess of 
total revenue over total cost) that is greater than the 
total revenue less the future costs of the old method of 
production. This means that the savings caused by the 
innovation of A ' (the lower costs of production at this 
stage in the process of production) will have to more than 
compensate for losses required if other stages yet undepreciated 
are to be scrapped or greatly modified. It seems unlikely 
that such will be the case. Indeed, it seems likely that 
the savings in production costs caused by innovation of A* 
would have to compensate more than Just a little for the cost 
of scrapping or modifying B . . . n. In other words, the 
total profit from innovations would have to be substantial.
This is due to two factors discussed previously.
36Ibid., p. 299.
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First, there Is the problem of an oligopolistic 
market structure. Any basic reduction in the cost of production 
that would have a substantial effect upon the economy as a 
whole would have to come in a large, basic and strategic 
industry which is tied in with other industries. The iron and 
steel industry, for example, more or less sets a basis for not 
only the price of steel, but also the price of automobiles, 
trucks, highways, construction of buildings or any other 
product or products that use steel-including the machinery 
itself. This industry has a great deal of imperfect competition 
involved in it and can generally be described as an oligopoly. 
Price leadership is also obvious in this industry,3? and 
price increases have been greater than wage increases.
These factors seem to indicate the presence of oligopoly.
Most other large, interrelated and strategic industries also 
have in them a great deal of imperfect competition. Since they 
do have a market structure which is non-competitive, there is 
no reason to believe that these companies will innovate even 
if the total profit after innovation is greater than total 
revenue less future costs of the old method. The companies
37"united States Steel Dictates Prices that Are Up—
But Not Running Away," Business Week (August 11, 195^), 
pp. 24-25. Also refer to "Big Steel Gains in the Field," 
Business Week (May 3, 1958), p. 34, as well as "Pinning 
Inflation on Steel," Business Week (November l4, 1959), p. l4.
38Herman Roseman, "The Price of Peace in Steel,"
The Reporter (February 6, i960), p. 14.
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or the industries would not have to because they can depend on 
others not doing so. Indeed, with patent-shelving this might 
be guarajiteed. Also, even if they did innovate they might not 
decrease the price to pass the savings onto the consumers which 
would result in the reduction of the usual stimulating effects
■30
of a new innovation. If Steindl's observations are correct,
probably the innovation would not come about because of the
fear of greater than desired excess capacity in that
The difference in the level of investment activity in 
different stages of the secular development can thus be 
explained in terms of an endogeneous theory, taking 
account of well-known structural changes such as the 
development of monopoly. From the above discussion it 
appears likely that utilisation operates as an adverse 
influence on investment in the period of economic maturity 
in contract to earlier periods, when it did not do
Second, Hamberg points out that business bureaucracy
fears dipping into the liquid assets of the firm and,
furthermore, does not escape the tendency to maintain the
4lstatus quo and the desire for security. Also, patent-
shelving is an important tool in inhibiting the innovation of 
42technology. Reddaway also believes that the market structure
39The reader is referred to Joseph Schumpeter, The 
Theory of Economic Development.
40j. steindl. Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ly$2), p. l37. TRe
reader may also refer to Chapter III of this dissertation.
Hamberg, Economic Growth and Stability (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1956), p. 128. The reader may also 
refer to Chapter III for a more complete analysis and review 
of Hamberg.
42lbid., p. 122.
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can Inhibit innovation. He states that the dominant firm 
could prevent the introduction of the technique (after they 
had prevented the entrance of new firms) because of the fact 
that they do not want to destroy present capital values and 
need not fear the adoption of the technique by other 
"competitors" who are also interested in maintaining present 
capital v a l u e s . Thus, even if A' meets the total profit 
test of Frankel, it seems that there still may be blocs to 
its innovation. Even if A' were innovated, however, there 
still remains a very basic problem; and this is the problem 
of internal financing and the accumulation of savings in the 
upper income groups outside of the corporation.
The innovation of A' could most likely be paid for by 
internal funds. The "retained earnings," "undistributed 
profits" and the spread of depreciation charges mean that the 
large corporations do not have to go to the banking system or 
to the securities market for investment funds. Dr. Oscar 
Altman of the Securities Exchange Commission stated before 
the Temporary National Economic Committee that from 1923-1929 
(a period of boom), seventy-five percent of all fixed capital 
requirements were internally fi n a nc e d. T hi s  is because
B. Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining 
Population (London: George Allen and Ünwin, Ltd., 1939),
p. 110. The reader is referred to Chapter III for a more 
complete analysis or review of Reddaway.
^^George Terborgh, The Bogey of Economic Maturity 
(Chicago: Machinery and Aiiiea Prooucts institute, 1945),
p. 28.
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. . . depreciation allowances are sufficient not only to 
maintain the productive capacity of industry but to 
increase it substantially . . . because the accruals 
over the life of the machine will typically replace it 
with a machine of higher capacity and in consequence, 
demand for individual savings will appear only when the 
expansion of total productive capacity is rapid— too 
rapid to be covered by depreciation allowances.^5
Thus, even if A' is innovated, it will not absorb individual
savings or institutional savings which might mean an increase
in the relative propensity to save— or would at least
increase savings and at the same time destroy the main source
of investment demand for private savings— the need to innovate
with outside funds. This may be especially true in light of
Hansen's observation that accounting and depreciation methods
are spreading.Therefore, even if A' is innovated, the
problem of the accumulation of savings still persists. Without
the historical demand from investors, this seems to be a
tendency leading eventually to stagnation.
Even though the innovation of A ' would not solve the 
problems of savings, it is hardly unlikely that A ' will be 
innovated. The interrelated process of the stages of 
production present a problem of depreciation. The problem of 
depreciation makes it necessary for the total profit from the 
new technique to exceed the total revenue less total costs 
of the old method. This means that the savings of innovating
45ibid., p. 29.
^^Alvin Hansen, "Some Notes on Terborgh, The Bogey of 
Economic Maturity," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 28 
(August, 1946), p. 1'61
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A ' must more than cover the losses involved in modifying 
or scrapping B . . . n. Also, the oligopolistic market 
structure, the rise of business bureaucracy, patent-shelving, 
the fear of excess capacity, the desire for the status quo 
and the lack of the fear of competition all combine to make 
it very unlikely that A' will be innovated even if it does 
cover the costs of modifying or scrapping B . . . n. Thus, 
the adoption of technology and the absorption of savings by 
any possible adoption of technology are no longer 
significantly dynamic factors in the American economy. Such 
a reality leads one directly into the potentiality of economic 
stagnation. The result is unemployment and possible economic, 
political and social collapse.
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
A critical analysis of the growth theories of Alvin H. 
Hansen and William J. Pellner reveals the presence of a basic 
split between economists with respect to the secular direction 
of economic development. Alvin Hansen maintains that a 
laissez faire capitalistic system would have strong propensities 
to stagnate. William Fellner, on the other hand, maintains 
that such an economic system would have an inherent tendency 
towards dynamic, upward growth. This Pellner maintains is 
due to the proper, long-run orientation of technology towards 
a proper balance of labor-saving and capital-using innovations. 
Pellner maintains this is possible (and has historically 
been forthcoming) when there is the proper type of monetary 
policy and the mobility of the various factors of production. 
Pellner maintains that the monetary policy and mobility 
corollaries are fulfilled and, thus, it is possible for the 
technological corollary to be fulfilled. Thus, dynamic, upward 
growth is possible.
Pellner is of course assuming an economy that 
approximates the competitive model. Such a model is in theory
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sufficiently influenced by monetary policy and also has a 
relatively large amount of mobility of resources. It has 
not been the purpose of this dissertation to analyze monetary 
policy. The dissertation has, however, indirectly euialyzed 
the mobility corollary of Fellner's thesis. If the mobility 
corollary is not present, dynamic, upward growth would not 
take place because even with the development of technology 
of the proper type, there would not be the innovation of this 
technology. Without the innovation of technology, economic 
growth and progress cannot be maintained.
The dissertation has used the analysis of several 
persons in relation to this dual problem of mobility and 
technology. J. Steindl, for example, analyzed the effect of 
excess capacity in relation to economic growth. He maintains 
that:
The inelasticity of gross profit margins in an economy 
dominated by monopoly will thus reinforce any given fall 
in the rate of growth of capital. But, as pointed out 
earlier on, the effects of monopoly will not only be to
make profit more rigid, it will be to raise them and
moreover, entrepreneurs will have a greater fear of
excess capacity under a regime of monopoly. For both of
these reasons there will be a tendency for the rate of 
growth to fall. Utilisation will be lower than it was 
before monopoly became dominant, and, moreover, the 
investment attributable to the influence of any given 
level of utilisation will be lower owing to the fear of 
excess capacity.^
Thus, there is a strong reason to believe that mobility
Steindl, Maturity ^ d  Stagnation in American 
Capitalism (London: Oxford University Institute of Statistics,
1952), p. 137.
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may be less relevant than Pellner believes. Hamberg would
add to this inhibitory factor the point that business bureaucracy
fears dipping into the liquid assets of the firm and does not
escape from the bureaucratic tendency of desiring to maintain 
2
the status quo. W. B. Reddaway would maintain that a
dominant firm could prevent the adaption of technology (after
it had prevented the entrance of new firms) because of the
fact that it did not want to destroy present capital values
and need not fear the adaption of the technique by other
"competitors" who may also be interested in maintaining present
capital values.3
It is Marvin Frenkel, however, who takes the giant
firm itself and analyses the effect of the interrelated
process of production.
The relevant hypothesis can be stated as follows: As an
industry (or industrial economy) grows and adapts to 
changing and increasingly complex production methods, 
interconnections, more or less rigid, develop among its 
technological components— among machines, plant, transport 
network, and raw materials supplies— that make increasingly 
difficult the introduction into the system of new, cost- 
saving changes.4
Confronted with this situation, the enterprise would 
compare the new and old methods not on a component or a
^D. Hamberg, Economic Growth and Instability (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 195&), p. l28.
B. Reddaway, The Economics of a Declining 
Population (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1939),
p. 110.
^Marvin Prankel, "Obsolescence and Technological 
Change," American Economic Review, Vol. 45 (June, 1955), 
p. 297.
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machine basis but on an entire plant basis since only by 
replacing existing plant In toto could It utilize the new 
machine. Even If, on the machine basis, profits from the 
new method exceeded revenue less future costs of the old 
method, comparison on an entire plant basis probably would 
find profits from the new method below revenue less 
future costs of the old method: rarely would the gains
resulting from Improvements In a single machine suffice 
to warrant Immediate replacement of the entire plant.5
Indeed, If the analysis of Steindl In relation to the 
Inhibitory effects of excess capacity were added to Prankel 
along with the results of business bureaucracy and the 
presence of a dominant firm as analyzed by Hamberg and Reddaway 
respectively, the Innovation of technology may seem to be 
Inhibited by several factors. Thus, there are strong doubts 
as to whether or not technology will be Innovated even If It 
Is forthcoming. The effect of any one of the factors discussed 
above and especially the accumulative effect of such factors 
could bloc technology. The blocking of Innovation destroys 
a primary factor leading to secular, dynamic upward growth.
If technology Is blocked, the amount of capital funds 
accumulating might not be able to find profitable Investment 
outlets. This Introduces once again the probability of the 
diminishing returns to capital. If technological Improvements 
and the offsets to the diminishing returns to capital were to 
be blocked or are blocked by these Institutional factors, the 
concept of the secular stagnation of the capitalistic 
economic system may well be relevant.
5lbld., p. 302.
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